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On the Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Increasing Direct Participation Rights in Democracies: Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno S. Frey

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Abstract

This article explores several issues related to whether and how direct participation of citizens could be further developed in democratic systems. The analysis starts with an overview of Frey’s proposals for a democracy of the future. The article then addresses three main issues related to direct citizen involvement in public decision-making: (1) the link between extensive direct participation rights and Pareto optimality; (2) the question whether political parties do matter in representative democracies; and (3) the role of program evaluation in our modern democracies. The main conclusion of the analysis is that, given the current state of the literature, the search for Pareto-optimal policies does not appear as either a necessary condition (representative democracies have merits on their own) or a sufficient condition (referendums can yield inefficient outcomes) for extended democratic participation rights.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Kristýna Dostálová and Manfred Holler for their valuable comments.

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Correspondence to Benoît Le Maux.

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Le Maux, B. On the Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Increasing Direct Participation Rights in Democracies: Comment on “Proposals for a Democracy of the Future” by Bruno S. Frey. Homo Oecon 35, 101–109 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-018-0063-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-018-0063-x

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