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Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims

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Abstract

This essay analyzes and develops recent views about explanation in biology. Philosophers of biology have parted with the received deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation primarily by attempting to capture actual biological theorizing and practice. This includes an endorsement of different kinds of explanation (e.g., mathematical and causal-mechanistic), a joint study of discovery and explanation, and an abandonment of models of theory reduction in favor of accounts of explanatory reduction. Of particular current interest are philosophical accounts of complex explanations that appeal to different levels of organismal organization and use contributions from different biological disciplines. The essay lays out one model that views explanatory integration across different disciplines as being structured by scientific problems. I emphasize the philosophical need to take the explanatory aims pursued by different groups of scientists into account, as explanatory aims determine whether different explanations are competing or complementary and govern the dynamics of scientific practice, including interdisciplinary research. I distinguish different kinds of pluralism that philosophers have endorsed in the context of explanation in biology, and draw several implications for science education, especially the need to teach science as an interdisciplinary and dynamic practice guided by scientific problems and explanatory aims.

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Notes

  1. Brigandt (2010c) presents a special notion of inference according to which explanations are inferences. However, this is not to deny the differences between predictions (arguments) and explanations, but to argue that what makes something a prediction or an explanation does not depend on its logical structure, but on the specific (empirical) content involved.

  2. This is well-reflected by the contemporary notion of the gene in molecular biology, which takes into account the complex and diverse processes in which DNA segments lead to different gene products, where this gene activity is highly context-dependent and generated by non-genetic factors (Brigandt 2010b; Stotz 2006a, b). Griffiths and Stotz (2007) call it the postgenomic molecular concept of the gene, as it stems from the postgenomic focus on genome wide gene function (beyond the mere study of the structure of individual DNA sequences).

  3. Heritable phenotypic variation can also result from epigenetic inheritance and niche construction. Moreover, given that heritable phenotypic variation is sufficient for evolutionary change, one may wonder whether it matters for evolutionary explanations what the basis of heritable phenotypic variation is (Godfrey-Smith 2009). I ignore these complications here, as my focus is on contrasting explanations of adaptation with explanations of evolvability.

  4. For a discussion of explanations focused on form and explanations focused on function in evolutionary biology, see Love (this issue).

  5. Explanatory aims are relevant even in philosophical studies of natural kinds, which have usually been approached from a purely metaphysical point of view. A natural kind is a grouping of objects that is not just a matter of human convention, but reflects the structure of nature. The standard project is to develop a metaphysical construal of what a natural kind is, and what distinguishes natural kinds from other kinds. However, I contend that epistemological issues are equally important, in particular the philosophical study of which particular explanatory aims scientists pursue when using kinds in their theorizing, and whether and how a grouping of objects into a kind meets the given explanatory aim (Brigandt 2009, 2011b).

  6. The philosophical importance of values in science has been particularly stressed by social studies of science and feminist philosophy of science (Douglas 2009; Kourany 2010). While some philosophers may still aim at a clear separation of epistemic and other values (where only epistemic, but not personal, socio-political, and economic values are a proper part of science and a concern for philosophy of science), at least in current biomedical research various values are so strongly intertwined in the production of knowledge that in my view a distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values is not philosophically fruitful. A philosophy of science that endeavors to study which kinds of scientific research are socially responsible will insist on the relevance of socio-political values from the outset (Kourany 2010). While it is beyond the scope of this essay’s topic, I view values in science to be of importance for science education as well. Science ought to be taught more as a social process that is based on institutional factors and various interests. Understanding debates about global warming and evolution not only requires that scientific facts are taught, but students should learn about the motivations and societal agendas of different groups, including groups of scientists, and what standards of intellectual integrity by different parties are used and how their values are defended (Brigandt 2011a).

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Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Kostas Kampourakis, Alan Love, and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version of this essay. This work was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Standard Research Grant 410-2008-0400).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, 2-40 Assiniboia Hall, Edmonton, AB, T6G 2E7, Canada

    Ingo Brigandt

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Brigandt, I. Explanation in Biology: Reduction, Pluralism, and Explanatory Aims. Sci & Educ 22, 69–91 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-011-9350-7

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