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The Incarnation: a philosophical case for kenosis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2000

PETER FORREST
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of New England, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia

Abstract

As a preliminary, I shall clarify the kenotic position by arguing that a position which is often called kenotic is actually a quasi-kenotic version of the classical account, according to which Jesus had normal divine powers but chose not to exercise them. After this preliminary, I discuss three problems with the strict kenotic account. The first is that kenosis conflicts with the standard list of attributes considered essential to God. The second problem is posed by the Exaltation, namely the resumption by Jesus of normal divine powers after his life on Earth. Finally there is the problem of how it was possible for Jesus to be the same person as the pre-incarnate Word. My solutions to these problems constitute my defence of a strict kenotic account of the Incarnation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

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