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Dual-process theory is Barbapapa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2023

Gustav Tinghög Open the ORCID record for Gustav Tinghög [Opens in a new window] ,
Lina Koppel Open the ORCID record for Lina Koppel [Opens in a new window]  and
Daniel Västfjäll Open the ORCID record for Daniel Västfjäll [Opens in a new window]
Gustav Tinghög
Affiliation:
JediLab, Department of Management and Engineering, Division of Economics, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden gustav.tinghog@liu.se lina.koppel@liu.se Department of Health, Medicine and Caring Sciences, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
Lina Koppel
Affiliation:
JediLab, Department of Management and Engineering, Division of Economics, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden gustav.tinghog@liu.se lina.koppel@liu.se
Daniel Västfjäll
Affiliation:
JediLab, Department of Behavioural Sciences and Learning, Division of Psychology, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden daniel.vastfjall@liu.se Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA
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Abstract

The biggest benefit of dual-process theory lies in its role as a benchmark theory that, regardless of its empirical plausibility, serves as a starting point for better and more domain-specific models. In this sense, dual-process theory is the Barbapapa of psychological theory – a blob-shaped creature that can be reshaped and adapted to fit in the context of any human behavior.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 46 , 2023 , e144
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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