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The Supreme Court and National Policy Making*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Jonathan D. Casper
Jonathan D. Casper*
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Abstract

The role of the Supreme Court of the United States in national policy making has long been a subject of debate among students of the American legal system and of democratic theory. Both the relative influence of the Court vis-à-vis other political institutions and the implications of judicial review for principles of majority rule and democracy have been central to this discussion. Perhaps the most influential account of the role of the Court offered in recent years is Robert A. Dahl's 1957 article, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court in National Policy-Making.” Dahl argues that the Court, like other political institutions, is a member of the stable ruling coalitions that dominate American politics, and that its decisions are generally supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions.

Consideration of the way Dahl interprets his own evidence, of Court decisions since 1957, and of other relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis (particularly the activities of the Court in statutory construction and in cases arising out of states and localities) suggests that the Court participates more significantly in national policy making than Dahl's argument admits.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 70 , Issue 1 , March 1976 , pp. 50 - 63
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1976

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Footnotes

*

I am indebted to several friends for advice and assistance with this paper: Paul Sniderman, Douglas Rae, Milton Heumann, John Manley, Richard Brody, Heinz Eulau, Brenda McLean, and David Danelski.

References

1 Dahl, Robert A., “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law, 6 (Fall, 1957), 279–295 Google Scholar. Dahl integrated and somewhat revised this article as a chapter in two editions of his American government text. See Dahl, Robert A., Pluralist Democracy in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), chapter 6Google Scholar; in the 1972 edition, called Democracy in the United States, see chapter 16. Because the original is the clearest and most widely read version of his argument, I shall focus upon it here.

2 Dahl, p. 282.

3 Ibid., pp. 285–86.

4 Ibid., p. 291.

5 Dahl., pp. 293, 294.

6 Ibid., p. 294.

7 For a discussion of the role of the Supreme Court during the 1950s, see Murphy, Walter F., Congress and the Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)Google Scholar; and Casper, Jonathan D., The Politics of Civil Liberties (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), chapter IIGoogle Scholar.

8 400 U.S. 112(1970).

9 Washington v. Legrant, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).

10 Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U. S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guargliardo, 361 U. S. 281 (1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234(1960).

11 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301 (1965).

12 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 (1958); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1963); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U. S. 163(1964).

13 Aplheker v. Sec. of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); U. S. v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437 (1965); Albertson v. SACB, 382 U. S. 70 (1965); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U. S. 253 (1967); U. S. v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258(1967).

14 U. S. v. Romano, 3S2 U. S. 136 (1965); Marchetti v. U. S., 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. V. S. 390 U. S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. U. S., 390 U. S. 85 (1968); U. S. v. Jackson, 390 U. S. 570(1968); Leary v. U. S., 395 U. S. 6(1969); U. S. v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57 (1969).

15 Schact v. U. S. 398 U. S. 58 (1970); Chief of Police v. J. Rankin Brigade, 409 U. S. 972 (1972).

16 U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U. S. 508 (1973); U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528 (1973).

17 Six of the total of 28 cases in which federal legislation was declared unconstitutional in the 1958-74 period were discussed in the text above (see notes 8–11); 19 of the cases are cited in notes 12–16; the remaining three cases are as follows: Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U. S. 410 (1971)—holding unconstitutional a procedure by which Postmaster General was authorized to deal with allegedly obscene material sent through the mails; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 672 (1971)—declaring unconstitutional on Establishment ground s a section of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963; and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973)—holding unconstitutional a form of discrimination against wome n members of the armed forces in eligibility for quarters' allowances and medical benefits for dependents.

18 Dahl's “ruling elite model” article, published in 1958, argues that influence can only be measured effectively in such situations. See “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,“ American Political Science Review 52 (06, 1958), 463–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Dahl, , “Decision-Making in a Democracy,” p. 282 Google Scholar.

20 Ibid., p. 287.

21 Ibid., p. 292, emphasis added.

22 The summary of the Supreme Court's work published each fall in the Harvard Law Review provides a useful account of the Court's business. In the 1972 term, for example, of 164 cases decided with full opinions, 69 involved the federal government as a party; of course many of these cases involving the federal government did not involve a challenge to constitutionality, but issues of administrative procedure, statutory construction, etc. See Note, “The Supreme Court, 1972 term,” Harvard Law Review, 87 (11, 1973), 307–09Google Scholar.

23 350 U.S. 497(1956).

24 18 U.S.C. s. 3231.

25 Murphy, especially chapters 7, 9.

26 U. S. v. Seeger, 380 U. S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. U. S. 398 U. S. 333 (1970).

27 Oeslereich v. Sel. Service Board, 393 U. S. 233 (1968); Breen v. Sel. Service Board, 396 U. S. 460 (1970).

28 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).

29 U.S. v. U. S. District Court, 407 U. S. 297 (1972).

30 King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968).

31 Columbia Broadcasting System v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94 (1973).

32 2 Dall, 419(1793).

33 4 Wheat 316(1819).

34 9 Wheat 1 (1824).

35 12 How. 299 (1852).

36 369 U.S. 186(1962).

37 377 U.S. 533(1964).

38 Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).

39 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).

40 See, for example, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U. S. 472(1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756 (1973).

41 For example, Roth v. U. S., 354 U. S. 476 (1957); Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U. S. 478 (1962); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 (1964); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966); Ginzburg v. U. S., 383 U. S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966).

42 E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); but also see Jenkins v. Georgia, 41 L. Ed. 2d. 642 (1974).

43 E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 (1960); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U. S. 762 (1962); Watson v. Memphis, 373 U. S. 526 (1963); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U. S. 61 (1963); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); Robinson v. Florida, 378 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U. S. 131 (1966).

44 For a useful review of the Warren Court's decisions dealing with criminal procedure, see Pye, A. Kenneth, “The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure, “ in The Warren Court, ed. Sayler, Richard H. et al. (New York: Chelsea House, 1969), pp. 58–77 Google Scholar.

45 E.g., Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974).

46 E.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).

47 E.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 1 (1971); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. S. 25 (1970): U. S. v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); U. S. v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974).

48 Murphy, chapter 9.

49 Dahl, , “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” p. 464 Google Scholar.

50 I shall not discuss here the problem of taking account of “anticipated reactions” in discussing the relative influence of the Court in the policy-making process. It seems plausible to argue, though, that just as the Court in its decisions may take account of the breadth and intensity of support for various policies, members of Congress may take into account their predictions of potential rulings by the Court in making choices about what legislation to pass. For a discussion of the role of constitutional considerations in the legislative decision-making process, see Morgan, Donald G., Congress and the Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Brest, Paul, “The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,” Stanford Law Review, 27 (02, 1975), 585–601 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 Much of Dahl's work is consistent with this view and has added to our understanding ofthe ways in which these processes operate. Yet in the article under consideration here, a narrower view of the nature of the policy-making process emerges from the fashion in which he formulates the question and gathers his data.