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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Sovietologists and Sinologists have found it extremely difficult to assess the position which the Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (DRV) occupies within the Communist bloc. Some have concluded that it is simply a satellite of Peking, basing their judgment upon its geographical position and the fact that the Vietnamese leaders closely followed the policies of the Chinese Communists, at least during the early years of the state's existence. Others have stated that the DRV is more closely bound to the Soviet Union than to China, and they quote extracts from the speeches of Vietnamese leaders to confirm this opinion. Still others maintain that the DRV enjoys a substantial measure of independence of both Russia and China and may, like Tito's Yugoslavia, break with the Communist bloc at some future date. They point out that the Vietnamese, like the Yugoslavs, won their own independence without the backing of the Russian or Chinese army. All of these conclusions are too facile and prove, if they prove anything at all, that their authors have not taken into account all the factors which have a bearing upon the events in the DRV. As in all Communist states, the formulation of policy is the responsibility of a few leaders, but these men, whatever their personal political inclinations, are restricted in their choice of policy by the circumstances in which they find themselves.
1 This campaign was organised early in 1955, when the streets of cities, towns and villages were hung with slogans, while the press and radio were daily filled with reminders of this historic friendship.
2 It is worth citing the remaries of Gerard Tongas on this subject: “Les statistiques de toutes sortes foisonnent et sont abondamment diffusées, car elles servent à alimenter la propagande. Or, precisement, comme elles ne servent qu'à cela, elles n'ont absolument aucune valeur.
“Les chiffres de production donnés ne sont pas simplement truques, les pourcentages ne sont pas simplement augmentés, les uns et les autres sont la plupart du temps inventés de toutes pièces, et avec quelle ardeur!”
Tongas, G., L'Enfer Communiste au Nord Viet-Nâm (Paris: NED, 1961), p. 213.Google Scholar
3 Cf. Wetz, Jean in Le Monde, 07 13, 1954Google Scholar; Jacques Fauvet in ibid., July 23, 1954; Manchester Guardian, 07 23, 1954, and many others.Google Scholar
4 Hie quarrel became public knowledge early in 1950, when Truong Chinh accused Giap of insecurity in his choice of personnel. It was further aggravated towards the end of that year when Truong Chinh accumulated enough evidence to secure the execution of Tran Chi Chau, chief of Giap's military supply service.
5 Viet Nam Cach Menh Thanh Nien Dong Chi Hoi, founded by Ho Chi Minh at Canton in June 1925. For further information see Gouvernement générale de l'Indochine, Direction des affaires politiques et de la sureté générale; Contribution à l'histoire des mouvements politiques de l'Indochine française, Vol. 4 (Hanoi: 1933).Google Scholar
6 In 1950 this quarrel led to a virtual split in the Communist leadership of South Vietnam. This was resolved in 1951 when Le Duan was recalled to North Vietnam and Le Duc Tho was left to manage South Vietnam.
7 See Ho Chi Minn's open letter of August 18, 1956, published by the DRV press and radio.
8 There were numerous indications between 1956 and 1960 that it was Le Duan, not Ho Chi Minh, who performed the duties of Secretary-General of the Party, and these would seem to have been confirmed by Le Duan's official appointment to the post of First Secretary in September 1960.
9 See “North Vietnam's Party Congress” by the present author in The China Quarterly, 10–12, 1960.Google Scholar
