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Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands

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Abstract

This paper analyses the role of partisan politics in determiningthe local tax burden. Property taxes are the most important revenuesource which municipalities in the Netherlands can decide uponthemselves. Using a new data set on Dutch local property taxes in1996, it is concluded that municipalities with a council dominatedby left wing parties have a higher tax burden. We also find thatlarger coalitions have lower levels of taxation. Finally, taxexporting increases tax rates.

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Allers, M., de Haan, J. & Sterks, C. Partisan Influence on the Local Tax Burden in the Netherlands. Public Choice 106, 351–363 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005123208352

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