Counter-cyclical budget policy across varieties of capitalism

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Highlights

  • We investigate whether LMEs have more accommodating fiscal policies than CMEs.

  • We use time-series cross-section data on 18 OECD countries between 1980 and 2009.

  • We test the reaction of discretionary fiscal policy to macroeconomic shocks.

  • Results are that CMEs’ fiscal policy is more counter-cyclical than LMEs’.

Abstract

The role of macroeconomic policy in the different varieties of capitalism has been largely ignored. Recent contributions to the literature have argued that nonliberal economies, i.e. coordinated market economies, should be expected to have less accommodating (i.e. less counter-cyclical) macroeconomic policies than liberal varieties. Using time-series cross-section data on 18 OECD countries between 1980 and 2009, this paper tests that hypothesis and, more particularly, whether the reaction of discretionary fiscal policy to macroeconomic shocks is different between liberal and nonliberal varieties of capitalism. The test results do not support the conclusion that nonliberal economies’ macroeconomic policy would be less counter-cyclical than that of liberal economies. On the contrary, discretionary fiscal policy has been more counter-cyclical in former economies.

Introduction

This paper investigates developed countries’ reaction to macroeconomic shocks. It is generally acknowledged that developed economies run counter-cyclical fiscal policies whereas developing countries mainly rely on a pro-cyclical stance (Perotti, 2004, Gavin and Perrotti, 1997, Catao and Sutton, 2002, Kaminsky et al., 2005, Woo, 2005, Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). Recent literature (Soskice, 2007) has argued that different varieties of capitalism should exhibit differentiated budget policy responses to macroeconomic shocks. Because liberal and nonliberal (a.k.a. coordinated) market economies possess different structural features in the fields of industrial relations, education and vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and intra-firm coordination (Hall and Soskice, 2001), the need for a counter-cyclical macroeconomic policy would not be the same in each variety.

Soskice (2007), Carlin and Soskice (2009) and Iversen and Soskice (2010) have presented some theoretical and empirical elements in favour of a clear differentiation between varieties of capitalism with respect to their aggregate demand management regimes (ADMRs). Liberal market economies (LMEs) such as the US would have to conduct a more active and more counter-cyclical discretionary government spending policy than nonliberal, coordinated, market economies (CMEs) such as Germany. Faced with the same adverse macroeconomic shock, a CME would implement a rather restrictive budget policy in order to limit the deficit, whereas an LME would choose an expansionary budget deficit to limit the effects of the negative shock on the level of activity or unemployment. This differentiation of ADMRs would correspond to a systemic requirement for each type of capitalism. Because of the presence of a strong welfare state and other institutional characteristics such as employment protection, nonliberal varieties of capitalism have built-in automatic stabilisers that make discretionary economic policy interventions less necessary. Also, their political systems, based on proportional representation and leading to coalition governments, would make it necessary to adopt a rule-based policy instead of using their own discretion, in order to prevent soaring deficits and to send a signal to trade unions that wage hikes that could threaten competitiveness would not be accommodated by the fiscal or monetary authorities.

There would thus be some complementarity between the production regimes (which can be either liberal or coordinated) and the aggregate demand management regimes (accommodating or conservative). This complementarity would then help to explain why some countries’ macroeconomic policies would react more strongly to macroeconomic shocks and be strongly counter-cyclical, whereas others’ would be less reactive.

The aim of this paper is to investigate these matters by testing whether one could differentiate among the discretionary fiscal policies implemented by liberal and nonliberal developed economies. In particular, the paper tests how the discretionary component of fiscal policy reacts to macroeconomic shocks for different varieties of capitalism. These tests are carried out using data from a panel of 18 OECD countries for the 1980–2009 period. Contrary to the expectations of the Varieties of Capitalism literature, our findings do not show that the fiscal policy of liberal market economies is systematically more counter-cyclical than that of nonliberal economies. In fact, a strongly counter-cyclical policy seems to be characteristic of nonliberal varieties of capitalism: the budget policy is expansive in the slump and restrictive in the boom. By contrast, the more liberal market economies seem to adopt a less counter-cyclical stance: their fiscal policy response to shocks is moderate.

The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the treatment of the pro/anti-cyclical stance of budget policy in the dedicated empirical literature and presents the arguments relating the cyclical stance (pro- or counter-cyclical) of a country to its type or variety of capitalism (liberal or coordinated). According to these arguments, liberal varieties are expected to be more counter-cyclical than coordinated (i.e. non-liberal) economies. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy adopted to test this prediction: data sources, variables used, and estimators. Results are then presented in Section 4, and their interpretation is discussed. A short conclusion follows.

Section snippets

Assessing the counter-cyclicality of macroeconomic policy

In order to assess whether fiscal policies are pro- or counter-cyclical, one usually relates some indicator of fiscal policy, e.g. the budget balance, to a measure of economic shock. A positive association means that a recession, for instance, leads to a decrease in the budget surplus or an increase in the budget deficit. In this case, fiscal policy is said to be counter-cyclical since the evolution of the budget balance will act in an expansionary way. By contrast, if the correlation between

The data

In order to test the degree of pro/counter-cyclicality of the discretionary budget policy of various types of economies, the following relationship is taken to the data:CAGPBit=αgapit+βXit+ci+εitCAGPBit is the Cyclically Adjusted Government Primary Balance as a percentage of potential GDP taken from the OECD Economic Outlook database.8 It is the most widely used measure of

Results

The estimation results are presented in Table 1. Regressions 1, 2 and 3 show the estimation results for the whole sample of countries. Regressions 1 and 3 can then be used as a benchmark to compare the values obtained for the α coefficient when using the very same regressions for restricted samples (thus regressions 1 and 3 in the whole sample can be respectively compared with regressions 4 and 5 in the LMEs sample, 6 and 8 in the CMEs sample and 9 and 10 in the mixed market economies (MMEs)

Conclusion

This paper has investigated the relationship between macroeconomic shocks and discretionary fiscal policies by distinguishing the type of capitalism which characterises countries. Indeed, it has recently been proposed in the VoC literature that liberal market economies would be expected to follow accommodating macroeconomic policies, whereas nonliberal varieties would adopt a more conservative stance. Using the standard distinction between LMES and CMEs, as well as taking account of the

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  • The research leading to these results was funded under the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2011) under grant agreement n°225349 (ICaTSEM project). Some of the research was conducted while the first author was Scholar in Residence at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. The authors wish to thank Martin Höpner and Tom Cusack for their helpful comments.

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