A risk-informed ship collision alert system: Framework and application
Introduction
Ship collisions remain a concern for safe navigation and marine environmental protection, especially in busy waterways and sensitive sea areas (Lehikoinen et al., 2013, Qu et al., 2011, Wang et al., 2014). Various countermeasures exist to support collision prevention, including training tools (Chauvin et al., 2009), technology for maritime surveillance (Bukhari et al., 2013) and for integrated navigation support services (Hänninen et al., 2014).
Several studies have shown that human error, and lack of situational awareness in particular, are important factors contributing to collisions (Chauvin et al., 2013, Gale and Patraiko, 2007, Grech et al., 2002). A collision alert system (CAS) enhances situational awareness of ship officers or Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) personnel, aiding operational decision making. A recent analysis has shown that implementing an enhanced CAS in a VTS center may be a cost-efficient risk-reducing measure (Lehikoinen et al., 2015).
The most widely used CAS is the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA). This technology tracks several targets and displays proximity indicators used for operational risk assessment. ARPA also includes a CAS, requiring two input values: limits for the Distance at Closest Point of Approach (DCPAlim) and the Time to Closest Point of Approach (TCPAlim) (Chin and Debnath, 2009).
The ARPA CAS has several drawbacks. First, there are no commonly agreed settings for the limiting values. Second, ARPA alarms sound frequently during normal navigation, causing nuisances as these are often perceived as unnecessary. This relates to the fact that ARPA only relies on DCPA and TCPA, while the same values for these indicators can, depending on e.g. relative bearing and heading, lead to a different risk interpretation and need for action. Consequently, some officers set DCPAlim and TCPAlim at zero, effectively switching off the CAS (Baldauf et al., 2011). Third, ARPA alarms are not informative in special operations such as convoys through ice fields. Finally, in special situations, ARPA can raise an alarm only when collision is unavoidable. This is illustrated in Video 1, which shows a radar sequence of a vessel transiting the Singapore Straits (Pahdi, 2011), with settings TCPAlim = 2 min and DCPAlim = 0.3 nm. Following events are of interest. 13:09: one target in close range to starboard is tracked. 13:13: alarm sounds. 13:35: target vessel overtaking on starboard side of own vessel makes a sharp turn to port. 13:38: own vessel initiates a turn. 13:40: own ship starts turning and alarm sounds. 13:42: a collision occurs.
A number of CAS methods have been proposed, in line with developments in e-Navigation (Patraiko et al., 2010). Hilgert and Baldauf (1997) propose heuristic criteria to categorize collision risk, refined by Baldauf et al. (2011) with fast time simulation techniques. Kao et al. (2007) and Wang (2010) propose fuzzy ship domains. Lee and Rhee, 2001, Ren et al., 2011 and Bukhari et al. (2013) propose fuzzy systems. Mou et al. (2010) apply dynamic adjustment factors to a baseline quantitative risk assessment. Chin and Debnath (2009) propose a CAS based on ordered probit regression modeling.
In risk and safety research, there is a recent focus on foundational issues (Aven and Zio, 2014, Le Coze et al., 2014), with calls for devising frameworks for risk-informed applications, focusing on issues such as how to understand and describe risk, and on suitable methods for measuring risk.
For policy-oriented maritime transportation risk analysis, focusing on effects of countermeasures on risk and/or its geographical distribution, some theoretical frameworks exist, based on system simulation (Harrald et al., 1998), traffic conflict technique (Debnath and Chin, 2010) or Bayesian Networks (Montewka et al., 2014, Goerlandt and Montewka, 2015a). However, no theoretical frameworks for CAS applications have been proposed, explicitly focusing on the risk-theoretical issues intended by Aven and Zio (2014). Goerlandt and Kujala (2014) furthermore identified a need for conceptual frameworks for understanding the ship–ship encounter processes and its relation to collision risk. Despite the various developed CAS applications, no such frameworks have been proposed.
In light of the above, the aims of this paper are twofold. First, a framework for risk-informed maritime CAS (RICAS) is proposed, useful for developing CAS applications for different navigational environments and in specific operations such as convoy navigation in ice. The framework includes a risk-theoretical basis (Section 2), an analysis of the construct “ship collision risk”, relating the encounter process with the risk perspective (Section 3), and a method for measuring this construct (Section 4). Second, the framework is applied and a RICAS is proposed for open sea navigation (Section 5). A discussion is made in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Section snippets
Risk-theoretical basis
In devising a risk framework, a distinction needs to be made between risk as a concept and the measurement of risk, which requires the formulation of a suitable risk perspective. Additionally, the intended use of risk assessment in decision making needs consideration (Aven and Zio, 2014). The first two issues are considered in this section, the use of the risk model is elaborated upon in the discussion (Section 6.3).
Operationalizing ship collision risk: theoretical framework
A framework for operationalizing the construct “ship collision risk” is proposed, aiding the identification of relevant SQs for assessing collision risk. Of central importance is the encounter process. While the framework is inspired by frameworks for road traffic encounters (Chin and Quek, 1997, Laureshyn et al., 2010), the specific nature of maritime navigation requires the identification of suitable measures, see Debnath and Chin (2010). The three underlying mechanisms in interpreting risk,
Measuring ship collision risk: method
In this section, the risk measurement tool and the model construction procedure is outlined, i.e. how the conceptual operationalization of Section 3 is transformed in a model.
Experts, area of application and background knowledge
The primary needed domain of knowledge concerns ship navigation in general and collision avoidance in particular. Candidate experts from shipping companies, pilot associations, training institutions and vessel traffic services were considered. Given the rather extensive scope of the elicitation, it was preferred to select only a limited number of experts who were able to contribute their expertise over a longer time period. This was necessary as the model was constructed in multiple stages,
Discussion
In the following, we address (i) the use of RICAS model in operational decision making, (ii) uncertainties concerning the developed RICAS method and (iii) application of the framework to other sea areas and navigational conditions.
Conclusion
In this paper, a framework for developing risk-informed maritime CAS has been presented, answering recent calls in risk research for increased focus on risk-theoretical aspects in applications.
The framework distinguishes risk as a concept and risk descriptions. The risk concept is understood as referring to the possible but uncertain occurrence of a situation where something of human value is at stake. Some characteristics of the conceptual understanding of risk have been addressed. In the
Acknowledgements
This research is carried out within the RescOp project in association with the Kotka Maritime Research Centre Merikotka. This project is co-funded by the European Union, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Finland. The financial support is acknowledged. The authors would like to thank the experts who have contributed to this study, and especially appreciate the interesting discussions with Pentti Kotilainen concerning practical collision avoidance. Finally, the authors are grateful to
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