Elsevier

Economics Letters

Volume 115, Issue 2, May 2012, Pages 236-239
Economics Letters

The Troika paradox

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.042Get rights and content

Abstract

In three binary choice problems, people reveal a choice pattern which falsifies expected utility theory and many generalized non-expected utility theories. This new paradox challenges popular non-expected utility models analogously to how the Allais paradox challenged neoclassical expected utility theory.

Highlights

► We present a new paradox for decision making under risk. ► The new paradox challenges many popular non-expected utility models. ► Experimental evidence on the new paradox is presented.

Section snippets

Falsified theories

Consider a binary lottery L which yields outcome x with probability p[0,1] and outcome y with probability 1-p. Suppose that a decision maker finds outcome x to be at least as good as outcome y. Let u(x) and u(y) denote the utility of outcome x and outcome y respectively. Many theories of decision under risk postulate that the utility of lottery L is given by formula (1).U(L)=u(x)w(p)+u(y)[1w(p)].

A non-decreasing function w:[0,1][0,1] satisfies w(0)=0, w(1)=1. This function differs across

Experiment

In the experiment, subjects faced three binary choice problems described in the introduction. The probability information was conveyed through a composition of red and black cards. Fig. 1 shows the first binary choice problem as it was displayed in the experiment (translated from German).

The experiment was conducted at the University of Innsbruck (Austria). Altogether, 35 undergraduate students took part in two experimental sessions, which were conducted on the same afternoon (October 14,

Conclusion

The paradox presented in this paper combines old empirical facts into a new puzzle. People simultaneously exhibit risk aversion when facing probable gains and risk seeking when facing small-probability gains. Friedman and Savage (1948) previously tried to explain this fact. It was also popularized by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as an ingredient of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes.

Equally well-known is another empirical fact. When facing lotteries of a similar expected value, people often

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