Do oil producers act as ‘Oil’igopolists?
References (29)
- et al.
A martingale characterization of the price of a nonrenewable resource with decisions involving uncertainty
J. Econom. Theory
(1985) Exhaustible resource oligopoly: Open-loop and Markov perfect equilibria
Boston College Working Paper 199
(1990)Scarcity and world oil prices
Rev. Econom. Statist.
(1986)The competitive floor to world oil prices
Energy J.
(1986)- et al.
Oil development-operating cost estimates, 1955–1985
Energy Econom.
(1989) Information theory and the extension of the maximum likelihood principle
- et al.
A competitive theory of the oil market: what does OPEC really do?
- et al.
The rise and fall of oil prices: A competitive view
Ann. Économ. Statist.
(1989) - et al.
Dynamic modelling and testing of OPEC behavior
Energy J.
(1991) Oil and Gas Forecasting: Reflections of a Petroleum Geologist
Exhaustible resources and alternative equilibrium concepts
Canad. J. Econom.
Dominant firm pricing policy in a market for exhaustible resources
Bell J. Econom.
OPEC behavior
Amer. Econom. Rev.
On oligopoly markets for nonrenewable resources
Quart. J. Econom.
Cited by (37)
On the profitability of cross-ownership in Cournot nonrenewable resource oligopolies: Stock size matters
2022, Journal of Environmental Economics and ManagementCitation Excerpt :These findings indicate that the degree of concentration in supply will increase over time, and a group of cross-owners will eventually supply the resource before exhaustion. This result resembles the ‘oil’igopoly theory (Loury, 1986; Polasky, 1992), which predicts that small firms will exhaust their stocks before large firms do, leading possibly to eventual monopolization of the market. The increased concentration over time induced by cross-ownership confers market power on those cross-owners.
Are renewable energy policies climate friendly? The role of capacity constraints and market power
2018, Journal of Environmental Economics and ManagementOPEC, the Seven Sisters, and oil market dominance: An evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling approach
2016, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganizationCitation Excerpt :Ulph and Folie (1980) use a Nash-Cournot approach to model a primary cartel and a fringe with different production costs. Loury (1986) examines oil producers as Nash-Cournot players to find that producers with large stocks extract a smaller proportion of their stocks than producers with small stocks, and his work is supported by Polasky (1992). Gilbert (1978) uses a Stackelberg approach to model OPEC as a price-making Stackelberg leader with other producers as price takers.
Imperfect cartelization in OPEC
2016, Energy EconomicsResource prices and planning horizons
2014, Journal of Economic Dynamics and ControlNon-renewable resource Stackelberg games
2014, Resource and Energy Economics
- ∗
I thank Salih Gurcan Gulen for excellent research assistance. I also thank David Belsley, Ted Bergstrom, Severin Borenstein, Frank Gollop, Peter Gottschalk, John Livernois, Scott Masten, Richard Porter, Steve Salant, seminar participants at Boston College, Harvard, Resources for the Future, the Fall 1990 Natural Resources Modelling Conference at Cornell, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.