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The Long-Term Effects of Matching Grants on Giving and Fundraising: A Longitudinal Study of Community Foundations in Indiana, USA

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Abstract

A matching grant is an important tool to leverage charitable giving. Most research on the effects of matching grants on donations has applied experimental methods to examine how and to what degree these grants affect donors’ giving behaviors. Through a 20-year mixed-method longitudinal study of community foundations in Indiana, USA, this study has found that matching grants not only have large and significant impacts on giving but also influence charities’ fundraising efforts. The results demonstrate that although matching grants could stimulate a temporal increase in fundraising expenses, they have a significant income effect and might discourage fundraising in the long term. Additionally, repeated provisions of matching grants induce an anticipating effect such that organizations delay fundraising activities for a higher future return.

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Notes

  1. Most research has applied field experiments to examine the effects of matching grants on selected donors from a single charity, and the match providers were anonymous individuals. The amounts of matching grants in field experiments were relatively small (less than $1 million). Some studies report matches provided by a private foundation (Castillo & Petrie, 2020) or multiple foundations and corporations (Meer, 2017), and on a large scale: Meer (2017) examined the effects of a $23 million matching grant through an online fundraising platform, and Hungerman and Wilhelm (2016) examined the effects of a $3 million matching grant to a university. However, no study has examined large-scale, repeated matching grant projects that support multiple charities’ development, like the Lilly Endowment’s GIFT Initiative.

  2. The NCCS is an open data platform for data on US charities. NCCS Core Files have been produced annually since 1989 and contain descriptive and financial information from Form 990, which is an informational tax form provided by the US Internal Revenue Service that most tax-exempt organizations are required to file on an annual basis.

  3. GuideStar is a database (now part of a new non-profit organization called Candid) that publishes tax-exempt organizations’ Form 990 filed to the IRS.

  4. The CICF’s affiliate fund in Hamilton County participated in all GIFT Initiative phases. The affiliate fund used to be an independent CF but later partnered with the Indianapolis Foundation to create CICF in 1997. Pre-2004 affiliate fund giving and fundraising data are missing. To avoid complications, the CICF and the Hamilton County affiliate fund were removed from the sample.

  5. For Form 990 prior to 2008, donation data were retrieved from Part I, Line 1, “Contributions, gifts, grants, and similar amounts received”; for Form 990 in and after 2008, the data were retrieved from Part I, Line 8, “Contributions and grants,” Column “Current Year”.

  6. CFs used different fiscal years for Form 990 reporting. The Lilly Endowment and most, but not all, CFs started the fiscal year in January. Therefore, 33 observations had negative checkbook donations after deducting the Lilly Endowment grants. In these cases, I moved the Lilly Endowment grant a year forward or backward to match the fiscal year of these foundations.

  7. For Form 990 prior to 2008, fundraising expense data were retrieved from Part I, Line 16b, “Total fundraising expenses”; for Form 990 in and after 2008, data were retrieved from Part IX, Line 25, “Total functional expenses” (Column D).

  8. For Form 990 prior to 2008, net assets data were retrieved from Part I, Line 21, “Net assets or fund balances at end of year”; for Form 990 in and after 2008, data were retrieved from Part I, Line 22, “Net assets or fund balances,” Column “End of Year”.

  9. Exceptionally large gifts are defined as gifts above $30 million. Excluding the three foundations, the maximum checkbook donations yearly are approximately $8–10 million.

  10. The Lilly Endowment uses the term “challenge grants” instead of matching grants. A typical challenge grant requires charities to raise funds up to a threshold to get the match. However, in the GIFT Initiative, CFs that failed to complete the challenge had their donations matched by the Lilly Endowment. Therefore, I use “matching grants” instead of “challenge grants”.

  11. The consultant’s personal communication with the author, November 14, 2019.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the helpful comments received from Lehn Benjamin, Nicolas Duquette, Jonathan Meer, Jonathan Oxley, and anonymous reviewers. More than the usual thanks go to Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm for helping me develop the theoretical framework and analytic strategy of this research project and to Helen Monroe for providing feedback from an insider’s point of view.

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Correspondence to Xiaoyun Wang.

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This research has been approved by Indiana University institutional review board (IRB). The IRB protocol number is 1711044024A001.

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Wang, X. The Long-Term Effects of Matching Grants on Giving and Fundraising: A Longitudinal Study of Community Foundations in Indiana, USA. Voluntas 34, 1243–1257 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-022-00551-x

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