Elsevier

Land Use Policy

Volume 84, May 2019, Pages 200-215
Land Use Policy

Bringing the neighbors in: A choice experiment on the influence of coordination and social norms on farmers’ willingness to accept agro-environmental schemes across Europe

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.03.006Get rights and content

Abstract

This paper aims to shed light on the challenges and opportunities of promoting farmers’ participation in agro-environmental programs at reasonable monetary cost in intensively used agricultural landscapes. On the one hand, the study assesses the costs of coordinating farmers for the implementation of the programs, as a complement or alternative to increasing the amount of land set aside for said programs. On the other hand, the paper responds to recent calls about the need to identify incentives other than monetary payments to promote farmers participation. Methodologically, the study consists of a choice experiment exploring the willingness of farmers in Germany, Switzerland, and Spain to participate in a tree planting measure. According to our findings, the resistance of farmers to participate in coordinated programs is not insurmountable and has to do with transaction costs as well as beliefs about other farmers’ behavior. Similarly, having conservation programs recommended by farmers can encourage other farmers to participate. Finally, different conservation framings can affect the resistance of farmers to participate depending on the emphasis put on the environmental benefits that farmers obtain from the programs. Overall, the findings illustrate the interest of further integrating farmers in the design of agro-environmental schemes and, further testing the feasibility of coordinated schemes in light of the influence of both monetary and social incentives.

Introduction

Adjusting intensive agriculture to natural resource conservation goals has become a major concern and challenge in Europe. Although farm activities have been the driver of much of the biodiversity loss in European landscapes, agriculture itself has also been understood as part of the solution (Batáry et al., 2015; Queiroz et al., 2014). This partially owes to the long history of farming activities and the cultural association of farmland with natural landscapes on the continent (Stoate et al., 2009).

Agri-environmental schemes (AES) are, with protected areas and compulsory regulations, one of the main governmental tools for conservation in EU countries, Switzerland and Norway (Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003). Like some compulsory regulations, AES target agricultural landscapes and promote the provision of ecosystem services via extensive agricultural management practices. Contrary to other tools, AES are voluntary and include economic compensation to farmers. Funds devoted to AES are substantial; they currently account for about 7% (i.e. nearly 20 billion EUR) of total EU funding for the Common Agricultural Policy programming period 2014–2020, which is approximately 20% of the expenditure for rural development and twice the cost of managing Natura 2000 protected areas (Früh-Müller et al., 2018).

The impact of AES, however, has been only modest. About half of the schemes aiming to enhance biodiversity, for example, lack positive effects (Batáry et al., 2015; Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003). This has raised questions about the cost-effectiveness of the schemes, as well as concerns about the existence of a trade-off between the ecological effectiveness of conservation schemes and the opportunity costs of participating in the schemes for farmers (Henle et al., 2008; Sabatier et al., 2014).

A European response to the trade-off between ecological effectiveness and opportunity costs has been the promotion of spatial coordination among farmers in the implementation of AES. Farmer coordination can help to overcome participation thresholds, facilitate agglomeration effects and targeting, and contribute to learning, economies of scale, innovation and sense of belonging among farmers (Carmona-Torres et al., 2011; Franks, 2011; Mills et al., 2008; Prager, 2013, 2015; Uetake, 2013). However, coordination also entails costs and risks such as transaction costs, constraints on individual decision making, and compliance issues, all of which discourage farmers from committing and hinder the efficiency of the collaborative ventures (Amblard, 2012; Ayer, 1997; Enengel et al., 2011; Ferranto et al., 2013; Stallman, 2011; Villanueva et al., 2015b). This paper focuses on assessing those costs as well as exploring the potentially countervailing influence of so called “neighbor effects”.

A response to the limitations of economic reasoning to explain farmer behavior has been the focus on “neighbor effects”, or the exposure of farmers to what is socially appropriate and what others think about them and their decisions (Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Burton, 2004; Chen et al., 2009; Jaeck and Lifran, 2009; Sheeder and Lynne, 2011; Kuhfuss et al., 2016; Chabé-Ferret et al., 2018; Le Coent et al., 2018). Our study analyses whether these neighbor effects can reduce trade-offs between ecological effectiveness and opportunity costs in the design of AES, and explores the relative weight of said effects compared to economic factors. With some notable exceptions, little empirical experimental research has been done in that direction (Chen et al., 2009; Jaeck and Lifran, 2009; Banerjee and Hanley, 2015; Kuhfuss et al., 2015a,b, 2016, Chabé-Ferret et al., 2018).

An alternative to increase the ecological impact of AES without increasing the number of farmers involved is increasing the amount of land enrolled. The greening reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was an important step forward in this direction. Farmers are now obliged to set aside 5% of their farms as Ecological Focus Areas if they want to benefit from agricultural subsidies. The measure, however, has fallen short of expectations due to a number of exceptions to the rule. These exceptions were motivated by the strong resistance of farmers to bear the opportunity costs of the measure, and reflect an ongoing debate about whether the 5% commitment is both economically feasible and ecologically effective (Rutz et al., 2014). Additionally, increasing the land enrolled also involves more spending. This paper explores the response of farmers to changes in the amount of land required for conservation as a test of the importance of opportunity costs in farmer’s decisions, as well as a reference to assess the impact of neighbor effects and coordination.

After an overview of the theory motivating the study, and the methods, we present the results of a choice experiment (CE) conducted in Switzerland, Spain and Germany, and discuss main findings with regard to the amelioration of the trade-off between ecological effectiveness of conservation measures and the opportunity costs for farmers.

Section snippets

AES uptake theory

Explanations about AES uptake abound. However, there are few if any universal variables that regularly explain the adoption of conservation agriculture across past analyses (Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). Variables can be classified into groups based on different criteria (de Graaff et al., 2008; Prager et al., 2012). This paper builds on the distinction between economic explanations on the one hand, and explanations that rely on cognitive aspects and social norms on the other (Christensen et

Material and methods

To assess the impact of coordination requirements and other attributes on farmer’s participation, we used a CE survey. The CE method builds on Lancaster’s theory of consumer choice (Lancaster, 1966), according to which individuals’ choices depend on the attributes of certain goods and their interest in maximizing the utility gained from those attributes. The statistical analysis of the data collected through CEs is based on random utility theory (RUT) (McFadden, 1973). According to RUT,

Results

The mail survey response rates varied significantly across countries. The rate was 30% in Spain (n = 37, Monegros and Sastago counties) and about 10% in Germany (n = 34, Uckermark district) and Switzerland (n = 163, Cantons Aargau and Zurich). Setting appointments with farmers at the Spanish and German sites was more difficult than expected and the in-person survey did not notably increase sample size. Given the satisfactory response rates obtained via mail we decided to use only mail surveys.

Discussion

Our results inspire several discussion points. First, the negative impact of the “share of farm” attribute is consistent with previous findings about the reluctance of farmers to give up agricultural production for conservation, and illustrates well-known tensions between agricultural intensification and conservation (Espinosa‐Goded et al., 2010; Schulz et al., 2014; Villanueva et al., 2015b). This is particularly relevant given recent recommendations to increase the agricultural land set aside

Conclusion

This paper sheds light on the challenges and opportunities of overcoming the trade-off between the ecological effectiveness of AES in Europe and the opportunity costs for farmers to participate in those programs (Batáry et al., 2015; Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003). On the one hand, the study assesses the cost of coordinating farmers for the implementation of the measures, as a complement or alternative to increasing the amount of land set aside for said conservation. On the other hand, the paper

Funding

The research has been conducted as part of the project BASIL (Landscape-scale biodiversity and the balancing of provisioning, regulating and supporting ecosystem services) under the Joint BiodivERsA/FACCE JPI 2013-2014 Call.

It has been funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation(Project number: 40FA40-158393) as part of the National Research Programme "Soil as a Resource" (NRP 68).

Acknowledgements

We thank farmers and district offices from Uckermark, Zurich, Aargau and Bujaraloz for their invaluable collaboration in the data collection process. We also want to thank the unconditional support of Karin Pirhofer-Walzl and Larissa Schaub, and the feedback from other members of the BASIL (Landscape-scale biodiversity and the balancing of provisioning, regulating and supporting ecosystem services) project, as well as scholars from WSL.

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