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Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Michael B. Yahuda
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Extract

Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideology in theory postulate objectives (both long and short term) and dictate both the organisational means and action programmes necessary to achieve them. Theory and practice should therefore be integrated into a coherent dynamic whole. Or, in other terms, the aspirational and operational aspects of policy should pursue the same ends. The object of this article is to examine the inter-relationship of the aspirational and operational aspects of Maoist foreign policy. The first is concerned with the future development of world revolution and China's relationship to it. But it is also related to the realisation of China's long-term goals. The second deals with the shrinking scope currently allocated in Peking to normalised interstate relations. But it is also concerned with China's active promotion and support of guerrilla movements in many of the states on her periphery.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 36 , December 1968 , pp. 93 - 113
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1968

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References

1 For slightly different views on the role of ideology see Schurmann, H. F., Ideology and Organisation in Communist China: University of California Press, 1966, especially p. 18et seq. andGoogle ScholarBrzezinski, Z. K., The Soviet Bloc: Praeger, 1965Google Scholar.

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3 See Neuhauser, Charles, “The Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s,” The China Quarterly, No. 32 (10–12 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See “On Khrushchev's Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World,” Ninth Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of People's Daily and Red Flag, 14 July 1964, Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 29, 17 07 1964Google Scholar. For an exceUent analysis see Barnett, A. Doak, China After Mao: Princeton 1967, pp. 49–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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12 Communiqué of the 11th Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, 12 August 1966, Peking Review, 19 August 1966.

13 21 January 1964.

14 New York Times, 21 February 1964.

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21 Quoted by Hughes, Richard, Sunday Times, 22 02 1964Google Scholar.

22 Ibid. See also NCN A Peking, 27 January 1964 “Chairman Mao' s Talk with Japaese Guests.”

23 New York Times, 21 February 1964. The People's Daily of 16 October 1967 attributed this view to Liu Shao-ch'i without stating when or where it had been said.

24 See Eckstein, A., “Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade,” New York, McGraw Hill, 1966Google Scholar.

25 Halpern, E., ed.: “Policies Towards China,” McGraw Hill, 1965Google Scholar, Chapters 1–5.

26 See Colin Legum, “Africa and China” in Halpern, “ Policies Towards China,” op. cit.

27 Ibid. p. 397.

28 See Griffith, W. E., Sino-Soviet Relations 1964–1965, M.I.T. 1967Google Scholar for complete coverage.

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33 Griffith, op. cit., pp. 11–48.

34 Ibid. pp. 106–109.

35 See Halperin, M. H. and Lewis, John Wilson: “New Tensions in Army-Party Relations in China (1965–1966),” China Quarterly, No. 26 (04–06 1966), pp. 58–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36 See Editorial Departments of People's Daily and Red Flag. “A Comment on the March Moscow Meeting,” 22 March 1965 (Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 13, 26 03 1965)Google Scholar.

37 First argued by the Albanians (Zeri i Popullit, 20 April 1965). See Griffith, , op. cit., p. 94Google Scholar, but taken on by the Chinese later (Fan Hsiu-chi “The Struggle Between the Two Lines over the question of Dealing with U.S. imperialism,” Ta Kung Pao, July 27, 1965, Griffiths, , loc. cit., p. 110)Google Scholar.

38 “Long Live the Victory of the People's War!“ Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 36, 3 09 1965Google Scholar. An excellent analysis in Barnett, A. Doak, China After Mao; Princeton 1967, pp. 58–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 See Dönes, Jurgen, “The Cultural Revolution and the Army,” Asian Survey, 06 1968Google Scholar.

40 Piao, Lin, “Long Live the Victory of the People's War! “ op. cit. and Lo Jui-ch'ing, ”Remember the Victory Over German Fascism! Fight Against U.S. imperialism to the End!” Peking Review, No. 36, 3 09 1965Google Scholar.

41 See Scalapino, Robert A., “The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy,” Current Scene, Vol. VI, No. 13, 1 08 1968Google Scholar.

42 See SCMP 4200, for the translation of a pamphlet form publication without a title dated 31 August 1967. It contains Mao's reported talk to a visiting military delegation from abroad—presumably from Mali.

43 See Scalapino, op. cit.

44 SCMP 3939, p. 7, and SCMP 4007, p. 2.

45 Hung Wei Chan Pao (Red Guard Combat Bulletin), 13 April 1967, published by Red Guards, Hungweitui and Tungfanghung Commune of the Chinese People's University, Congress of Red Guards Peking. Translated in SCMP 4007.

46 Ibid.

47 Pao, Ke-ming Ch'lao (Revolutionary Overseas Chinese Affairs Bulletin), 9 04 1967Google Scholar. Published by Returned Overseas Chinese Tungfanghung Commune Peking. Translated in SCMP 3939.

48 Wai Shift Hung Ch'i {Foreign Affairs Red Flag), 14 June 1967: “Thoroughly Smash the Foreign Affairs Ministry Privileged Stratum.” Published by the Proletarian Revolutionaries Liaison Committee of the Foreign Affairs System, Peking. Translated in SCMP 4004.

49 See Hung Wei Chan Pao, op. cit.

50 P'i Liao Chan Pao (Criticize Liao Combat Bulletin), No. 4, 18 06 1967Google Scholar, “Criticize and Repudiate Liao Ch'eng-chih's Revisionist Line of ‘Three Capitulations and One Annihilation.’“ Translated in SCMP 4013.

51 See virtually any copy of the Peking Review of the last two years for the section entitled “Mao Tse-tung's Thought Lights the Whole World” or “The People of the World Love Chairman Mao.”

52 The deterioration of relations with Burma in 1967 is a good example of this phenomenon.

53 See for example “Vice Premier Ch'en Yi Answers Questions Put by Correspondents,” Foreign Language Press, Peking 1966, p. 31Google Scholar.

54 See, for example, note 51.

55 e.g., Sweden, Switzerland, Ceylon, Afghanistan, etc.

56 See for example “‘May 16’ Condemned by Central Leaders,” San Szu Hung Wei-ping (Third Headquarters Red Guard), 30 September 1967, Canton. SCMP 4068, also SCMP 4069. “History Pronounces Death Sentence on Ch'i Pen-yu,” by T'ao Ch'i (Punish Ch'i), Canton, 1 March 1968 of the “Tao Ch'i Combat Team, Chungshan University Revolutionary Rebel Committee, SCMP 4142. See also “Drag Out Counter-Revolutionary Double Dealer Ch'i Pen-yii” by “Red Flag “of Ta Ch'ing Commune of Peking Petroleum Institute, reprinted in Canton, 26 February 1968. SCMP 4137.

57 See Bridgham, Philip: “Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967 The Struggle to Seize Power,” China Quarterly, No. 34 (04–06, 1968)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 Ibid.

59 See Red Flag, No. 12, 1967, pp. 55–57Google Scholar, and speeches by Chiang Ch'ing and Chou En-lai in September, in SCMP 4069 and 4066 respectively. See Bridgham, op. cit., for more extended treatment.

60 SCMP 4191.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 SCMPs 4137 and 4142, op. cit.

64 See Observer and Sunday Times, London, 5 11 1967Google Scholar. See also Prince Sihanouk's Phnom Penh Press Conference Statement, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts FE/2682/A3/11 (1 January 1968).

65 See for example, Piao, Lin, “At the Peking Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution,” Peking Review, No. 46, 10 11 1967Google Scholar.

66 Communique of the 11th Plenum, 12 August 1966. Peking Review, No. 34, 19 08 1966Google Scholar.

67 Joint leader by editorial departments of People's Daily, Red Flag and Chieh Fang Chun Pao, “Advance Along the Road Opened Up by the October Socialist Revolution”. Peking Review, No. 46, 10 11 1967Google Scholar.

68 For the earlier period see the earlier section on “intermediate zones.” For more recent examples see the accounts of Peking receptions for President Kaunda of Zambia in 06 1967, Peking Review No. 27Google Scholar and for President Nyerere of Tanzania, a year later, Peking Review No. 26 (28 06 1968)Google Scholar.

69 See Peking Review, No. 26, 28 06 1968Google Scholar. Chou En-lai still appealed for Afro-Asian solidarity and for pursuing policies of self-reliance, whilst Nyerere spoke only in terms of African nationalism and unity. Not once did he use the term “Afro-Asia.”

70 Communiqué of the 11th Plenum, op. cit.

71 “Statement by Mao Tse-tung in support of the Afro-American struggle Against Violent Repression” (16 04 1968), Peking Review, No. 16, 19 04 1968Google Scholar.

72 Implicit in CCP claims that the Soviet Union was revisionist and from the enormous role assigned to Mao Tse-tung's “Thought.” SeeSchram, S. R., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung: Praeger, 1963, pp. 56–71 andGoogle ScholarSchram, S. R., Mao Tsetung: Pelican, 1966Google Scholar, especially Chapters 10 and 11.

73 Khrushchev's Phoney Communism, op. cit.