Power imbalance between supply vessels and offshore installations may impede the communication of safety issues

Highlights

• Nine interviews with 22 bridge officers from different offshore supply vessels.

• Questions about their communication with offshore hydrocarbon production installations.

• Power imbalance influences trust, pressure and sincerity in the communication.

• Communication challenges may lead to inaccurate representation of safety–critical factors.

• Inaccurate representation may cause accidents or prevent their resolution.

Abstract

The power relationships between collaborators may affect communication in safety–critical industries, thus leading to inaccurate or unreliable representations of risks. We interviewed the bridge crew of nine offshore supply vessels (22 informants) about issues concerning their communication with offshore hydrocarbon production installations on the Norwegian continental shelf. We asked about the relationship between the vessel and other units, the aims for the communication, how it took place, and what the kind of communication problems that tend to arise. Template analysis showed that the sample believed there was a power relationship where the vessel is subordinate to the offshore installation. This relationship had consequences for trust between the two parties, for the exertion of pressure, for whether justifications were given for instructions, the sincerity of the communication, and for who had the power of decision in case of disagreement. The relationship also seemed to cause various communication challenges, such as the installation not responding to radio calls, the vessel not receiving sufficient information from the installation, or the installation having insufficient experience and knowledge about maritime work. In order to maintain safety in maritime operations, each party uses the communicated information to build a mental model of the opposite party and their shared situation. If power imbalances impede accurate communication as indicated in the current study, this may lead to inaccurate mental models, which increases the risk of unwanted incidents, and makes them more difficult to handle.

Introduction

The hydrocarbon-maritime industry often operates under difficult and potentially dangerous conditions, where efficient and accurate communication is crucial to avoid accidents and harm to personnel, the environment or equipment. The work takes place between distributed teams with infrequent contact, in stressful environments with noise and many distractions, which presents challenges for the communication. It is conceivable that power relationships between collaborating parties influence the communication in this setting in a way that impacts safety. Although power and social context has been shown to impact interaction (Cohen, 1958, Tjosvold, 1985), to our knowledge, the effect of power relationships on communication has not previously been studied for distributed teams in the maritime industry.

The hydrocarbon-producing offshore installations are serviced by offshore supply vessels that run supply missions over multiple days, transporting container and bulk cargos of supplies and equipment between port facilities and multiple offshore installations in the North Sea. Other vessels serve as additional storage for the installation, as stand-by for emergency purposes or to assist in relocating installations. The operations are assigned by the traffic control centre, and traffic control may make changes to the route while a mission is under way. The vessel must alert the installation an hour before arrival, and again to obtain safety approval to enter a 500 m safety zone. The installation’s crane offloads the container cargo and loads the return cargo, while liquid cargo is pumped to or from the vessel using the installation’s hoses. The crane operator coordinates the loading/offloading operation with the bridge and deck personnel by radio communication. The vessel informs the installation when it is ready to leave the 500 m safety zone.

Communication in a collaborative setting takes place in a power context, since power is part of and affects most forms of social interaction (Grimes, 1978). For example, a high-power actor’s communication may be ‘top-down’, in a way that to little extent provides justifications for why the instruction was given, or encourages further discussion of the issue. On the other hand, a low-power actor may communicate in a way intended to show compliance, subservience and competence, and to downplay any critique or ambiguity. If power relationships lead to inaccurate communication, this could have consequences for safety. Although the different parties in the hydrocarbon-maritime setting are not part of the same formal organisational hierarchy, power relationships can be expected to follow the allocation of resources such as financial control, privileged information and power of decision. The most obvious issue could be that the hydrocarbon-producing installation wields power over an offshore supply vessel by representing the company that chooses whether to continue chartering the vessel (thus controlling financial resources). At other times, the vessel may have the authority to cancel an operation based on an evaluation of the weather conditions, thus controlling the installation’s work schedule.

Shannon and Weaver (1949) described communication as a process consisting of five components: an information source, a sender, a channel, a recipient and a destination. The sender must code the message so that it is converted into appropriate signals suitable for sending through the relevant channel. The message may take different forms, for example as written words, sound transmitted through radio or by telephone, or face-to-face interaction. Shannon and Weaver’s model (1949) was later expanded by Berlo (1960) to more clearly distinguish between sender, message, channel and receiver. Barnlund (1970) recognised that communication is a transactional and reciprocal process in which an individual can both send and receive messages simultaneously. This model emphasises that the message must be decoded to perceive its meaning, and to do so may rely on information not included in the message. Misunderstandings in the communication process can prevent the sender's message from reaching the recipient due to the sender failing to encode the message in a way that makes the meaning clear, due to signals not reaching the recipient, or due to the recipient failing to decode the message in the intended way. An example of such a misunderstanding in communication between the vessel and installation could be interference on the radio channel, or misalignment in the use of technical terms. Of particular interest for the current research question, Schramm (1954) emphasised the social interaction inherent in communication, and how a message could have both intended and unintended effects on the receiver.

In settings where operators make decisions about safety-critical issues based on information that is held by their collaborators, the quality of the communication is a determinant for safety. In a review of factors that could threaten the safe operation of complex, dynamic systems, Salas et al. (1995) stated that ‘communication’ was the only factor that all the reviewed researchers agreed was crucial. Other studies (e.g. Bearman et al., 2010) have argued that breakdown in communication often precedes accidents and negative safety outcomes.

The media richness theory (Daft and Lengel, 1986) states that the channel through which the communication takes place restricts the receiver’s interpretation of the message. Media richness is determined by the media’s capacity for multiple simultaneous information cues, for facilitating feedback and for establishing a personal focus (Lengel and Daft, 1989). Communication media can be arranged along a continuum from ‘rich’ to ‘lean’ (Rhoads, 2010), where face-to-face communication is a rich medium, since it can convey information both verbally and nonverbally, can provide immediate feedback and result in a personal understanding of the information conveyed (Lengel and Daft, 1989, van der Kleij et al., 2009). Phone calls or radio communication allow for instant feedback, but cannot capture non-verbal signs, such as eye contact and body language (Lengel and Daft, 1989, van der Kleij et al., 2009). Written documents and emails are even leaner, as they have limited capacity for personalisation, immediate feedback and variation of expression. The theory states that richer forms of media are more suitable in complex situations where the task is ambiguous and the personnel are relatively experienced (Lengel and Daft, 1989). Thus, rich media appear to be preferable for communicating safety-critical information, and in particular for communication during emergencies. Leaner forms of communication may be sufficient and efficient when the sender and recipient have shared expectations based on previous experience.

In a critique of the media richness theory, van der Kleij (2007) argued that the theory does not encompass the flexibility modern communication technology allows for, and that real-life communication can be adapted to the situation at hand, rather than having an optimal mode of communication. The media synchronicity theory (Dennis and Valacich, 1999) takes into account that one can follow several conversations simultaneously, that communication partners can be assigned equal weight and that agents may adapt their use of a medium. Rather than rating mediums from lean to rich, the theory emphasises the way the medium is used, given the situation and social context, and notes that combining or alternating between media can reduce the communication’s efficiency (van der Kleij, 2007).

Communication is a form of social exchange, and engaging in communication can entail some costs, while rewards are uncertain. Blau (1964) argued that trust is one of the factors underlying effective social exchange, and is thus essential for effective communication. Interpersonal trust can be defined as an actor’s positive expectations of another actor's conduct (Lewicki et al., 1998), or as ‘an expectation about a future behaviour of another person and an accompanying feeling of calmness, confidence, and security’ (Kassebaum, 2004, p 21.). Deutsch (1958) argued that having something invested in a relationship is a prerequisite for building trust. Grimes (1978) saw trust as a result of the actors’ previous experience of the relationship, and argued that how power issues are resolved could result in a trust relationship of confidence, neutrality or alienation.

Greenberg et al. (2007) distinguished between cognitive trust and affective trust. A cognitive trust judgement is based on a rational and calculated assessment of the collaborator’s integrity and abilities. In the current setting, cognitive trust may result from the vessel’s crew having repeated experience of collaborating with a given installation (and vice versa), and evaluating the extent to which the partner has been reliable in the past. An affective trust judgement is based on the emotional and social ties that develop in reciprocal relationships. It consists of an evaluation of the opposite actor’s kindness and hospitality. In the current setting, affective trust may result from the non-task-related communication and interaction between the installation and vessel crew, such as exchanging greetings and friendly banter, and making allowances and accommodations for the collaborator.

Trust has been seen as necessary for effective collaboration (Blau, 1964, Greenberg et al., 2007, Staples and Webster, 2008). This implies that collaborators and collaborating parties in safety-critical settings need some level of mutual trust to perform shared tasks while maintaining safety. Previous research has shown that trust plays an important role in the team members’ motivation to share knowledge (Butler, 1999), which is important for the team to work safely and effectively. In meta-analyses of a number of independent studies, Mesmer-Magnus and DeChurch, 2009, Mesmer-Magnus et al., 2011 found that information sharing is important for team performance, cohesion, decision satisfaction, and knowledge integration, and that information sharing was positively correlated with the team’s discussion structure, cooperation, and face-to-face interaction.

Social power can be understood as the ability of one individual or group to influence the activity of another (Emerson, 1962, Grimes, 1978, Hunt and Nevin, 1974). McClelland and Burnham (1976) noted that the acquisition and maintenance of power is one of the most socially motivating processes in an organisation. Rather than being innate and intrinsic, a need for power may be acquired through socialisation and may correspond to the motivations of seeking to impress, control and influence other people and groups (McClelland, 1975).

A power imbalance describes a situation where power is distributed unequally among collaborating parties (Emerson, 1976). Pfeffer and Salancik’s resource dependence theory (Hillman et al., 2009, Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978) noted that power is often rooted in an imbalance of resources, outcomes or activities. Organisations tend to formalise the division of power by establishing a formal hierarchy, but power can also follow informal divisions. The formal and informal organisation structure can thus direct power relationships, and the exercise of power becomes part of the organisation’s routine and its members’ worldview. Hofstede (1984) considered a power imbalance to be essential for an organisation’s structure and existence, because it alleviates disorder and confusion. However, an excessive imbalance of power has been associated with tension, conflict and anxiety (Sherif, 1966). Studies in the airline industry and medical setting (Helmreich and Davies, 2004, Helmreich et al., 2001) have indicated that different national or organizational cultures may have differences in ‘power distance’ that may affect the extent to which hierarchical power can be challenged, or in ‘uncertainty avoidance’, which may affect the extent to which power needs to be formalized. Lee (1997) found in laboratory and field studies that partners of unequal power were less likely to engage in help-seeking behaviour. In the relationship between offshore installations and their supply vessels, power may come into play because the two parties represent distinct and at times opposing actors working towards the overall goal of hydrocarbon production. From the competing values framework (Cameron and Quinn, 2005), it may be argued that although both parties are focused on stability, the installation acts within a hierarchy and is driven by efficiency, timeliness and consistency, while the vessels operate within a competing market and are driven by goal achievement and maintaining their market share. The installation’s goals may include the maximisation of the their own production, with less regard for the goals of the vessel and other installations. A vessel’s goal may be to efficiently fulfil its commitment to all installations on its route, while maintaining the crew’s safety and comfort.

Issues relating to power may be relevant to safety-critical settings, if they influence the quality or accuracy of the organisation’s communication. An imbalance could influence when actors choose to communicate, the frequency of communication, choice of communication medium, whether a given piece of information is communicated, to what extent the sender attempts to convey the information honestly, and the extent to which the receiver interprets the message in good faith. The communication serves as input to the actors’ mental model of the safety situation, and to their mental representation of the opposite actor’s knowledge. As the mental models form the basis of how actors make choices that impact safety and how they handle any arising emergency situations, this issue is relevant for safety (Bearman et al., 2010, Burtscher and Manser, 2012, Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 1998, Cannon-Bowers et al., 2001). Furthermore, nuances in the communication (e.g. the tone, friendliness and allowances made) may, in turn, influence the future relationship between the communicating parties. For example, safety could be impacted if power imbalance leads to inaccurate or misleading information, preventing each actor to understand the other actor’s motives or operational conditions, reducing the quality of mental models being constructed, and reducing the willingness to request further information.

In what remains the most influential typology of power, French and Raven (1959) postulated five possible sources for acquiring power. Reward power is an actor’s ability to control the distribution of various incentives, in terms of increasing positive valences and minimising negative valences. Coercive power is achieved by administering the distribution of undesired outcomes. Legitimate power is the authority that derives from a formal superior-subordinate relationship. Referent power is based on the ability to administer feelings of acceptance or approval. Expert power is the potential to influence others through the distribution of information, knowledge or skills. Raven, 1993, Raven and Kruglanski, 1970 later added a sixth power base, information power, the ability to influence others by controlling the distribution of knowledge and facts, and applying it in rational argumentation or persuasion.

There are also competing accounts of power sources, such as the theory of power-dependence relationships (Emerson, 1962), which states that power emerges from a relationship between individuals or groups where one party depends on the other for resources. Willer et al. (1997) differentiated between power, which they saw as determined by formal organisational structures, and influence, which they saw as informal and socially induced without the possibility of sanctions.

In our setting, there may be a power imbalance in the interaction between the installation and the vessel based on the allocation of resources. To the extent that the installations have a say in questions about the renewal of vessel contracts, they can be said to hold reward power over the vessels. The vessels have a support function to the installations by bringing goods to and from the installation, providing offshore storage, providing emergency support, or being involved in the relocation of the installations. The installation’s tasks may initially be seen as more directly associated with the industry’s main goal of hydrocarbon-production, since the search for and production of hydrocarbons are done on the installations. While the vessel’s tasks are crucial to achieve this, they nevertheless contribute in a more indirect way, which may lead to them being seen to have a supporting role. Such a relationship indicates subservience and can contribute to the vessels being the less powerful actor in the relationship, yielding legitimate power to the installations. In some cases, the installation’s decisions may impact the vessel’s efficiency, plans, comfort or well-being, thus wielding coercive power. For example, if an installation makes a vessel remain on location to wait for better working conditions rather than abort the mission, the waiting periods are uncomfortable for the vessel’s crew, can interfere with work rotas and delay future operations. The installations may also have information power, since a vessel’s schedule relies to some extent on information about the hydrocarbon production process that only the installation has access to. For example, the installation may claim that the delivery of certain equipment is critical to keep a drilling operation going, which may put pressure on the vessel to expedite the delivery.

The vessels’ sources of power are their expertise and privileged access to information about marine operations (expert and information power). The captain has the authority to abort missions on safety grounds, e.g. due to weather conditions not being compatible with the vessel’s capabilities, or not being comfortable with the safety of the installation’s work. Since such decisions may interfere with the installation’s work, this can constitute coercive power.

Power tactics are conscious approaches applied in a social environment with a view to gaining power for current or future use (Forsyth, 2010). Different tactics are used depending on preferences, strategies and what is possible in a given situation. According to Falbo (1977), rational tactics are approaches that apply common sense, logic and reasoning, for example to negotiate and compromise in order to get the other party agree to an outcome that is aligned with their interests. Irrational tactics are based on instrumental presentation of emotion and providing misinformation, such as engaging in indolence, pandering or lying. Another dichotomy is between direct tactics, where the agent’s intentions are clearly shown in their arguments, displaying one’s aims and being direct about what one wants, and indirect tactics, where the actor’s intentions are concealed, and the actor may make more subtle attempts to influence and manipulate (Falbo, 1977, Falbo and Peplau, 1980). Bilateral tactics are interactive approaches where both actors are expected to engage in give-and-take, such as persuasion, discussion or negotiation, whereas unilateral tactics are applied without regard to the opposite party’s approach, and may include making demands, evading or avoiding commitment (Falbo and Peplau, 1980). In soft tactics, the actor in control of resources exploits the relationship with the other actor through actions such as using pandering, friendship, cooperation, socialising or personal rewards, while, in hard tactics, control of resources is brought into play more obliquely, and may involve threats or rewards, such as using financial or tangible means to win influence (Raven et al., 1998). Grimes (1978) presented a model for authority and power, where the less powerful can exert social influence (persuasion, inducement or constraints) on the more powerful, and the more powerful can counter this with social control (persuasion, sanctions or insulation). The choice of power tactics has been shown to be correlated with the source of power (Kapoor and Ansari, 1988).

Work procedures, legislation and industry standards limit the extent to which the vessel or the installation can influence how maritime operations are carried out. The captain and the installation’s crane operator are to agree on how to perform an operation given the current situational conditions and risk assessment. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that parties use different power tactics to influence their counterpart, and that tactics can vary between situations. Since the installation is the most powerful party in the collaboration (as argued in tion 1.2.2), it can be expected to use rational, direct and bilateral tactics to exert power over the vessels. In accordance with established gender differences (Falbo and Peplau, 1980), the male-dominated hydrocarbon industry may show a preference for direct tactics over indirect tactics. As the actors are assumed to be highly interdependent, it could also be the case that, in order to maintain a good relationship, the installations attempt to exert power over the vessels only through bilateral tactics.

The current research project was commissioned by an international hydrocarbon company. In order to underpin and improve safety interventions, the company wanted to identify which challenges their chartered vessels saw in their communication with other actors. The aim was to investigate the communication between the vessels and the following actors: installations, traffic control, and supply bases (including port office), with emphasis on safety issues. The current paper focuses on communication between the offshore installations and offshore supply vessels, and in particular on how power relations may influence safety.