Elsevier

Energy Policy

Volume 137, February 2020, 111186
Energy Policy

Strategic planning for power shortages

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111186Get rights and content

Highlights

  • 1.

    Lack of participation in planning for power shortage weakens the process

  • 2.

    Weak coordination of enforced networks deteriorates energy policy

  • 3.

    Continuity is important in between rounds in planning for power shortage

  • 4.

    Lack of feedback between actors affects planning for power shortage

  • 5.

    Lack of information threatens the national plan for power shortage

Abstract

Electricity is critical to almost all other critical infrastructure. Disturbance in the power supply would likely have devastating effects on all areas in society. Assurance of electricity to vital societal functions requires policies to manage power shortages. Such policies exist in only a handful of countries. This study focuses on one of those countries. In Sweden, the policy for power shortages, Styrel, includes all levels of society, all responsible institutions, and expert organisations. The policy is governed from the top down. We are primarily interested in how Styrel affects municipalities in their planning processes and supports decision making at the local level. The study is an interview study with key informants at the municipal level. The results show that the policy is supportive under certain conditions, depending on how the actors carried out previous processes. Lack of knowledge and support, and time pressure, characterise the process, although participants also have a sufficiently positive attitude to allow a more relaxed method of handling the process. The study provides insights on challenges that municipalities must manage in their work with policies for critical infrastructure protection.

Introduction

With the almost ubiquitous reliance on technological inventions, a reliable power supply is vital for society to function. Disturbance in the power supply could have devastating effects on all areas of society (Rinaldi et al., 2001). Although the power grid is rigid and redundant concerning power suppliers, it is vulnerable to various impacts, such as weather conditions, ageing of components, demolition, and cyberattacks (Gheorghe et al., 2006; Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016). Thus, although power shortages occur (Campbell, 2012), they are unlikely in most Western countries. However, planning for the consequences of shortages is necessary to ensure the maintenance of critical infrastructure.

In Sweden, a major disturbance in the power system occurred in September 2003, when the southern part of Sweden and the eastern part of Denmark experienced a blackout due to unfortunate circumstances that overburdened the power grid system. This outage in addition to severe power outages caused by severe weather events, such as hurricanes Dagmar (2005) and Per (2007), called for actions to ensure the power supply to critical infrastructure. In Sweden, numerous actors share responsibility for the energy supply, including the supply of electricity. The Swedish Energy Agency (EA) is responsible for creating conditions for efficient, resilient, and sustainable energy use (EA, 2012), and the Swedish Energy Markets Inspectorate is responsible for supervision, regulation, and licensing in the energy market. Furthermore, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) is responsible for the crisis management system and the measures taken before, during, and after an emergency or crisis, and the Svenska Kraftnät (SvK) is responsible for the Swedish power grid and operates the national grid. During a power shortage, the SvK is accountable for and permitted to impose manual load shedding (MFK) (EA, 2012; Veibäck et al., 2013). To ensure that MFK considers the maintenance of critical infrastructure, the EA developed a planning process called STYREL (steering of electricity to prioritise users during short-term electricity shortage). The process intends to identify and locate key consumers for vital societal functions and includes all levels in society, including municipalities, the County Administrative Board (CAB), county councils, national authorities, expert organisations such as the SvK (Swedish National Grid) and Energimyndigheten (Swedish EA), and the government.

The Styrel process is a part of the national crisis management system and governs based on a clear structure to support the decision-making process among expert organisations, municipalities, and national authorities within the power system. The aim of the Styrel process is to minimise consequences in the event of an electricity shortage. From 2004 to 2007, the Swedish EA designed the Styrel process in collaboration with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) and the SvK, followed by a pilot study in 2008 and 2009. This pilot study highlighted the necessity for a well-functioning network for effective implementation of the planning process (Länsstyrelsen Blekinge, 2009). Based on the pilot study, the EA implemented the process in 2010 and 2011, preceded by an extensive education effort at the local and regional levels. The process became a part of the municipalities’ ordinary work during the second round in 2014 and 2015. Due to the increased workload of the general elections for the municipalities in 2018, the EA postponed the third round until 2019.

As a part of the prevention of risks and hazards, all authorities in Sweden at all levels are obliged to conduct a risk and vulnerability analysis (RSA) (Abrahamsson and Tehler, 2013). In the Styrel process, the CAB is obligated and the municipalities are invited to identify and rank socially important objects and prioritise electricity consumers in their county in case of power shortages (EA, 2014). Because the need for Styrel is identified at the national level, we are primarily interested in how municipalities are integrated into the planning process from a governance perspective while considering that the local level would bear the consequences in case of a power shortage.

The aim of this study is to investigate how officials at the local level involve themselves in the Styrel process. The research questions are as follows:

  • What are the possibilities and challenges for the municipalities in organising and applying the Styrel process?

  • How can the organisation and application of the Styrel processes in the municipalities be understood from a governance perspective?

In our analysis, we focus on finding patterns of conditions for the process of creating a plan for prioritising electricity users.

Crises are often characterised as low-probability/high-consequence events (Weick, 1988; Park et al., 2013) that typically strike suddenly, are unexpected prior to their occurrence, are difficult to prepare for (Brown and Eriksson, 2008), and require substantial effort to manage (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003). In general, the literature has strongly supported that crisis plans increase the likelihood of success in crisis response (Steigenberger, 2016:9). However, authors have argued that the unpredictable nature of critical incidents is difficult to prepare for (Eriksson, 2010) and that the relationship between crisis planning and crisis management outcomes is more complex and nuanced than often assumed (Eriksson and McConnell, 2011). A power shortage would be a major disturbance for society. However, the complexity of electricity breakdown makes it difficult for crisis management to foresee possible outcomes. For instance, research on the effects of heavy storms shows that rural areas have managed power breakdowns better than urban areas due to their preparedness and alternative sources of heat (Asp et al., 2015).

Studies that include collaboration and decision making must consider, for example, time pressures, levels of information, and quality of decision-making support, because these factors might place constraints on the process and the ability to collaborate, as earlier studies have demonstrated (e.g., Paldanius, 1999; Danielsson, 2002; Yusta et al., 2011; Haavik, 2017). In the case of STYREL, these matters are crucial because of the design of the process (Fig. 1).

In the first step (1), the government authorities (1) identify the vital social objects within their realm. Each authority sends information on the objects to the relevant CAB. The CAB then divides the information and sends it to relevant municipalities (2). In step (3), the municipalities identify socially important objects within their geographical area and include the objects identified by the national authorities. In step (4), the power grid companies provide information on the power lines relevant to the identified objects. Based on the ranking (priority class) of the various objects, the municipalities rank the power lines in step (5) and then send the list to the CAB. Based on the ranking of the power lines, the CAB compiles the ranked power lines into a common list for the county. The list is then sent to SvK, which produces a national list that can be used to conduct an MFK plan (EA, 2014: 10–11).

If municipalities, prepare prior to a power shortage, follow the Styrel process, officials and community residents can be prepared for the shortage (Lee et al., 2007; Bird and Gisladóttir, 2012; Enander et al., 2014). In this sense, the Styrel process is a means to improve authorities’ ability to address a power shortage and to establish roles and responsibilities (McEntire, 2002; Comfort, 2007; Ansell et al., 2010; Ödlund, 2010; Steigenberger, 2016). However, preplanning for a crisis is not the same as having a crisis plan in place for the aftermath (i.e., post planning) or as planning and leading during a disaster (Alterman, 1995). The latter is vital in the Styrel process. The Styrel process as experienced in the model is a preplanning process for power shortages and supports decisionmakers in the prephase of the crisis. However, consequences for the municipalities are prominent in the aftermath of the crisis, and Styrel has no plan of action for during or after the power outage.

The Swedish crisis management system relies on cooperation between actors, including the public and the private sector. Three principles regulate the system: responsibility, similarity, and proximity. The principle of responsibility implies that individuals responsible under normal conditions retain that responsibility during a crisis. The principle of similarity implies that an activity or a process should function in the same manner during a crisis as under normal conditions. Finally, the principle of proximity implies that the actor closest to the crisis is responsible for crisis management (Tehler et al., 2012; MSB, 2015). A fourth, recently added principle states that all levels of government are obliged to collaborate in a crisis. The national authorities send their analysis directly to the governmental office and to the MSB, and each municipality sends in their plans to the CAB, which then coordinates the analysis for the respective region and sends those to the MSB and the governmental office (Tehler et al., 2012). Styrel is a part of the crisis management system. Although the process is similar to the RSA, including risk analysis and risk preparedness activities, the process is separate from the RSA. Furthermore, it notes that the municipalities must perform an RSA according to the law (SFS, 2006:544) on the actions of municipalities and county councils in the event of extraordinary events in peacetime and reinforced alert. In the act (SFS, 2011:931) on planning for prioritising socially important electricity users (STYREL), nothing is said regarding the responsibility of the municipalities or the county councils. This omission implies that the law requires the municipalities to conduct an RSA, but they are not forced to participate in STYREL. In addition to STYREL, the Swedish EA is responsible for a similar six-step planning system focusing on natural gas, called STYRGAS. Similar to STYREL, the municipalities also play a key role in STYRGAS, and in this case, they are not forced to participate (SFS, 2012:275; EA, 2016).

A high degree of bureaucratic autonomy and independence in executive agencies characterises the Swedish political system. For example, a departmental minister does not have the mandate to intervene in particular cases (Lindblom, 1997). Therefore, the decision-making bodies and the politicians are not involved in the implementation of political decisions. This distinction also applies to the crisis management system and is vital to the Styrel process.

The CAB is supposed to act as the coordinator in the crisis management system. Studies have demonstrated difficulties connected to this coordinating role because the system is characterised by a lack of continuity and conflict-solving mechanisms (Wimelius and Engberg, 2015) and a weak governance structure, including vague instructions. One study showed such difficulties using various river groups as an example, and they included different actors, had different focuses, and were differently organised (Olausson and Nyhlén, 2017). Studies on energy policy have demonstrated that the CAB needs to lead the implementation and thereby acts as meta-governor for the process to be more effective (Palm and Thoresson, 2014). However, this case is not so in Styrel, and subsequently, the plan's effectiveness in the county is affected (Olausson, 2019).

Section snippets

Conceptual framework

The Styrel process is part of the national crisis management system, as aforementioned. The planning process, and the crisis management system as such, requires cooperation between public and private actors at different levels and that the actors participate and have the opportunity to participate in the planning process and in the crisis management system. By using the concepts of network governance and participation, we understand how the municipal level has organised and participated in the

Method

We based this research on retrospective interviews and document studies (in 2014). The aim was to explore how officials at the local level involve themselves in the Styrel process. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to uncover how the municipalities organised and applied the Styrel process in their work (ref). The questions were predetermined and derived from the theories in use and based on a number of key topics. There were opportunities for the interviewer to ask supplementary

Results

STYREL is a planning process implemented by the government as a response to the risk of a power shortage, as was the case in September 2003. The process requires cooperation between private and public actors and involves networking between the actors. Subsequently, we regard the process as enforced networking. The results show common trends in the municipalities’ work with STYREL. In the following, we analyse the planning process based on three themes: the process, networks, and political

Discussion

The protection of critical infrastructure is important for the functionality of society. Because electricity is necessary for almost all critical infrastructure, the need to ensure a reliable, sustainable, and resilient electricity protection is crucial. The development of a planning process to be prepared for a power shortage is therefore important. Styrel is a planning process to identify and prioritise socially important objects in a short-term power shortage. The EA, with the MSB and SvK,

Conclusion and policy implications

As researchers’ have shown, participation implies that participants have sufficient time and resources, receive feedback on ideas, can follow their input in the process, and that the issue is open to argument and dialogue. As this study shows, much of this environment was not in place. Nevertheless, some informants clearly felt that they had participated in the process, mostly due to earlier involvement in the process. The most important issues for participation were observed to be knowledge of

Author Contribution Statement

Erna Danielsson, Conceptualization; Roles/Writing - original draft; Data curation; Formal analysis; Investigation; Methodology; Supervision; Validation.

Jon Nyhlén, Conceptualization; Roles/Writing - original draft; Formal analysis; Investigation; Methodology; Resources; Validation.

Pär M. Olausson, Conceptualization; Roles/Writing - original draft; Writing - review & editing; Data curation; Funding acquisition; Formal analysis; Investigation; Methodology; Project administration; Validation;

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Acknowledgements

This study forms part of the research project ‘From authority to citizens and back – A study of the interaction and communication in the context of STYREL’ funded by the Swedish EA.

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