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Unilateralism of the State: ‘Invisible Government’ at Work

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State and Civil Society in Pakistan

Part of the book series: St Antony’s Series ((STANTS))

Abstract

The symbiotic relationship between state and civil society in Pakistan is obvious in vital areas such as the civil liberties of women, religious minorities, political activists, dissenters, the judiciary, independent intellectuals and journalists. Whereas the narrowly based regimes of so-called strong men coopted intermediaries from the regional feudal families or willing religious elements from the ulama and pirs, vast sections of civil society remained marginalised. Under General Zia ul-Haq, in particular, Pakistan suffered the most suffocating years of its existence and, in the wake of depoliticisation, regimented ideas like chaadar and chardiwari denoted women’s place in the home, democracy was portrayed as anathema to Islam and the media was made use of to silence the opposition. A demagogic emphasis on religion promoted obscurantism and unleashed sectarian violence which jeopardised the polity. Mainstream politics held at bay serious dilemmas like ethnic violence, sectarian feuds, drug addiction and polarisation on university campuses; social banditry became the order of the day.

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Notes

  1. Zia’s policies were eulogised in the official media which was controlled by Mujibur Rehman, an active military general and close Punjabi confidant of Zia. Like General Sher Ali, the information minister under General Yahya Khan, General Mujib masterminded a persistent campaign in favour of Zia. Anti-Bhutto forces were coopted and, through a string of right-wing protagonists, Zia was projected as the Islamic leader. Concurrently, the Afghan crisis proved equally helpful for the regime. Many conferences and semi nars were held on the nature of Islamisation and Zia’s strong East Punjab credentials worked to establish his authority over a shocked nation. Some went to the extent of finding his Punjabi Arain roots to prove that, true to the tradition of Mughal Emperor Aurengzeb, Zia was a frugal, unassuming but extremely religious and hard-working model Pakistani Muslim, unlike a partying, brash Dara Shikoh, personified by Z. A. Bhutto. For an interesting sociological extrapolation, see Akbar S. Ahmed, Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia, Karachi, 1986.

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  2. For further details, see Abbas Nasir, ‘Pakistan’s Intelligence Agencies: The Inside Story’, The Herald, January 1991.

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  3. This is not to suggest that it was only with General Zia ul-Haq that sycophancy and repression became the order of the day in Pakistan, since the process began soon after the death of the Quaid i-Azam in 1948. The politics of patronage at the behest of a growingly strong state anchored on the pillars of bureaucracy and the military ensured that efforts to empower the masses were unsuccessful. In the process, depoliticisation and irreverence towards Jinnah’s constitutionalism became the order of the day. ‘The palace conspiracies’ were epitomised under General Ayub Khan, whose regime set the pattern for future military regimes. Despite its liberal espousals, his regime remained elitist and monopolistic, with the field marshal assuming a supreme position. For an insider’s viewpoint, see Altaf Gauhar, Ayub Khan. Pakistan’s First Military Ruler, Lahore, 1993.

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  4. ‘Today he acts as Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s eyes and ears while the IB, under him, is said to run Pakistan’s invisible government. As a cabinet minister put it: “The Prime Minister takes key decisions not in the cabinet but somewhere else. That somewhere else is when he is closeted with the IB chief. Says a senior bureaucrat: “Imtiaz is the most important member of the Sharif’s mini kitchen cabinet. His influence is not limited to giving just advice; he plans the Prime Minister’s political moves and ensures their implementation”. He has been one of the most influential men in the history of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and was nick-named James Bond. He retired during the first tenure of Benazir Bhutto but was re-hired by her successor.’ See Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, ‘The Invisible Government’ in The Daily Jang (London), 31 October to 1 November 1992.

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  5. For the CIA, it was not the first time they had collaborated with another intelligence agency, but for the ISI it was certainly new. Bypassing the political facade under Junejo, the ISI’s cell on Afghanistan, headed by a brigadier, funnelled weapons into Afghanistan and operated as a conduit for the CIA in the region. The story has been brought to light recently by the brigadier himself. For details, see Brigadier (Retd) Mohammad Yusuf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap; Afghanistan’s Untold Story, London, 1992.

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  6. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987, London, 1987, p. 311.

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  7. For details, see Lawrence Lifschultz, ‘Islamabad was Conduit for Israeli Arms to Iran. The Contra Sideshow’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 December 1991.

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  8. For more details, see Brigadier (Retd) Mohammad Yusuf, Silent Soldier: The Man Behind the Afghan Jehad, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Shaheed, Lahore, 1991

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  9. Such views were clandestinely given out to PPP or pro-PPP parliamentarians to gain support for a no-confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto. She became aware of such attempts and pro-PPP sleuths in the IB began monitoring ISI officials like Brigadier Imtiaz and Major Aamer. Cassette recordings of their secret talks with the MNAs were released to the public by the PPP leaders but without much impact on the agencies themselves. For the transcripts, see Munir Ahmed, Pakistan Mein Intelligence Agencion Ka Siyasi Kirdar (The Political Role of Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan) (Urdu), Lahore, 1993, pp. 117–234.

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  10. For details, see Zahid Hussain and Hasan Mujtaba, ‘Crime and Polities’, Newsline (Karachi), August 1992.

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  11. See Tehmina Durrani, My Feudal Lord, Lahore, 1991, p. 146.

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  12. For details, see Ayesha Jalal, ‘State-Building in the Post-War World: Britain’s Colonial Legacy, American Futures and Pakistan’, in Sugata Bose (ed.), South Asia and World Capitalism, New Delhi, 1990, pp. 271–72.

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© 1997 Iftikhar H. Malik

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Malik, I.H. (1997). Unilateralism of the State: ‘Invisible Government’ at Work. In: State and Civil Society in Pakistan. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230376298_6

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