Skip to main content
Log in

Pluralism, Antirealism, and the Units of Selection

  • Published:
Acta Biotheoretica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In an important article, Kim Sterelny and Philip Kitcher (1988) challenge the common assumption that for any biological phenomenon requiring a selectionist explanation, it is possible to identify a uniquely correct account of the relevant selection process. They argue that selection events can be modeled in any of a number of different, equally correct ways. They call their view 'Pluralism,' and explicitly connect it with various antirealist positions in the philosophy of science. I critically evaluate Sterelny and Kitcher's Pluralism along with its attendant antirealist theses. In particular, I argue that there are serious problems with their pluralistic antirealism regarding units of selection. By correctly diagnosing these problems a more adequate position can be constructed. I defend such a position, which I designate Inclusive Hierarchical Monism, and show how it captures the important virtues of Sterelny and Kitcher's approach while avoiding its problems.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Brandon, R. and R. Burian (eds.) (1984). Genes, Organisms, and Populations: Controversies Over the Units of Selection. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buss, L. (1987). The Evolution of Individuality, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cassidy, J. (1981). Ambiguities and pragmatic factors in the units of selection controversy. Philosophy of Science 48: 95–111.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dawkins, R. (1982). The Extended Phenotype: The Gene as the Unit of Selection. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harper, J.L. (1977). Population Biology of Plants. London, Allen & Unwin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Janzen, D.H. (1977). What are dandelions and aphids? American Naturalist 111: 586–589.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kitcher, P., K. Sterelny and K. Waters (1990). The illusory riches of Sober's Monism. Journal of Philosophy 87: 158–161.

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith, J. (1987). How to model evolution. In: J. Dupré, ed., The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality, pp. 119–131. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober, E. (1984). The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus. Cambridge, MIT/Bradford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sober, E. and D.S. Wilson (1994). A critical review of philosophical work on the units of selection problem. Philosophy of Science 61: 534–555.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sterelny, K. and P. Kitcher (1988). The return of the gene. Journal of Philosophy 85: 339–361.

    Google Scholar 

  • Waters, K. (1991). Tempered realism about the force of selection. Philosophy of Science 58: 553–573.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, D.S. and S. Sober (1994). Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17: 585–654.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Shanahan, T. Pluralism, Antirealism, and the Units of Selection. Acta Biotheor 45, 117–126 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1000377821347

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1000377821347

Keywords

Navigation