¹ Haas, Ernst B., “Dynamic Environment and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations,” in Kaplan, Morton A. (ed.), The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 267–309Google Scholar.

…the United Nations must be described as a multi-phase system, whose characteristics and evolutionary potential must be specified in terms of the changing environment in which it operates. Environments, in turn, are made up of the totality of policies, aims, expectations, fears, hopes, and hatreds funneled into the institutional structure and its political processes, the “system” proper.

Ibid., p. 278, and later—“The UN system is hyper-dependent on its environment.” (P. 280.) See also Haas, Ernst B., “The Comparative Study of the United Nations,” World Politics, 01 1960 (Vol. 12, No. 2), pp. 298–322Google Scholar. Haas has further suggested that the construction of an empirical theory of international organization can best be approached through the examination of the system in each phase in which the pattern of inputs changes because of change in the environment. Such an examination would explain the evolution of the system “in terms of the global tasks and programs which devolve upon it because of the tensions in the policies of the members.” (Haas, , World Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 303.)Google Scholar For a parallel suggestion with regard to political systems in general see Easton, David, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 115–116Google Scholar.

² Throughout this article the term “African state” excludes the Republic of South Africa.

³ Hadwen, John G. and Kaufmann, Johan, How United Nations Decisions Are Made (New York: Oceana Publications, 1962), p. 128Google Scholar. For an early analysis of some of the implications for the Organization of a greatly expanded membership see Stein, Eric, Some Implications of Expanding United Nations Membership (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956)Google Scholar; and Sharp, Walter R., Implications of Expanding Membership for United Nations Administration and Budget (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956)Google Scholar. (The two volumes are bound together.)

⁴ During the plenary sessions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council states are represented by delegations specially accredited to the particular session of the body. The composition of these special delegations varies from country to country. Many states choose to compose them of prominent members of the government while others tend to draw heavily upon their permanent missions when making such appointments. As a general rule the new nations tend to follow the latter practice. Regardless of the composition of the special delegations they are dependent upon the permanent missions for staff work and expertise in the politics of the Organization. The author has followed the practice of using the term “missions” to cover the activity of die specially accredited delegations as well as the permanent missions.

⁵ Hyde, James N., “United States Participation in the United Nations,” International Organization, 02 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 1), pp.22–34Google Scholar; Pedersen, Richard F., “National Representation in the United Nations,” International Organization, Spring 1961 (Vol. 15, No. 2), pp. 256—266Google Scholar; Kay, David A., “Instruments of Influence in the United Nations Political Process,” in The United Nations Political System, ed. by Kay, David A. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), pp. 92–108Google Scholar.

⁶ Until 1963 Libya followed the curious policy of appointing a permanent mission but not maintaining a New York office for the mission.

⁷ Alker, Hayward R. Jr and Russett, Bruce, World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 218–219Google Scholar; Hovet, Thomas JrAfrica in the United Nations (Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 1963), pp. 218–222Google Scholar. The author's personal observation as a member of the United States delegation to the 22nd General Assembly confirms these judgments.

⁸ For a discussion of this problem in interviewing United Nations delegates see Vincent, Jack Ernest, The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations—An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization, Arts and Sciences Studies, Social Studies Series, No. 12 (Stillwater, Okla: Oklahoma State University Press, 1965), p. 139Google Scholar.

⁹ This method was first applied to the United Nations in Russett, Bruce M., Trends in World Politics (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 70–71Google Scholar; and in Alker and Russett, pp. 191–217. Alker and Russett also constructed a more complicated measure of intensity based on whether a delegate spoke, how many times he spoke, and whether he introduced resolutions or amendments on the topic. However, when they compared the results of this index with those of the speech count, such a high correlation, r= .88, was found that the more complicated index was abandoned in favor of the speech count. (Ibid., pp. 192–193.)

The reason for choosing the General Assembly and its main committees is that it is only in these bodies that all the Members are represented and hence have an opportunity to express their views.

¹⁰ While not absent, the high correlation Alker and Russett obtained between die speech count and a more inclusive index indicates that the bias introduced by the personal loquaciousness of the delegates is not great.

¹¹ The speech count used in the present study is based on the Official Records of the General Assembly as indexed in Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly, fifteenth-21st sessions (New York: United Nations, 1961–1966)Google Scholar. For purposes of this count when a speech dealt with more than one topic, each topic was counted as a separate speech.

¹² As the membership and work load of the Organization have increased it has become virtually impossible during the course of a single research project to conduct personal interviews with responsible officials from every mission. This index does provide a means around this obstacle. Unfortunately, this same increase in membership and work load has made the construction of this index more onerous.

¹³ The results obtained for the nineteenth session must be viewed with caution. The deadlock resulting from the Organization's financial crisis prevented the main committees from meeting and focused the discussion that did take place largely on the Organization's inability to act.

¹⁴ Kay, David A., “The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process,” International Organization, Autumn 1967 (Vol. 21, No. 4), pp. 802–804CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ Claude, Inis L. JrThe Changing Untied Nations (New York: Random House, 1967), p. xviGoogle Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. xv.

¹⁷ Kay, David A., “The New Nations in the United Nations: A Study in the Exercise of Political Influence in the United Nations, 1960–1965” (unpublished dissertation, 1967)Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Kotschnig, Walter M., “The United Nations as an Instrument of Economic and Social Development,” International Organization, Winter 1968 (Vol. 22, No. 1), pp. 40–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), November 3, 1950.

²¹ Kay, , International Organization, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp. 786–811CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²² ibid.

²³ The formal ride of this body is the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It is often referred to as the Special Committee on Colonialism or the Special Committee of Twenty-Four (after 1962).

²⁴ Kay, “The New Nations in the United Nations,” Chapter V.

²⁵ The then members of the Special Committee were: Algeria, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, and Somalia.

²⁶ UN Document A/6356, June 29, 1966. Also declining membership were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Ceylon, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. Canada did not reply, and Denmark and Italy replied conditionally.

²⁷ For an analysis of the issues surrounding the possible use of sanctions against South Africa see Leiss, Amelia C. (ed.), Apartheid and United Nations Collective Measures: An Analysis (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965)Google Scholar.

²⁸ General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), October 27, 1966.

²⁹ See the debate surrounding General Assembly Resolution 2248 (S–V), May 19, 1967.

³⁰ Article 55 of the Charter is the only article in which economic development is directly referred to as an objective of the Organization: “the United Nations shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development…”

³¹ In analyzing all the votes taken on economic questions in the sixteenth through the 22nd sessions of the General Assembly in both main committee and plenary meetings the author found that over 95 percent of the votes were either unanimous or simply by show of hands. In United Nations practice a show-of-hands vote is not recorded on a country-by-country basis. For example, there were only six roll-call votes during 1962–1963 so that a sufficient statistical base did not exist for meaningful voting analysis.

³² Lubin, Isador and Asher, Robert E., “The Struggle for a Better Life,” Chapter IV of The US. Stake in the U.N., ed. by The American Assembly (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 74Google Scholar. Cited in Asher, Robert E. and otibers, , The United Nations and Economic and Social Co-operation (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1957), p. 491Google Scholar .

³³ Asher and others, pp. 56–86, 96–158.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 435.

³⁵ That many of these budgetary increases may have been supported or even initiated in the hope of gaining future support from the new nations on other issues is only a recognition of the fact that influence is, as Harold Las swell has noted, a “deference value.” In fact, if there were cases where the new nations were catered to in the hope of gaining their future support, this is but another indicator of their influence potential within the Organization. See Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society, A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1950), PP. 55–73Google Scholar. Also see Kotschnig, , International Organization, Vol. 22, No. I, pp. 16–43Google Scholar.

³⁶ General Assembly Resolution 1521 (XV), December 15, 1960.

³⁷ General Assembly Resolution 2186 (XXI), December 13, 1966.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Kay, “The New Nations and the United Nations.”

⁴⁰ It is true that some absences are entirely unpremeditated and result from the debilitating effects of the New York climate on seriously overworked staffs and the inability of small missions to cover every main committee. However, since 49 of the 50 votes analyzed took place in either plenary or the First (Political and Security) Committee, the two bodies every mission covers first, it is not felt that the inability to separate the absences according to the motives behind them introduces a large possibility of error.