Political economy of a public corporation: Pricing objectives of BART

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(86)90008-3

Journal of Public Economics

Volume 13, Issue 3, June 1980, Pages 299-318

https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(86)90008-3 Get rights and content

Abstract

The revealed preference approach is used to identify the objectives implicit in the fare structure of a rail mass transit system. A model assuming bureaucratic aggrandizement provided a better predictor of actual fares than a majority rule or interest group political model. Bureaucratic objectives work to the advantage of commuters from distant suburbs who are relatively wealthy and young. The data is too weak to support firm conviction about these conclusions, but our methods contribute to quantitative political economy.

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The revealed preference of a government bureaucracy
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There are more references available in the full text version of this article.

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^∗: We would like to thank Lee Friedman, Bob Harris, Ted Keeler, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions. Partial funding for this work was provided by the Institute for Business and Economic Research, Berkeley, and the Sloan Foundation.

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Political economy of a public corporation: Pricing objectives of BART

Abstract

Memorandum Report on BART Fare Policy

Business behavior, value and growth

Theory of committees and elections

The internal organization of hospitals: Some economic implications

Bell Journal of Economics

Short range transportation evaluation program

The revealed preference of a government bureaucracy

Bell Journal of Economics