Abstract
This paper attempts three things. The first is a defense and the rest is a critical appraisal of a crucial notion involved in the defense. First, it argues that John Turri’s criticisms of Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemological account of knowledge that it fails to rule out Gettier cases rest on a misconstrual of the “because of clause” which Sosa employs. Turri overlooks the notion of “success manifests competence” which is central to understand the “because of” clause. Thus, the position of Sosa is defended from the criticisms of Turri. Secondly, it critically examines the notion of “success manifests competence” which is a crucial notion in Sosa’s account. It argues, unlike what Sosa seems to hold, some of the conditions which Sosa provides for “success manifests competence” are not necessary. It also clarifies, by agreeing with Sosa, that the conditions he provides are not sufficient for “success manifests competence.” Thirdly, it briefly argues that Sosa’s occasional insistence that complete competence should be present in the case of success manifests competence brings in certain internal tension in the account of Sosa. Thus, the paper defends Sosa’s position from the criticisms of Turri; but it also clarifies Sosa’s account as well as raises some criticisms to it.
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Notes
Turri notes that usually under such conditions the agent also will believe that ‘the person who committed the murder had a limp at the time of the murder’. But that is not the belief under consideration. The belief under consideration is: ‘the person who committed the murder has a limp’; the belief is in present tense.
According to Sosa, this example will be considered as a Gettier case in the realm of action. As it is well known in the epistemology literature, Gettier cases are cases, which are formulated following Gettier (1963), where there is a belief which is justified and true but is not knowledge. Arguably, Gettier cases are cases where a mutually counter acting bad luck and good luck are involved (Zagzebski 1994, 1996). For a classification of the Gettier cases, see Hazlet (2015).
Greco (2012) provides the following examples which have similar structure as that of Hobbled.
Inspired Office Worker: Jones believes that someone in the office owns a Ford, basing his belief on extensive evidence that his co-worker, Nogot, owns a Ford. But Jones’s evidence about Nogot is misleading—Nogot own no Ford. However, another co-worker in the office, Havit, is inspired by Jone’s excellent reasoning about Nogot. So much so that he is shaken out of his long-term depression and goes out and buys a Ford (Greco 2012, p. 11).
Guardian Angel: Smith has an epistemic guardian angel who is keen to reward Smith’s competent performances. On this occasion, Smith competently reasons to a false belief, the angel sees as much, and so changes the world around so as to make the belief true (Greco 2012, p. 11).
However, Greco uses these examples to argue that agents in Gettier cases are partially credited for success.
Lackey (2009, pp. 38–41) also provides examples which have a similar structure; again to argue that agents in Gettier cases are partially credited for their success.
This is different from a performance manifesting adroitness. A belief is adroit if it is formed or/and sustained competently.
Turri states as follows: “I treat ‘manifests’ as primitive, relying on our robust pretheoretical understanding of it” (Turri 2011, p. 7).
One might argue that the example Fire is not analogous to the Gettier cases. It might seem that the competence of the microwave oven is not present in the causal chain since the microwave did not function properly. Thus, one might hold, the performance of the microwave oven is not an adroit one. In Gettier cases, the performances are adroit. Therefore, it might be argued, the example Fire is not analogous to the Gettier cases. However, it should be noted that adroitness can come in degrees. Though the function of the microwave went astray after a while, the microwave oven initiated the causal chain properly. That means that the performance is an adroit one to some degree. Thus, though the performance is an adroit one in a lesser degree, nonetheless, it is an adroit performance.
For example, see Sosa (2007, p. 23, 29, 42). While talking about the adroitness of an archer’s shot, Sosa says the following: “…there is a further dimension of evaluation: namely, how skillful a shot it is, how much skill it manifests, how adroit it is” (Sosa 2011, p. 4). Here, Sosa construes “adroit performance” as “performance which manifests competence”.
A performance manifests competence iff it is adroit. A performance can manifest competence without its success manifesting competence. This is clear since a performance can manifest competence even while the performance is not successful. Thus, “performance manifest competence” is different from “success manifest competence.” The former is necessary, but not sufficient for the latter.
As we already saw, Sosa provides the tripartite analysis of apt performance. That is, a performance is apt iff it is: (1) accurate, (2) adroit and (3) accurate because adroit. The condition 3 consists of two sub-conditions. Accuracy is because of adroitness iff: (a) accuracy is caused by the adroitness and (b) accuracy manifests competence. Turri mistakenly seems to assume that the third condition in Sosa’s analysis can be understood only in terms of (a). As we already discussed, Turri provides his four part analysis of adept performance as follows. A performance is adept iff it is: (1) accurate, (2) adroit, (3) accurate because adroit and (4) accuracy (success) manifests competence. In the third condition, Turri uses the clause “because of” only as a causal term. However, Sosa is not using the term merely as a causal term. As we saw, while Sosa says “A because of B” he means to say the following: (a) A causes B and also (b) B manifests A. Thus, it is clear that Sosa’s third condition consists of the third and fourth conditions in Turri’s characterization. That suggests that Turri’s account of adept performance does not bring any improvement on the account of apt performance which Sosa provides.
As it is alluded to above, Sosa exploits the notion of “success manifests competence” in his characterization of knowledge. In his view, an apt performance is a performance whose success (accuracy) is because of the competence. Understanding of the “because of” clause is crucial here.
According to Sosa, similar is the scenario in Gettier cases. In Gettier cases, the success (accuracy/truth of the belief) is caused by the adroitness. However, the success (accuracy/truth of the belief) does not manifest the competence exercised/adroitness. Thus, the belief is not apt.
As Sosa notes, the example the archer involves a “deviant causal chain.” That is the reason why he holds that the success is not caused in the “right way” by the competence. The example the archer is a deviant case in the realm of action. In cases of deviant causal chains in the realm of belief and perception as well, the success is not caused by the competence in the “right way.” Sosa holds that introducing the notion of “success manifests competence” in the account of knowledge will solve the problem of deviant cases of belief—such as the Gettier cases—and deviant cases of perception along with deviant cases of action. He notes that Donald Davidson’s attempts (Davidson 1963, 1980, 1985) to provide a solution to the problem of deviant cases of action makes use of the expression “right way.” Sosa notes that Davidson characterizes action as a success that is brought about by the intention in the “right way, ‘with the right kind of causation’” (Sosa 2015a, 11). Similarly, Sosa notes, responding to the deviant cases of perception, Grice (1961) characterizes perception as follows. “X perceives M if, and only if, X hosts a sensory experience for which M is causally responsible in the right way” (Sosa 2015a, p. 12; emphasis added). Sosa contends that the “right way” in the case of action, belief and perception can be characterized as “success manifests competence.” Sosa notes that Davidson holds that no definition of the “right way” is required. According to Grice—Sosa notes—the “right way” can be understood only through examples (and it cannot be defined). Sosa holds that characterizing the “right way” as “success manifests competence” brings advancement on both Davidson’s and Grice’s notion of “right way” in their account of action and perception, respectively. Sosa holds that while Davidson and Grice propose the “right way” one is not sure what that “right way” is. However, Sosa holds, if one characterizes the “right way” as “success manifesting competence” it brings more clarity on the “right way.” This is so according to Sosa since “success manifests competence” is a primitive notion which we readily understand.
For a detailed account of these notions, see Sosa (2015a, pp. 26–30). In his 2010 work, Sosa uses a slightly different terminology for “Shape” and “Skill/Seat.” In Sosa (2010), instead of “Shape” Sosa uses the term “Condition,” and instead of “Skill/Seat,” he uses the term “Constitution.” This is a mere terminological difference and there is no difference in the idea; see Sosa (2010, pp. 465–467).
Skill is a disposition limited to living beings, whereas Seat is a broader term which includes the disposition in living as well as non-living things. Skill is a specific kind of seat.
trigger + SSS + “trigger causing the outcome appropriately/in the right way.”
Since there is no criteria available to determine whether “success manifests competence” in a particular case, one has to go with one’s intuitive feel. I think that it is intuitive to hold that the success of the batter manifests his competence.
One might hold that the condition of “shape” is satisfied in the instance where the batsman hit the ball skillfully. However, that would be to construe the “situation” component too narrowly.
Remember, that according to Sosa, the right situation is determined by convention. Here in this example, according to the conventions of cricket, the condition of proper situation is not satisfied. Therefore, Sosa would agree that the condition of proper situation is not satisfied in this example.
Arguably, SSS conditions are not satisfied in most of the Gettier cases since the Situation component is absent in most of the cases.
Sosa claims that the virtue epistemology project he undertakes does not attempt to provide a linguistic analysis or conceptual analysis of knowledge. His project, Sosa holds, attempts to provide a metaphysical analysis of knowledge. According to him, a linguistic analysis of a sentence attempts to provide the pragmatics and semantics of a notion or a sentence. A conceptual analysis, according to Sosa, attempts to provide an analysis of the conceptual content of a word or a sentence. A conceptual analysis attempts to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions of a concept. The project of metaphysical analysis, according to Sosa, is very distinct from the linguistic and conceptual analysis mentioned above. The concern of a metaphysical analysis is not limited as to how the word is to be used: the pragmatics and semantics of a concept. Its concern is also not as to what are the necessary and sufficient conditions which constitute a concept. On the contrary, a metaphysical analysis attempts to provide an analysis of a state in the world. Similar to the position of Sosa, virtue epistemologists in general do not attempt to provide a conceptual analysis of knowledge, which has been a dominant project in epistemology. John Greco (2003, 2007, 2010), for example, holds that his virtue epistemology account does not provide any sort of analysis of knowledge. Unlike Sosa, he does not undertake a “metaphysical analysis” of knowledge either. Greco does not attempt to provide a linguistic, conceptual or metaphysical analysis of knowledge. According to him, he only attempts to provide “insight into what knowledge is by identifying it as instance of a more general, familiar kind” (Greco 2010, pp. 3–4).
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Acknowledgements
I thank the Indian Council of Philosophical Research (ICPR) for supporting this work by awarding me the Junior Research Fellowship. I am thankful to Prof. Prajit K. Basu (University Hyderabad) for his valuable comments on several earlier drafts of this paper. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers of JICPR for their comments and criticisms.
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Sreejith, K.K. A Defense and Critical Appraisal of Sosaesque Virtue Epistemology. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 35, 333–351 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0136-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-018-0136-z