Promoting prospective self-control through abstraction

Abstract

When people anticipate that future temptations may undermine valued goals, they use a number of prospective self-control strategies (or “precommitment devices”) to increase the likelihood of future self-control success. Little is known, however, about the conditions under which people are more or less likely to use them. Drawing from construal level theory (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003), we argue that people are more likely to engage in prospective self-control when they construe events more abstractly (at higher-level construals). Results from two experiments demonstrated that higher-level construals promote use of two well-documented prospective strategies: choice bracketing and self-imposing punishment. Higher-level construals thus appear to enhance people's efforts to protect their valued goals from anticipated temptations.

Introduction

People employ a number of strategies to bolster their self-control efforts (e.g., Ainslie, 1975, Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991, Rachlin, 2000, Thaler & Shefrin, 1981, Trope & Fishbach, 2000). Odysseus, on his mythic voyage home, for example, bound himself to his ship's mast so that he could safely pass the Isle of the Sirens without crashing ashore, seduced by their hypnotic voices. People need not be mythical heroes, however, to guard against their potential for self-control failures. For example, people save for seasonal gifts in “Christmas club accounts,” which pay no interest yet entail early withdrawal fees (e.g., Thaler & Shefrin, 1981). Such financially counternormative behavior deters people from withdrawing their savings for impulsive reasons. To protect future self-control, people also self-impose deadlines (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002), make rewards contingent on self-control success (Trope & Fishbach, 2000), and regulate the availability of temptations (Wertenbroch, 1998).

Prospective self-control is motivated, engaged to the extent that people anticipate future temptations will imperil valued goals (e.g., Trope & Fishbach, 2005). For example, people self-impose higher cancellation fees as punishment for missed health screenings only inasmuch as they value health and expect the screening procedures to be painful (Trope & Fishbach, 2000). How consciously aware people are of using such strategies is unclear. Even pigeons, presumably lacking conscious awareness, engage in prospective self-control (e.g., Rachlin, 2000), suggesting that these strategies may be adopted without conscious intent. What is apparent, however, is that such strategies are used to protect valued goals from future temptations.

Despite their effectiveness and widespread applicability, social psychologists have largely overlooked prospective self-control strategies as means of improving self-control. Instead, social psychological research has focused narrowly on the moment of immediate choice, examining only factors that influence whether people's self-control efforts fail when directly confronted with temptations (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996, Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999, Mischel et al., 1989). For example, cognitive load increases in-the-moment preferences for chocolate cake over fruit salad, highlighting the role of effortful deliberation in self-control (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; see also Hinson et al., 2003, Ward & Mann, 2000, Wiers & Stacy, 2006). Exerting self-control in one task also reduces immediate self-control in subsequent tasks, suggesting that self-control requires sufficient “energy” (e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). Affective states also impact self-control (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999, Mischel et al., 1989). For instance, construing temptations (one marshmallow now, tempting two at delay) in an affective rather than cognitive manner (“the marshmallows look yummy” vs. “the marshmallows look like clouds”) reduces children's success at delay of gratification (e.g., Mischel & Baker, 1975). Moreover, negative moods are more likely to prompt self-control failures than positive moods (e.g., Tice et al., 2001, Trope & Neter, 1994).

Given the fallibility of self-control during the moment of choice (e.g., its susceptibility to cognitive load, energy depletion, and emotion; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996, Loewenstein, 1996, Wegner, 1994), it is surprising that prospective self-control has not received more attention in social psychology. When people can anticipate future temptations, they can promote self-control by engaging in any number of prospective self-control strategies to reduce or even obviate the need for self-control in the moment. What is not well understood, however, is when people are likely to capitalize on such strategies. The present paper proposes that how people mentally represent, or construe, a situation impacts whether people engage in prospective self-control. Specifically, we hypothesize that more abstract, higher-level construals promote adoption of prospective self-control strategies.