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Political Rule, Prudence and the “Woman Question” in Aristotle*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Leah Bradshaw
Leah Bradshaw
Affiliation:
Brock University
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Abstract

Aristotle gives the classical definition of political rule as the kind of rule appropriate for free and equal persons. This concept of political rule is complicated, however, by the fact that, even in what Aristotle calls a free and equal association, the ruler is separated from the ruled by his possession of the virtue of prudence. This article explores the relation between political rule and prudence in Aristotle's writings, and considers particularly the case of political rule between men and women. Though Aristotle characterizes the proper relation between men and women as a free and equal one, he distinguishes the male/female political relation from the more general political relation by saying that men are naturally more fit to rule than women. We are interested in whether Aristotle excludes women from political rule because he thinks that women lack the potential for the virtue of prudence.

Résumé

Selon la définition classique, donnée par Aristote, la règie politique s'applique à tous les citoyens considérés comme libres et égaux. Ce concept de règle politique devient plus complexe dès lors que, malgré le pouvoir de libre et égale association, le citoyen est séparé du gouvernant par l'obligation de prévoyance que détient ce dernier. Cet article explore le lien entre la règie politique et la vertu de prévoyance dans les écrits d'Aristote, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne la relation politique entre les hommes et les femmes. Même si Aristote considère que la relation entre les hommes et les femmes est égale et librement consentie, il distingue la relation politique homme-femme de la règie générate en affirmant que les hommes sont naturellement plus aptes à gouverner. La question, ici, est de savoir si Aristote exclut les femmes de la règie politique parce qu'il pense qu'elles ont moins d'aptitudes à maîtriser la vertu de prévoyance.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , September 1991 , pp. 557 - 573
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1991

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References

1 All quotations from Aristotle's Politics are from the translation by Lord, Carnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984Google Scholar); from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, the translation by Rackham, Harris (London: William Heinemann, Loeb Classical Library, 1926Google Scholar); from Aristotle's Rhetoric, the translation by Roberts, Rhys (New York: Modern Library, 1954Google Scholar); and from Aristotle's Generation of Animals, the translation by Peck, A. L. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Loeb Classical Library, 1943Google Scholar). In writing about Aristotle's theory of political rule and the exercise of prudence, I have occasionally used the masculine pronoun. Since Aristotle did not include females in the practice of either of these activities, it does not make sense to employ gender-neutral language in the discussion.

2 The Greek term is akuron, meaning without authority. Akuros can pertain to persons, denoting that they have no power or authority; or it can apply to laws or sentences, in which case the term takes on the rather more pointed meaning of “no longer in force, cancelled, annulled, or set aside.”

3 Salkever, Stephen, “Women, Soldiers, Citizens: Plato and Aristotle on the Politics of Virility,” Polity 19 (1986), 243.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Rist, John M., The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 152–153.Google Scholar

5 Saxonhouse, Arlene, “Family, Polity and Unity: Aristotle on Socrates' Community of Wives,” Polity 15 (1982), 202–219.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 There is a substantial body of literature written on Aristotle from feminist perspectives. Some of the most acute criticisms of Aristotle's views on women are Okin, Susan Moller, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979Google Scholar); Elshtain, Jean, Public Man, Private Woman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981Google Scholar); Morgan, Kathy Pauly, “Woman and Moral Madness,” in Code, Lorraine et al. , Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Methods and Morals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988Google Scholar); Coole, Dianah, Women in Political Theory (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988Google Scholar); and Whitbeck, Caroline, “A Different Reality: Feminist Ontology,” in Garry, Ann and Pearsall, Marilyn, eds., Women, Knowledge and Reality (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989Google Scholar). Okin finds that Aristotle “relegated women to an altogether subhuman position” (87), Elshtain claims Aristotle thought of woman as a “household animal” (49), and Coole identifies in Aristotle an “absolute (ontological) distinction between male and female” (47). The findings of this article do not accord with any of these interpretations. While I do not deny that Aristotle barred free Athenian women from equal social and political status with their male counterparts, I argue that the differences in political status between men and women are grounded in Aristotle's understanding of differing physical (especially sexual) constitutions, and prudence. There is no evidence that Aristotle thought women defective in their power of intellect or reason, that he thought women less than human, or that he thought men and women to be so different that they did not share the same ontological status.