Elsevier

Energy Policy

Volume 36, Issue 5, May 2008, Pages 1697-1711
Energy Policy

From state monopoly to renewable portfolio: Restructuring China's electric utility

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.01.012Get rights and content

Abstract

Deregulation and decentralization in the electricity sector have thrived worldwide since the early 1980s. China also started restructuring its electricity industry since the mid-1980s. The reform shares many common features with restructuring practices in other countries and exhibits some unique characteristics as well. To some extent, two features, namely governmental administrative departments’ dual role of government and business inherited from a highly centralized planned economy, and the coal-intensive nature of power generation, has determined many aspects of the evolution of China's electric power sector. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive account of the process with some emphasis on recent developments. We also identify some of the features that are similar to electricity market reforms in other countries and, most importantly, those that characterize the uniqueness of the restructuring practices in China's electricity industry through investigating the administrative framework, price and investment mechanisms, and associated legislation and policy settings at each of the five stages in the evolution of the electric utility sector. The paper concludes with a discussion and summary of some generic characteristics and remaining challenges.

Introduction

Since the early 1980s, utility restructuring has become an international trend. Chile was the first to reorganize its electricity market in 1982. The Chile practice has influenced following reforms in other Latin American countries. In 1989, the British government launched the restructuring and privatization of the state-owned Central Electricity Generating Board to separate the ownership and operation of generation, transmission and distribution (T&D). The British practice was then used as a model or a catalyst for the deregulation in other Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand. Norway introduced similar innovations in 1991. In US, early important restructuring efforts include the creation of non-utility generators in the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) and the introduction of transmission open access in the break-through legislation—Energy Policy Act of 1992; however, comprehensive utility restructuring and competition initiatives only began to be taken seriously by policy makers in the mid-1990s, marked by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 888 and 889 (Hogan, 2002; Joskow, 2006).

Experiences and lessons on utility restructuring and deregulation have been studied widely. Despite the differences in the models adopted in various countries, some common features and steps are identified. Newbery (2001) and Jamasb (2002) compared the practices in developed and developing countries and summarized some of the generic reform aspects: clear legal framework, incentive regulation (IR), separation of competitive segment from monopolistic segment, open network access, wholesale market construction, and appropriate privatization. However, the primary aims of utility reforms in developing countries are basically different from those in developed countries. In developed countries, the focus has been to improve efficiency while in developing countries the attraction of investment for generation capacity expansion is a main concern resulting from the chronic supply shortage which in turn results from a mix of weak infrastructure and high demand growth (OFFER, 1998; Rajan, 2000). The practices in many Latin American and Asian countries have generally followed this path (International Energy Agency (IEA), 1997; Lalor and Garcia, 1996; Mendonca and Dahl, 1999). Later in 2000 and 2001, the California electricity crisis led many to suggest that further electricity reforms be carried out prudently. The crisis had repercussions in both developed and developing countries (Brennan et al., 2002; Joskow, 2006; Rudnick and Montero, 2002; Yeh and Lewis, 2004). China has also launched electric utility reforms since the mid-1980s. The experiences in China have exhibited both uniqueness and common features compared with those in other countries. This paper conducts a policy analysis of China's electric utility reforms over the past two decades. The paper is organized as follows. The second section provides an overview of China's electricity industry and related studies. The third section investigates the utility restructuring in each of the five stages. Policy discussions and conclusions are provided in the last section.

Section snippets

Overview

China's electricity industry has developed rapidly in the past two decades. China is currently the world's second largest electricity generation market only after the United States. By 2006, electricity generation had reached 2834.4 TWh, which accounts for 14.9% of global total and is nearly five times the amount that the entire Africa generated (British Petroleum (BP), 2007). What makes China's power situation particularly compelling, however, is the coal-intensive nature. While coal

Reform of China's electricity industry

The development of China's electricity industry can be separated into five stages. This section analyzes the restructuring trajectory in the aspects of administrative framework, price and investment mechanisms, and legislative and policy settings. Special attention is placed on the milestone reform in 2002 and the recent initiative to bring renewable energy into the electricity portfolio.

Shift of reform priority

The development of China's electricity industry has experienced five stages: pre-reform state monopoly, generation promotion, state entrepreneurialism, monopoly dismantlement, and, clean and efficient power. A clear shift of priority can be identified from policies introduced at each stage. During the pre-reform period, like many other industries, electric utility was monopolistically controlled by the central government. The focus was to effectively mobilize and allocate rather limited

Acknowledgments

This project received financial support from the Alcoa Foundation Conservation and Sustainability Fellowship Program at the Erb Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise at the University of Michigan and the Chauncey Starr Fellowship Program at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. We would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments.

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