Multi-agent based experimental analysis on bidding mechanism in electricity auction markets

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Abstract

Determining the best market pricing rule is a controversial issue in the design of electricity auction markets. Pay-as-bid (PAB) has been proposed to replace the market-clearing price (MCP) in deregulated electricity markets, with the expectation that it would lower market prices and reduce price volatility. A multi-agent based experiment was constructed to compare and analyze the balanced process of the two auction mechanisms. Each adaptive agent represents a generator who develops a bid price and quantity based on a reinforcement learning algorithm. In the simulation experiments, the experimental results are not as expected. Before the market reaches equilibrium, the market price with the PAB mechanism is lower than it is with the MCP mechanism. However, the market price in the PAB mechanism is higher than it is with the MCP when the market achieves a state of equilibrium. With the PAB mechanism, the volatility of volume and price of each generator is less than it is with the MCP system, as expected. The experimental results also show that unconscious collusion behaviors by generators during the game process are a key reason for producing generator market power in the two auction mechanisms.

Highlights

► A multi-agent based experiment was constructed to compare and analyze the auction mechanisms in power market. ► The bid price and quantity of each generator is based on a reinforcement learning algorithm. ► In the equilibrium process, the market price in the PAB mechanism is lower. ► In the equilibrium state, the market price in the PAB mechanism is higher. ► The unconscious collusion behaviors are a key reason for producing generator market power.

Section snippets

Introductions

With the progress of the market-oriented reform of the electricity market, how to construct a good trading rule and auction mechanism has become a key issue. There are numerous constraints in the electricity market, such as the non-storability of electricity, limited resources and social necessity and the need to ensure real-time balance of supply and demand. With these constraints it is very difficult to design an effective bidding mechanism for the deregulated electricity auction markets.

The comparative and analysis of MCP and PAB mechanism

The MCP was adopted at the beginning of electricity market. Some problems of the MCP were discovered in the actual operations. In order to reducing the market-power of the generators. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission requirements California PX and ISO study an alternative schema because the price mechanism of California electricity market cause serious electricity market accident [4]. UK Power Market agencies believe, compare to MCP mechanism, it is different for the generator to

Simulation model of the two mechanisms based on Swarm

The modeling concept of Swarm is that a series of standalone agents interact through independent interaction events. It is a contribution to the study of the behavior of complex adaptive systems composed of many agents. The modeling principle of Swarm is to achieve the interactive behavior through signal transduction between the various subjects. Economic entities calculate their earnings according to the information received, and thus adjust their strategies. In Swarm, the initial values of

Swarm simulations

To evaluate the simulation model, as a scenario, the power market including seven generators in Chonging city of China was simulated by the Swarm-based simulation model proposed in Section 2. Taking into account price, power consumption, prices rise and GDP growth and other factors in Chongqing city, the demand function Pd = 1.5986  0.0055Qd of the electricity market can be generated by regression using Eviews. The inelastic market demand function is Qd = 2300 MW h. The maximum power supply and the

Conclusion

This paper proposes a complex model of a multi-agent game in an electricity market based on CAS theory. Quantitative analysis results were produced by a Swarm simulation to enable a comparative analysis of the behavior of generators under the MCP and PAB mechanisms. Through this simulation, it was found that the clearing price before the market equilibrium is lower with the PAB mechanism than with the MCP mechanism. However, when the market achieves equilibrium, the clearing price with the MCP

Acknowledgments

This project is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71073095) and by Youth Foundation of Humanities and Social Sciences of Education Ministry (10YJC630161).

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