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Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 June 2020

Sanford C. Goldberg
Sanford C. Goldberg*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
*
Email: s-goldberg@northwestern.edu
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that epistemically normative claims regarding what one is permitted or required to believe (or to refrain from believing) are sometimes true in virtue of what we owe one another as social creatures. I do not here pursue a reduction of these epistemically normative claims to claims asserting one or another (ethical or social) interpersonal obligation, though I highlight some resources for those who would pursue such a reduction.

Keywords

epistemologysocial epistemologynormsobligationsreduction
Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 17 , Special Issue 3: Epistemic Norms as Social Norms Conference , September 2020 , pp. 364 - 383
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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