Abstract
This essay discusses the fraud triangle, or how factors such as opportunity to cheat, motivation to cheat or ability to rationalize or justify dishonest behavior lead to dishonesty. The fraud triangle is applied on behavior of professionals active in fields such as medicine, education, research and science or clergy. Evidence shows that even in these fields, which attract more altruistic individuals, the fraud triangle factors predicts emergence of behavior in breach of ethical standards. In the conclusion several measures for reducing dishonesty are discussed. Disciplines such as forensic economics or behavioral ethics are emphasized to provide wider variety of tools to detect and reduce dishonest behavior.
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Houdek, P. Professional Identity and Dishonest Behavior. Soc 54, 253–260 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0132-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0132-y