Abstract
Several governments have tested formal index-based insurance to build climate resilience among smallholder farmers. Yet, adoption of such programmes has generated concerns that insurance may crowd out long-established informal risk transfer arrangements. Understanding this phenomenon requires new analytic approaches that capture dynamics of human social behaviour when facing risky events. Here we develop a modelling framework, based on evolutionary game theory and empirical data from Nepal and Ethiopia, to demonstrate that insurance may introduce a new social dilemma in farmer risk management strategies. We find that while socially optimal risk management is achieved when all farmers pursue a combination of formal and informal risk transfer, a community of self-interested agents is unable to maintain this co-existence under rising climate risks. We find that a combination of prosocial preferences—moderate altruism and solidarity—helps farmers overcome these concerns and achieve the social optimum. In our model, behavioural interventions that cue such preferences can reduce farmer expected losses by 26% and save approximately 5% of community agricultural income through reduced premium subsidies under climate risk levels likely to emerge in the coming decades.
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Data availability
Data sources used to support this analysis include Chitwan Valley Family Study—Labour Outmigration, Agricultural Productivity and Food Security, Nepal (ICPSR 36755) (https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/DSDR/studies/36755/versions/V5); IBLI Borena Household Survey R1-4 Stata 13 data (https://data.ilri.org/portal/dataset/ibli-borena-r1/resource/41b75ad5-71cd-4d23-911c-dcce53bc68a7); and SPEI (https://spei.csic.es/database.html).
Code availability
The game theory model for this study was developed via Python 3 software and is available via a Zenodo repository at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.8347265.
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Acknowledgements
N.C.L. acknowledges financial and organizational support from the Center for Policy Research on Energy and the Environment at Princeton University and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, as well as financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (752-2020-077). M.W. acknowledges funding received from the Oxford Martin Programme on Systemic Resilience.
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N.C.L. and M.W. conceived of and developed an initial design for the study and drafted the initial manuscript. F.P.S., S.A.L., M.O. and E.U.W. proposed modifications incorporated in the final design. N.C.L. wrote the model code. N.C.L. and M.W. analysed model results. All authors contributed to drafting the final manuscript.
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Choquette-Levy, N., Wildemeersch, M., Santos, F.P. et al. Prosocial preferences improve climate risk management in subsistence farming communities. Nat Sustain 7, 282–293 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01272-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-024-01272-3