Indonesia's Forest Management Units: Effective intermediaries in REDD + implementation?

Highlights

• Intermediaries deserve explicit recognition in REDD + policy discussions.

• REDD + intermediaries must take on transformative functions to reshape relations.

• Indonesia's Forest Management Units can be effective local REDD + intermediaries.

• Policies are needed to cultivate effective local REDD + intermediaries.

Abstract

Previous literature encouraged a hybrid institutional approach for REDD + implementation, where clear government policies help reconcile the rules, regulations and interests of external institutions with those of the communities involved. However, it is unclear how such an approach can be designed in the scale necessary to match local, national and international interests in protecting forests. For this reason, the functions of intermediaries deserve explicit recognition by key actors in shaping REDD + policy nationally and internationally. Indonesia is promoting the more localized Forest Management Unit (Kesatuan Pengelolaan Hutan or KPH) as a key element of forest governance reform for embracing REDD + and related initiatives. Using a case study from eastern Indonesia, we analyzed local factors driving deforestation and forest degradation. We then reviewed the work of the local KPH to examine the necessary roles of a potential REDD + intermediary. We argue that progress made by the local KPH in improving forest governance, including partnerships with local communities, is made possible by the KPH fulfilling the role of policy intermediary while taking on transformative roles reshaping internal and external relations. However, for the KPHs to fulfill their mandate as effective REDD + intermediaries, more concerted efforts from the central and provincial governments, as well as from international donors, are still needed. These include greater consistency in government policies and regulations, improved policy communications, and the commitment to strengthening the capacity of individual KPHs.

Introduction

Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), there are two international carbon governance regimes: the ‘Clean Development Mechanism’ (CDM) and ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD +). The CDM was institutionalized first as a cost-effective mechanism for developed countries to offset greenhouse gas emission with low carbon technology transfer to developing countries that host CDM projects. However, incorporation of forestry in the climate change regime under the CDM has been largely viewed as unsuccessful due to financial and administrative constraints (Thomas et al., 2010, Lederer, 2011). The proposal to offer financial incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation (RED) was first introduced in international climate discussions in 2005. Forest degradation, a source of at least 20% of total tropical forest carbon emissions (Griscom et al., 2009), was formally recognized in 2007, adding the second D in REDD. The “plus” sign was added in 2009 to acknowledge “the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries” in reducing forest emissions (UNFCCC, 2010).

REDD + was conceived as a type of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) initiative. With a new, potentially massive source of funding through carbon trading, REDD + promised to offer a new approach for climate mitigation based on a national crediting scheme (Karsenty and Ongolo, 2012). REDD + sought to create a win-win-win solution for climate mitigation, ecosystem conservation and poverty alleviation (Pistorius, 2012). Although far from guaranteed, REDD + presents an opportunity to enhance a variety of ecosystem services on the global (e.g., carbon and biodiversity) and local (e.g., water) scale through results-based rewards (see, inter alia, UN-REDD Programme, 2013, Grainger et al., 2009, Harvey et al., 2010). With careful project design, REDD + is also viewed as an opportunity to better define property rights and improve forest governance, while diversifying and enhancing local livelihood options (Larson et al., 2013). A hybrid institutional approach, where clear government policies help reconcile the rules, regulations and interests of external institutions with those of the communities involved, was encouraged (De Koning et al., 2011, Peskett et al., 2011, Poffenberger, 2009), with an emphasis on bottom–up project design (Hajek et al., 2011). Many REDD + project proponents see working with communities as the key to success and are paying close attention to tenure security issues at the local level (Resosudarmo et al., 2013). However, these efforts are insufficient in addressing the challenges originating at the national level (Larson et al., 2013), and lack of coordination between national and local efforts can seriously jeopardize project legitimacy and implementation (Sunderlin et al., 2013).

Thus, the question is how to design a hybrid institutional approach at the scale necessary to match local, national and international interests in protecting forests. In this hybrid institutional approach, local institutions must function not only as policy intermediaries that implement mandated policies and regulations, but also PES intermediaries bridging the external interests of funders (buyers) of REDD + projects with the interests of local communities (providers). Previous studies on the roles of intermediaries in PES arrangements in developing countries have focused on how international or regional NGOs can help socially vulnerable groups in arrangements between local people and government, i.e., the “pro-poor” element in PES design (Davis et al., 2014). Intermediaries can help shape the nature and process of the resource transfer between providers and buyers in PES arrangements, although their specific roles have not yet been studied extensively (Muradian et al., 2010). More recently, several studies have examined social networks and power structures among key actors in REDD + policy and information networks (e.g., Brockhaus et al., 2014, Moeliono et al., 2014). However, limited attention has been given to the potential roles of intermediaries in REDD + project design and implementation. In fact, very few studies have analyzed project design prior to REDD + project implementation (Caplow et al., 2011), especially how to reconcile the rules, regulations and interests of external institutions with those of local communities (Mustalahti et al., 2012).

In this paper, we focus on the role of local institutions in REDD + implementation using one of Indonesia's Forest Management Units in eastern Indonesia as an example. First, we describe the conceptual framework used to examine the roles of a potential intermediary in the context of a REDD + project. Next, we analyze local factors driving deforestation and forest degradation and review the work of the local Forest Management Unit in addressing those factors. We conclude by discussing the necessary roles of local institutions in effectively functioning as REDD + intermediaries, and the necessary investments for building and institutionalizing such intermediaries at the national scale.