Abstract
We construct models of the endogenous formation of politicalgroups designed to capture some of the key features ofpolitical and social conflict. We draw on the `citizencandidate' approach and consider both instrumental andexpressive approaches to understanding group formation andconflict between groups. We argue that the inclusion ofexpressive elements into the analysis of political groupsprovides both new insights and a better fit with certainaspects of the realities of political conflict.
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Hamlin, A., Jennings, C. Group Formation and Political Conflict: Instrumental and Expressive Approaches. Public Choice 118, 413–435 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019908.98720.1e
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000019908.98720.1e