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Functional reduction and emergence in the physical sciences

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Abstract

Kim’s model of ‘functional reduction’ of properties is shown to fail in a class of cases from physics involving properties at different spatial levels. The diagnosis of this failure leads to a non-reductive account of the relation of micro and macro properties.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, T6G 2E5

    Alexander Rueger

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  1. Alexander Rueger
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Correspondence to Alexander Rueger.

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Rueger, A. Functional reduction and emergence in the physical sciences. Synthese 151, 335–346 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9027-y

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