Author's note: I would like to thank S. Behdad, S. Rahnema, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. I am, of course, solely responsible for the views expressed in this article.

¹ See the Islamic Consultative Assembly, “The Bill for the First Economic–Social–Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 1986. For a detailed discussion of the initial attempts at economic planning in the IRI, see Behdad, S., “The Political Economy of Islamic Planning in Iran,” in Post-Revolutionary Iran, ed. Amirahmadi, H. and Parvin, M. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988).Google Scholar

² Plan and Budget Organization, The First Economic Social and Cultural Plan of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 1368–72 (Tehran: Islamic Republic of Iran, 01, 1990).Google Scholar

³ Ibid., 44.

⁴ Ibid., 43.

⁵ Ibid., 46.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 47.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 64.

¹⁰ Ibid., 66.

¹¹ Bank Markazi Iran, Economic Reports and Bulletins, various issues.

¹² This was the case throughout the 1980s, except 1981/82, 1983/84, and 1984/85, see n. II.

¹³ Bank Markazi Iran, “Post-Revolutionary Changes in the Economy” (Tehran: Bank Markazi, 1983/ 84) 163–69.

¹⁴ Ibid., 268–78.

¹⁵ See various issues of Bank Markazi Iran, economic reports.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.; see also, First… Plan, 61.Google Scholar

¹⁸ First… Plan, 33, 43.Google Scholar

¹⁹ During these two periods, private-sector investment at 1974 constant prices amounted to Rls 268.4 billion and RIs 254.1 billion, respectively.

²⁰ In the same period, public-sector gross investment at 1974 constant prices fell from Rls 294.0 billion to Rls 231.7 billion.

²¹ For extensive discussions on the critical analysis of the uses and effects of the oil windfalls on the Iranian economy, see Amuzegar, J., “Oil Wealth: A Very Mixed Blessing,” Foreign Affairs 60: 814–34;CrossRefGoogle ScholarKatouzian, M. A., “Oil versus Agriculture: A Case of Dual Depletion in Iran,” Journal of Peasant Studies 2 (04 1978);Google ScholarPesaran, M. H., “Dependent Capitalism in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 14,4 (1982): 501–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For detailed discussion of the experience of a number of oil exporting countries, see Alan, GeIb et al. , Oil Windfall Blessing or Curse?(Washington, D.C.: World Bank Research Publication, 1988).Google Scholar

²² First… Plan, 42–45.Google Scholar

²³ Bank Markazi Iran, “Post-Revolutionary Changes.”

²⁴ Bank Markazi Iran, economic reports, various issues.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ For detailed discussion see Ghasimi, M. R., “Macroeconomics” (Tehran: Central Bank of Iran,1986, unpublished study), 410–41.Google Scholar

²⁷ Among a sample of oil producing developing countries, only Indonesia initiated a tax reform in1983 in response to the windfall from the second oil price rise, see Gelb, et al., Oil Windfall, 66.Google Scholar

²⁸ Bank Markazi Iran, economic reports, various issues.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Bank Markazi Iran, “Post-Revolutionary Changes,” Table 3.

³¹ Bank Markazi Iran, economic reports, various issues.

³² Ibid.

³³ Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, The Law for Usury—Free Banking(Tehran: 1983).Google Scholar

³⁴ See Hassan, Shirvani, “Factors Responsible to Determine Money Supply in Iran” (Economic Research Department, Central Bank of Iran, 1986, unpublished study).Google Scholar

³⁵ See Ghasimi, , “Macroeconomics,” 368–74.Google Scholar

³⁶ See Khalatbary, F., “Reconstruction of Monetary and Credit Policy,” Ronagh 3 (1990): 3–14;Google ScholarKhalatbary, F., “Underground Economy,” Ronagh 1 (1990): 5–11;Google ScholarKhalatbary, F., “Dollarrization and Foreign Exchange Deposits in the Iranian Economy,” Economic and Management Quarterly Journal of Azad University 1(1989): 29–47.Google Scholar

³⁷ See Katouzian, , “Oil versus Agriculture,” 46.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid., 47.

³⁹ Ibid., 68, Table 9.

⁴⁰ For detailed discussion, see Ghasimi, M. R., “Boasting Non-Oil Exports,” and “A Marketing Strategy for Exports,” Kayhan International (1975);Google ScholarGhasimi, M. R., “Exports of Manufactured Goods from Developing Countries by the Multinational Companies,” International Relations, Special issue on Multinational Companies (1977): 87–110; idem, “Expansion of Exports of Manufactured Goods from Iran,” Mercantile Bank of Iran and Holland Magazine, 3, 4 (1979).Google Scholar

⁴¹ For discussions of arguments in favor and against a general devaluation, see Lautenschlager, W., “The Effects of an Overvalued Exchange Rate on the Iranian Economy 1979–1984,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 18 (1986): 31–52;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBehdad, S., “Foreign Exchange Gap, Structural Constraints, and the Political Economy of Exchange Rate Determination in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 20 (1988): 1–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² See First… Plan, 46.Google Scholar

⁴³ Bank Markazi Iran, economic reports, 1985/86.

⁴⁴ Bank Markazi Iran, economic reports, various issues.

⁴⁵ Ibid.