The emerging power of peasant farmers in the tenurial conflicts over the uses of state forestland in Central Java, Indonesia
Introduction
Forest policy in Indonesia is generally based on models of state's ownership of and control on forestland and the resources. Since 1970s, the government has gazetted roughly two-thirds of the country's land as state's forestland, which is strongly controlled and authorized under the jurisdiction of its Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Barr et al., 2006, Maryudi, 2015). Over the past few years, forest land-use and allocations in the country have been curtailed by conflicting interests and innumerable uncertainties and complexities (Maryudi, 2015, Sahide and Giessen, 2015). There has been an increasing occurrence of spontaneous and organized landless movements and struggles demanding access to state forestland (Adi et al., 2004, Wulan et al., 2004, Afiff et al., 2005, Nomura, 2008, Marwa et al., 2010, Peluso, 2011, Maryudi and Krott, 2012, Lounela, 2012). These include occupation of the state forestland for agricultural cropping by peasant farmers (Peluso, 2011, Maryudi and Krott, 2012) and even growing demand for agrarian reform (Afiff et al., 2005, Nurrochmat et al., 2014). Some groups of local people have also attempted to claim ownership rights over some parts of the forests (Lounela, 2012, Maryudi and Krott, 2012).
A sizeable body of literature has explained the driving factors of land movement in Indonesia but most of them focus on processes at the national level principally on the changing socio-political landscapes at the end of 1990s (Moniaga, 1993, McCarthy, 2000, Colfer and Resosudarmo, 2002, Thorburn, 2004, Barr et al., 2006, Nurrochmat et al., 2012) and the overlapping land use policy and regulations (Casson, 2001, Santoso, 2003, Contreras-Hermosilla and Fay, 2005, Brockhaus et al., 2012, Indrarto et al., 2012, Maryudi, 2015, Sahide and Giessen, 2015). While all of this provides important insights and explains factors that encourage the land movement, the literatures give insufficient answers on the dynamics at the local or micro level. More importantly, how the power of peasant farmers is relatively strengthened manifested in prolonged occupation of state forestland restricted for them remains understudied.
Using the case of the forestland of Perhutani, a parastatal forest enterprise mandated to administer and manage nearly all of production and protection forests in Java and Madura Islands, this paper attempts to explain of the local dynamics of the land movement. It specifically tries to find the empirical evidence of the emerging power of peasant farmers at the field. This will provide a better picture on the struggles over uses and access over forestland in Indonesia, complementing the existing literatures. To explain that, our research borrows the theory of actor-centred power (ACP) developed by Krott et al. (2014). ACP has been intensively tested in a number of studies (Devkota, 2010, Maryudi, 2011, Yufanyi Movuh and Schusser, 2012) and has been widely used in research (Schusser, 2013, Yufanyi Movuh, 2012, Chen et al., 2013, Schusser et al., 2015) that focuses on understanding the empirical power resources of actors in social-political relationships.
Section snippets
The theoretical framework: actor-centred power (ACP)
The development of ACP departs from the fact that diverse actors are interested in forestry issues. Each actor may have different priorities and conflicting interests on the resources that may eventually suggest them to influence the formulation and implementation of forest policies, congruent to their respective interests (Krott, 2005). With this regard, their respective power is said to be decisive in shaping the outcomes of a particular forest policy (Krott, 2005, Giessen et al., 2009,
Overview of administration and management of forestland in Java
Approximately 2.5 million ha of forestland in Java and Madura is administered and managed by Perhutani the parastatal forest company of Perhutani. The forestland was gazetted during the time of Dutch colonial as ‘permanent forest estates’, which was distinguished from agricultural land of private ownership (Peluso, 2011). According the Government Regulation No. 72/2010, Perhutani is mandated to directly regulate the uses the forestland, while it also determines forest management, exploitation,
Research location
This research was conducted in Sub-Forest District (Bagian Kesatuan Pemangkuan Hutan/BKPH) Kalibodri, KPH Kendal of Central Java, one of the first batch Perhutani's KPHs certified by FSC. The forestland of BKPH Kalibodri is about four thousand hectares, sharing borders with six villages. Agricultural cropping has been long practiced in BKPH Kalibodri. In fact, it was first experimented in the region by the Dutch colonial a strategy to obtain cheap labor for reforestation activities (Simon, 2010
The weakened coercive power of Perhutani
A bulk of scientific publications (particularly Peluso, 1991, Peluso, 1992, Peluso, 1993a, Peluso, 1993b, Peluso, 2011, also Peluso and Poffenberger, 1989) has discussed the strong coercive power of Perhutani in responding the resistance of peasant farmers in Java in the past decades. Perhutani has been able to strike fears among local people even to enter the forestland due to its mandate to administer and manage the forestland, backed by the totalitarian regime, during which Perhutani has
Conclusions and policy recommendations
Our research is successfully able to identify factors explaining the emerging power of peasant farmers in the prolonged use of the state's forestland that used to be strongly controlled by the state apparatus. In fact, it is due the combination of the weakened power of the state apparatus and the more consolidated power of peasant farmers. From the perspectives of the state apparatus, it is its weak law enforcement capacity. KPH Kendal is weakened by the poor forest control by its personnel at
Acknowledgments
The first author would like to express sincerely thanks to Professor Dr. Max Krott, Director of the Chair of Forest Policy and Nature Conservation, Georg August Universitaet Goettingen, Germany for his innumerable academic inputs as doctoral advisor (2007–2011). All authors also acknowledge the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable and constructive comments on the draft of the paper.
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