¹ Rowen, Herbert H., ‘A second thought on Locke's First treatise’, Journal of the History of Ideas, xvii (1956), 130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Ibid. p. 132.

³ Christophersen, H. O., A bibliographical introduction to the study of John Locke (1930)Google Scholar; Hall, Roland and Woodhouse, Roger, ‘Forty years of work on John Locke (1929–1969)’, Philosophical Quarterly, xx (1970), 258–68Google Scholar, and ‘Addenda to “Forty years of work on John Locke”’, ibid. 394–6; and the bibliographies in such books on Aaron, Richard I., John Locke (Oxford, 1937, 1955)Google Scholar; Cox, Richard, Locke on war and peace (Oxford, 1960)Google Scholar; Laslett, Peter (ed.), John Locke, Two treatises of government (Cambridge, 1960)Google Scholar; Seliger, Martin, The liberal politics of John Locke (London, 1968)Google Scholar; Dunn, John, The political thought of John Locke (Cambridge, 1969)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Axtell, James (ed.), The educational writings of John Locke (Cambridge, 1968)Google Scholar; and Abrams, Philip (ed.), John Locke, Two tracts on government (Cambridge, 1967)Google Scholar. There is, of course, no eliminating the nagging suspicion that one might have overlooked something.

⁴ Laslett, , Two treatises, p. 61Google Scholar. Accepting at face value Locke's apology in the ‘Preface’ that the ‘middle’ of the work has been lost or destroyed, Laslett and others have presumed, somehow, that what Locke has presented us in the First treatise was fragmentary. It is, of course, difficult to know what interpretative force this might have, but in spite of that difficulty many recent interpreters have assumed that imagining what the missing portion was like is sufficient critical basis for concluding that, overall, it was Filmer that provides the clue to understanding the whole of Two treatises. This view is reinforced when Laslett argues, in a note at the end of the First treatise, that that work ‘breaks off abruptly in the middle of a phrase, obviously where Locke's manuscript reached the foot of a page’. See pages 280–1, n. Laslett perhaps makes too much of his reading of the last sentence in the Fist treatise. It makes much more sense to me than it appears to make to him; it is certainly too ambiguous, at best, to support Laslett's remark about ‘nonsense’.

⁵ Cox, , Locke on war and peace, p. 33.Google Scholar

⁶ Ibid. p. 34.

⁷ Ibid. pp. 46–9, 65–7, 85–7, 110–11.

⁸ Ibid. p. 46.

⁹ Ibid. p. 4.

¹⁰ Cook, Thomas I. (ed.), John Locke, Two treatises of government (New York, 1947), p. x.Google Scholar

¹¹ Bourne, H. R. Fox, The life of John Locke (New York, 1876), ii, 169.Google Scholar

¹² Cranston, Maurice, John Locke (New York, 1957), p. 207.Google Scholar

¹³ Seliger, , The liberal politics of John Locke, p. 204.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Laski, Harold J., Political thought in England (New York, 1920), p. 38.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Strauss, Leo, Natural right and history (Chicago, 1953), p. 215.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Aaron, , John Locke, p. 274.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Schochet, Gordon S., Patriarchalism in political thought (Oxford, 1975), p. 244.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Dunn, , Political thought of John Locke, p. 68.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Sabine, George H., A history of political theory (3rd edn, New York, 1937, 1961), p. 523.Google Scholar

²⁰ Germino, Dante, Modern western political thought (Chicago, 1972), p. 118.Google Scholar

²¹ Germino, Dante, ‘The contemporary relevance of the classics of political philosophy’, in Greenstein, Fred I. and Polsby, Nelson W. (eds.), Handbook of political science (Reading, Mass., 1975), 1, 264.Google Scholar

²² Kendall, Willmoore, John Locke and the doctrine of majority rule (Urbana, Ill., 1941, 1965)Google Scholar and Macpherson, C. B., The political theory of possessive individualism (Oxford, 1962).Google Scholar

²³ Lough, John, Locke's travels in France 1675–1679 (Cambridge, 1953)Google Scholar and ‘Locke's reading in France (1675–79)’, The Library, viii (1953), 229–58.Google Scholar

²⁴ One particularly striking and anomalous consequence of the prevailing overviews of the First treatise has been to lead critics into the false conclusion that not only did Locke ‘duplicate’ what his friend, James Tyrrell, had already done in his Patriarcha non monarcha, but, ironically, that he was less successful than Tyrrell! See Laslett, , Two treatises, p. 68Google Scholar, and Cook, , Two treatises, p. xiiGoogle Scholar. At the risk of adding to the irony, it is fair to say, however, that Tyrrell's book better squares with the prevailing depictions of the First treatise than does the First treatise itself.

²⁵ Throughout this paper I have used Laslett, Two treatises. The numbers in parentheses in the text refer to pages in that volume. This additional notation system was made necessary by the unavoidably frequent quotations which, in turn, were demanded by the nature of the argument. To sustain both the demonstration that the First treatise is richer and more interesting than we have been led to believe and the claim that this particular interpretation is faithful to Locke's text, I have had much of the time to let Locke speak for himself.

²⁶ For evidence of Locke's optimism about constitutional settlement after the Restoration, see Abrams, , The tracts, pp. 119, 120, 210, 211, 212Google Scholar. For his hopes that 1689 would produce a thoroughgoing and reasonable constitutional settlement and a return to the ‘ancient constitution’, see Rand, Benjamin (ed.), The correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke (Oxford, 1927), p. 289Google Scholar. And for Locke's self-estimation as a man mainly knowledgeable in the constitutions of his country, see his refusal of political appointment in King, Lord, The life and letters of John Locke (New York, 1830, 1972), p. 174.Google Scholar

²⁷ Such ‘factional’ apprehensions were rhetorically common among Whig writers of the time. See Behrens, B., “The Whig theory of the constitution”, Cambridge Historical Journal, i (1941), 55Google Scholar; and ‘A letter from a person of quality’, in Woodhall, H. et al. (eds.), The works of John Locke (1768), vi, 565, 568, 570Google Scholar; Marvell, Andrew, ‘An account of the growth of popery, and arbitrary government in England’, in Grosart, Alexander B. (ed.), The complete prose works of Andrew Marvell (New York, 1875, 1966), iv, 248, 261, 413–14Google Scholar: Sidney, Algernon, Discourses on government in Political classics: life, memoirs, &c. of Algernon Sydney (1794), ii, 366Google Scholar; and Tyrrell, James, Patriarcha non monarcha (London, 1681), ‘Preface’ and pp. 135, 248Google Scholar. Locke's contempt for court flattery and position-seeking is interestingly displayed in a letter to Shaftesbury. He advised Shaftesbury that rumours suggested ‘that there must be a parliament; and in preparation thereunto there is already great striving amongst those who think themselves most in danger who shall be thrown to the dogs. And who can think it other than good court-breeding, that might become a duke or a duchess, to strain courtesy in the case, and each desire to prefer the other as most deserving’? Locke to Shaftesbury, 5 August 1680, quoted in Fox-Bourne, , John Locke, i, 416.Google Scholar

²⁸ Klibansky, Raymond (ed.), John Locke, Epistola de tolerantia: a letter on toleration (Oxford, 1968), pp. 147, 149.Google Scholar

²⁹ Laslett, , Two treatises, p. 161 n. 4Google Scholar, merely refers to Man waring and Sibthorp as ‘exhalting the Royal Prerogative’, while Cox, , Locke on war and peace, p. 16Google Scholar, as an element in his discussion of ‘the problem of persecution’, focuses on their later ostracism by Parliament for their views and suggests that Locke's reference to them meant to convey a warning about the risks involved in the public avowal of political views. Another, more interesting and Whig view is Andrew Marvell's. See Smith, D. I. B. (ed.), Andrew Marvell, The rehearsal transpros'd (Oxford, 1971), pp. 127–34, especially, 130–1 and 135Google Scholar, where Marvell connects Sibthorp and Manwaring with clerical flattery of the king, with the causes of the Rebellion and Civil War, and suggests that Charles II was not getting any better advice from his clergy after the Restoration. ‘But after all the fatal consequences of that Rebellion’, Marvell asks, ‘which can only serve as Sea-marks unto wise Princes to avoid the Causes, shall this sort of Men still vindicate themselves as the most zealous Assertore of the Rights of Princes’?

³⁰ See, too, Behrens, , Cambridge Historical Journal, p. 44Google Scholar, and ‘A letter from a person of quality’, pp. 539, 546–7, 568.Google Scholar

³¹ Burke, Kenneth, A rhetoric of motives (Berkeley, 1950, 1952), p. 39Google Scholar. The exact character of the audience Locke was intending to reach is difficult to infer. Certainly he did not mean merely to reinforce the opinions of Exclusionist Whigs, already mostly in agreement with what he says. And it seems unlikely that he thought he could dissuade those committed tories and Royalists whose interests and convictions already found expression in Filmer's writings. More likely, he meant to reach men whose attitudes and positions might make them practically anxious about the deeper and more certain security of government, religion, and property. Optimally, I think he meant to reach the King himself.

That this is not an outlandish suggestion can find some support in the circumstances of the publication of another Whig document, Andrew Marvell's The rehearsal transpros'd. In that book, Marvell attacked the writings of Samuel Parker who, like Filmer, had defended the absolute power of kings. Charles II, however, was thought to dislike heavy and serious ponderings of religious-political questions, and so, Marvell, to gain the ear of the king with his warnings and criticism of absolute pretensions, couched his arguments in wit and sarcasm. Marvell's intention was ‘to woo Charles II away from the clutches of the Church of England “politicians”’, and he actually ‘succeeded in gaining the attention and approbation of the King’. In fact, when there was an effort made to obstruct the licensing of that book, the king himself ‘acted to prevent its suppression’. And this only seven years or so before we find Locke at work on his Treatises. See the interesting account in the ‘Introduction’ in Smith, pp. xi–xxii. On the generally peace-seeking quality of Marvell's political prose and the move to greater anger and pointedness between The rehearsal transpros'd and The growth of popery and arbitrary government, see Wallace, John M., Destiny his choice: the loyalism of Andrew Marvell (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 184–231Google Scholar. Locke himself took exception to Parker's unlimited grant of power to the king. See Locke's notes contra Parker reproduced in Cranston, , John Locke, pp. 131–3.Google Scholar

³² Nidditch, Peter H. (ed.), John Locke, An essay concerning human understanding (Oxford, 1975). p. 350.Google Scholar

³³ Abrams, , Two tracts, p. 124.Google Scholar

³⁴ von Leyden, W. (ed.), John Locke, Essays on the law or nature (Oxford, 1958), p. 185.Google Scholar

³⁵ Abrams, , Two tracts, p. 138.Google Scholar

³⁶ Ibid. p. 225.

³⁷ Klibansky, , A letter on toleration, p. 123.Google Scholar

³⁸ Nidditch, , Essay, p. 70.Google Scholar

³⁹ Abraras, , Two tracts, p. 225.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Laslett, , Two treatises, p. 235 nGoogle Scholar. Failing to appreciate the purposes of Locke's use of ‘conscience’ in the First treatise, Laslett faults Locke for not pursuing a more philosophical discussion of the ‘quite complicated arguments about conscience’ that were typical of the younger Locke and other writers on the subject. This mistake helps to focus the limitations inherent in reading the First treatise as if its purposes were detachedly philosophical, or, as Laslett implies in another place (259 n.), those of ‘academic disputation’.

⁴² See Klibansky, , Toleration, p. 139Google Scholar and Abrams, , Two tracts, pp. 138–9, 154.Google Scholar

⁴³ See Locke's discussion of reason and revelation in Nidditch, , Essay, pp. 691–8.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ For the cumulative effects of Locke's general denials of the relevance of the Bible to political problems, see Laslett, , Two treatises, pp. 186, 187, 188, 189, 193, 198, 241, 246, 267, 272, 280–1Google Scholar; and Dunn, , The political thought of John Locke, p. 99Google Scholar: ‘The entire First treatise, which is designed to descredit Filmer's extrapolations from the Old Testament, ends up by making the latter seem almost wholly irrelevant to issues of political right.’ What is surprising is that Dunn sounds surprised.

⁴⁵ Abrams, , Two tracts, pp. 118, 120, 121, 211Google Scholar, and Klibansky, , Toleration, pp. 65, 139, 147.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Klibansky, , Toleration, p. 131.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 133.

⁴⁸ Laslett, , Two treatises, pp. 162, 187, 206, 215, 216, 261.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ A similar point is stressed by Tyrrell in the ‘preface’ to Patriarcha non monarcha.

⁵⁰ See Sidney's, ‘The very copy of a letter delivered to the sheriffs’ (1683), State tracts (1660–1689), p. 268.Google Scholar

‘That Usurpation could give no Right, and the most dangerous of all Enemies into Kings were they, who raising their Power to an exorbitant Height, allowed unto Usurpers all the Rights belonging to it./That such Usurpations being seldom compassed without the Slaughter of the Reigning Person or Family, the worst of all Villanies was thereby rewarded with the most glorious Privileges./That if such Doctrines were received, they would stir up Men to the Destruction of Princes with more Violence than all the Passions that have hitherto raged in the Hearts of the most Unruly.’

⁵¹ King, , Life and letters, pp. 101–2.Google Scholar

⁵² Ibid. p. 102.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 104 (emphasis added).