Elsevier

Orbis

Volume 50, Issue 4, Autumn 2006, Pages 657-667
Orbis

East European Democratization
The Political Economy of Georgia's Rose Revolution

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2006.07.006Get rights and content

Abstract

The Rose Revolution opened a new chapter in the history of modern Georgia. The post-revolution government achieved a number of successes in areas such as dramatically increasing state budget revenues, fighting corruption, and setting up effective cooperative relationships with the international financial institutions. But it made some mistakes, too, in building a democratic state in general and in its economic policy in particular. Its relationship with Russia and its excessive exposure to Russian investments is particularly troubling. The country's policies need to be fine-tuned in order to protect its democracy and promote further economic growth.

Section snippets

The Pre-Revolution Economy

Georgia's economic development from 1991 until the revolution, which was characterized by some successes but also several significant mistakes,3 can be thought of in three phases: the years of disregarding economics (1991–94), then consistent reforms (1994–98), followed by the rise of corruption (1999–2003).

Post-Revolution Economic Achievements

The concentration of power in the president's hands is the most notable characteristic of Georgia's development since the revolution. In February 2004, the parliament approved the president's initiative to amend the national constitution, giving the president the power to disband either the parliament or the cabinet in case of a conflict between the two. The constitutional amendments significantly weakened the parliament: a permanent threat of disbanding keeps parliamentarians loyal to the

Post-Revolution Economic Mistakes

One of the negative consequences of the strengthened presidential and weakened parliamentary powers is an intensified feeling of impunity among government officials, which has been manifested in their disregard for the rule of law. The judiciary has been degraded and denounced, and judges have turned into tacit executors of the prosecutors’ wishes. The government's control over the media has become overwhelming. In this context, the process of democratization and improving human rights has

Russian-Georgian Relationships

As the West's support for Georgia has increased since 2003, so has irritation in Moscow, to which the Georgian leaders respond in kind. The mutual reproaches between Tbilisi and Moscow have become increasingly loud. What policy does Russia actually plan to pursue with respect to Georgia and the other post-Soviet states?

Russia's policy toward these states today—the author of which is Anatoliy Chubais, the president of rao ees (Unified Energy Systems), a huge nationwide utility—is an updated

Conclusions

The democratic roots of the Rose Revolution gave hope to Georgia's citizens and allies alike that the country would develop on the basis of democratic values, respect for human rights, and economic reform. The fact that many of those expectations have not yet been fulfilled has caused much disappointment among the revolution's supporters. The new government is a kind of mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements.20

Vladimer Papava ([email protected]) is a Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. He was a Minister of Economy of the Republic of Georgia (1994–2000) and Fulbright Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Nitze School at The Johns Hopkins University's SAIS (2005–06).

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Vladimer Papava ([email protected]) is a Senior Fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies. He was a Minister of Economy of the Republic of Georgia (1994–2000) and Fulbright Fellow at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of the Nitze School at The Johns Hopkins University's SAIS (2005–06).

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