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The problem of low expectations and the principled politician

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2022

Sam Schmitt Open the ORCID record for Sam Schmitt [Opens in a new window]
Sam Schmitt*
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UNC-Chapel Hill, Hamilton Hall, 358, Campus Box 3265, Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA
*
Email: sschmit@live.unc.edu
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Abstract

Nobel laureate James Buchanan downplays any theory of ethical politicians, focusing instead on rules which economize personal restraint, setting lower moral expectations. Through a constructive critique of James Buchanan’s work, I argue these lowered expectations come at a cost: degraded character in politicians, leading to constitutional decay. Buchanan lacks a theory to address choices between (a) action which furthers the politician’s self-interest and (b) action which protects some already accepted, good rule, but which does not further their self-interest. I generate a theory of the Principled Politician, an agent characterized by a prior commitment to fair play.

Keywords

James Buchanandemocratic backslidingpublic choiceconstitutional political economycharacter
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , July 2023 , pp. 177 - 198
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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