Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Soldiers as laborers: A theoretical model

  • Published:
Theory and Society Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Armies always reward soldiers in ways that are valuable in civilian life. Soldiers figure in two simultaneous reward systems: material rewards and symbolic rewards that stem from the prestige and honor accruing to military service. In general, inverse relations are observed between material and symbolic rewards. Increasing the symbolic rewards decreases the expectation for material rewards, on the condition that the former are highly convertible into valuable assets such as social rights and professional mobility. Part of the historical process of state-building, the end of mercenarism was accompanied by a decrease in material rewards, whereas symbolic rewards increased as military service determined the eligibility for citizenship and its status. Conversely, attenuated symbolic rewards increase expectations for greater material rewards, as a sort of bridging or substitute compensation. In turn, increased reliance on material rewards frequently devalues symbolic rewards as it subverts the soldiers’ image as bearing the weight of national missions and portrays them as holders of a rewarding occupation instead, as in the transition from conscript to volunteer forces of the post-Cold War militaries.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Moskos, C. (1977). From institution to occupation: trends in military organization. Armed forces & Society, 4/1, 41–50.

  2. Asch, B. J., & Warner, J. T. (1994). A theory of military compensation and personnel policy. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.; Dunn, L. F. (2003). Is combat pay effective? Evidence from operation desert storm. Social Science Quarterly, 84/2, 344–357; Kirby, S. N. (1996). Enlisted personnel management: A historical perspective. Washington, DC: Rand.

  3. Angrist, J. D. (1993). The effect of veterans benefits on veterans’ education and earnings. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46/4, 637–652; Angrist, J. D. (1991). The draft lottery and voluntary enlistment in the Vietnam era. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 86, 584–595; Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (1994). Why do World War II Veterans earn more than nonveterans? Journal of Labor Economics, 12/1, 74–97; Krueger, A. B. (2004). For white men, military service does not pay later in life. New York Times, Economic Scene Columns. 11 November.

  4. Kerstens, K., & Meyermans, E. (1993). The draft versus an all-volunteer force: Issues of efficiency and equity in the Belgian draft. Defence Economics, 4/3, 271–284.

  5. Segal, D. R. (1986). Measuring the institutional/occupational change thesis. Armed Forces & Society, 1/3, 351–376; Woodruff, T., Kelty, R., & Segal, D. R. (2006). Propensity to serve and motivation to enlist among American combat soldiers. Armed Forces & Society, 32/2, 353–366.

  6. See mainly Abbott, A. (1988). The system of professions: An essay on the division of expert labor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  7. Moran, D. (2003). Introduction: The legend of the levée en masse. In D. Moran & A. Waldron (Eds.), The people in arms: Military myth and national mobilization since the French revolution (pp. 1–7). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  8. Levy, Y. (1998). Militarizing inequality: A conceptual framework. Theory and Society, 27/6, 873–904.

  9. Burk, J. (1995). Citizenship status and military service: The quest for inclusion by minorities and conscientious objectors. Armed Forces & Society, 21/4, 503–529; Janowitz, M. (1976). Military institutions and citizenship in western societies. Armed Forces & Society, 2/2, 185–203.

  10. Lake, D. A. (1992). Powerful pacifists: Democratic states and war. American Political Science Review, 86/1, 24–37.

  11. Levy, Militarizing Inequality.

  12. Adventure/challenge, cited by Woodruff, Kelty and Segal (ibid) as among the major motivating factors in the U.S. Army of the 2000s, is not merely an institutional norm. It is one of the ways that the army provides its enlistees with social capital usable in the labor market, and may impact on the enlistees’ motivation as having civilian merit.

  13. DeTray, D. (1982). Veteran status as a screening device. American Economic Review, 72/1, 133–142; Teachman, J. (2004). Military service during the Vietnam era: Were there consequences for subsequent civilian earnings? Social Forces, 83/2, 709–730.

  14. Weede, E. (1992). Some simple calculations on democracy and war involvement. Journal of Peace Research, 29/4, 377–383.

  15. Enloe, C. (1980). Ethnic soldiers: State security in divided societies. Athens: University of Georgia Press.

  16. Mills, W. C. (1956). The power elite. London: Oxford University Press.

  17. See Soysal, Y. (1994). The limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in Europe (pp. 4–32). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  18. Dandeker, C. (1990). Surveillance, power and modernity: Bureaucracy and discipline from 1700 to the present day. New York: St. Martin Press.

  19. See Janowitz, M. (1961). The professional soldier: A social and political portrait. New York: Free Press; Moskos, C. (1971). Armed forces and American society: Convergence or divergence? In C. Moskos (Ed.), Public opinion and the military establishment (pp. 271–294). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

  20. Krebs, R. R. (2005). One nation under arms? Military participation policy and the politics of identity. Security Studies, 14/3, 529–564.

  21. For a critical, comprehensive discussion, see Krebs, R. R. (2004). A school for the nation? How military service does not build nations, and how it might. International Security, 28/4, 85–124.

  22. Levy, Y. (2003). Social convertibility and militarism: Evaluations of the development of military–society relations in Israel in the early 2000s. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 31/1, 71–96.

  23. Latzko, D. A. (1997). The market for mercenaries. Paper presented at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Crystal City, VA.

  24. Thomson, J. E. (1990). State practices, international norms and the decline of mercenarism. International Studies Quarterly, 34/1, 23–47.

  25. Burk. Citizenship status and military service. 503–529; Janowitz. Military Institutions and Citizenship. 185–203.

  26. Tilly, C. (1997). Democracy is a lake. Roads from past to future (pp. 193–215). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

  27. Burk, J. (2001). The military obligation of citizens since Vietnam. Parameters, 31/2, 48–60.

  28. Kirby. Enlisted Personnel Management. 119.

  29. Callan, J. F. (1858). The military laws of the United States relating to the army, marine corps, volunteers, militia, and to bounty lands and pensions, from the foundation of the government to the year 1858. Baltimore: J. Murphy & Co. 272–273, 276, 351–352.

  30. Dandeker, Surveillance, power and modernity, 93–101; Ferguson, N. (2001). The cash nexus: Money and power in the modern world, 1700–2000. New York: Basic Books; Tilly, C. (1992). Coercion, capital, and European States, AD 990–1992. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

  31. Thomson. State practices. 32–33.

  32. Importantly, Area B is schematically located at the upper-right corner, though it may actually be located in a lower position close to Area D. The move from D to B is meant as a process rather as an ultimate positioning.

  33. Moffat, W. C. (2000). Soldiers pay. Cincinnati, OH: Cincinnati Civil War Round Table. http://members.aol.com/CintiCWRT/soldier_pay.html).

  34. Office of War Information Press Release (1943). Rights and privileges of American servicemen. May 23.

  35. For example, in the years 1861–1864, an army private’s base pay was $13 per month and grew to $50 in World War II (Moffat, Soldiers Pay). Given that real wages grew in theses years by about 500% [Jeremy Greenwood and Ananth Seshadri, “The U.S. Demographic Transition,” American Economic Review 92, 2 (2002): 153–159], soldiers’ pay was not significantly improved.

  36. Hancock, W. K., & Gowing, M. M. (1949). History of the Second World War: British war economy (pp. 505–506). London: U.K. Civil Series.

  37. Campbell, A. (2004). The invisible welfare state: Establishing the phenomenon of twentieth century veteran’s benefits. Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 32/2, 249–267.

  38. Burk. The military obligation of citizens; Skocpol, T. (1997). Lessons from history: Building a movement for America’s children. Washington, DC: The Children’s Partnership.

  39. Giving the lie to the public belief that recruits enjoyed preferred rewards, World War II veterans earned 5–10% less than comparable nonveterans. Military service thus reduced the veterans’ levels of earning from what they otherwise would have been without losing civilian experience. However, this economic consequence was not reflected in the public discourse. See Angrist and Krueger, “Why Do World War II Veterans Earn More,” 74–97.

  40. Abbott, System of Professions.

  41. Abu-Lughod, D. I. (2000). Failed buyout: Land rights for contra veterans in postwar Nicaragua. Latin American Perspectives, 27/3, 32–62.

  42. Kirby. Enlisted Personnel Management. 210–121.

  43. Inglehart, R. (1977). The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among western publics (p. 49). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

  44. Burk. Citizenship status and military service. 503–529; Feld, M. D. (1977). The structure of violence: Armed forces as social systems. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

  45. Harries-Jenkins and Moskos cited in Ajangiz, R. (2001). Being influential without participating in the policy process. The case of conscription in Western Europe (pp. 3–4), European Consortium for Political Research.

  46. Angrist. Draft lottery. 584–595.

  47. Angrist, J. D. (1990). Lifetime earnings and the Vietnam era draft lottery: evidence from Social Security administrative records. American Economic Review, 80/3, 313–336.

  48. In Abbott’s terms, The System of Professions.

  49. Levy. Social convertibility and militarism. 79

  50. Carrell, S. E. (2004). Local labor market effects on air force reenlistment. Department of Economics and Geography, US AIR FORCE Academy.

  51. Dunn. Is combat pay effective? 344–357.

  52. Ajangiz, R. (2000). The European farewell to conscription? In L. Mjoset & S. Van Holde (Eds.), The comparative study of conscription in the armed forces (pp. 307–335). Amsterdam: JAI Press.

  53. For different perspectives, see: Kier, E. (1995). Cultural and military doctrine: France between the wars. International Security, 19/4, 65–93; Sandel, M. J. (1998). What money can’t buy: The moral limits of markets, Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered at Brasenose College, Oxford (pp. 11–12).

  54. Theoretically drawn from Tilly, C. (1998). Durable inequality. Berkeley: University of California Press.

  55. Enloe. Ethnic Soldiers.

  56. Sion, L. (2006). Too innocent and sweet for war: Dutch peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo. Armed Forces & Society, 32/3, 454–474.

  57. Appy, C. G. (1993). Working class war: American combat soldiers and Vietnam (pp. 35–43). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press; Fallows, J. (1993). Low-class conclusions. Atlantic Monthly, 271/4, 38–42; For another approach, see Barnett, A., Stanley, T., & Shore, M. (1992). America’s Vietnam casualties: Victims of a class war? Operations Research, 40, 856–866.

  58. Berube, A. (1990). Coming out under fire: The history of gay men and women in World War Two. New York: Free Press; Sullivan, A. (1995). Virtually normal: An argument about homosexuality. New York: Knopf.

  59. See, at the theoretical level, Marx, A. W. (1996). Race-making and the nation–state. World Politics, 48/2, 180–208.

  60. Hisnanick, J. J. (2003). A great place to start: The role of military service on human capital formation. Labour, 17/1, 25–45; Krueger. For white men.

  61. Kerstens, & Meyermans. Draft versus an all-volunteer force. 271–284.

  62. Angrist. Effect of veterans benefits. 638–639.

  63. MacLean, A. (2005). Lessons from the cold war: Military service and college education. Sociology of Education, 78/3, 250–266.

  64. Kirby. Enlisted Personnel Management. 128–129.

  65. Kirby. Enlisted Personnel Management. 131.

  66. Levy, Militarizing inequality. 873–904. For other views, see Burk, Military Obligation of Citizens. 48–60.

  67. Williams, C. (2005). From conscription to volunteers: NATO’s transitions to all-volunteer forces. The Naval War College Review, 58/1, 42.

  68. Gilroy, C. L., Phillips, R. L., & Blair, J. D. (1990). The all-volunteer army: Fifteen years later. Armed Forces & Society, 16/3, 329–350; Kirby. Enlisted Personnel Management. 119–124.

  69. Asch, B. J., Hosek, J. R., & Warner, J. T. (2001). An analysis of pay for enlisted personnel. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

  70. Goldich, R. L. (2004). Military pay and benefits: Key questions and answers. CRS Issue Brief for Congress.

  71. Williams. From Conscription to Volunteers. 46–52.

  72. James, N. A. (1993). What does the future hold for the Russian military? USA Today. January 7

  73. Betz, D. J., & Volkov, V. G. (2003). The false dawn of Russian military reform. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 4(2), 45–51.

  74. Doeringer, P., & Piore, M. J. (1971). Internal labor markets and manpower analysis (pp. 1–2). Lexington, MA: Heath.

  75. Rosen, S. (1992). The military as an internal labor market: Some allocation, productivity, and incentive problems. Social Science Quarterly, 73/2, 227–237.

  76. Asch, & Warner. Theory of military compensation. xv–xvi.

  77. Becker, G. S. (2001). Yes, raise military pay. Just do it cleverly. Business Week, 3719, 12.

  78. Fukuyama, F., & Shulsky, A. N. (1997). The “virtual corporation” and army organization. Washington: Rand.

  79. Posner, R. A. (2003). An army of the willing. The new republic. May 19.

  80. Snider, D. M., & Watkins, G. (2000). The future of army professionalism: A need for renewal and redefinition. Parameters, 30/3, 5–20.

  81. Heinecken, L. (1995). Military unionism in South Africa: Legality and potential for development. African Security Review, 4/5 (Internet edition).

  82. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy.

  83. Avant, D. (2005). The market for force: The consequences of privatizing security. New York: Cambridge University Press; Mandel, R. (2001). The privatization of security. Armed Forces & Society, 28/1, 129–151.

  84. Snider, D. M. (2003). Jointness, defense transformation, and the need for a new joint warfare profession. Parameters, 33/3, 23.

  85. Snider & Watkins, “The future of army professionalism,” 13–14.

  86. Segal. Measuring the Institutional/Occupational.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Guy Ben-Porat, Yinon Cohen, Erez Tzfadia, and especially Michael Shalev for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article, and to the reviewers and Editors of Theory and Society whose advice enabled me to clarify the argument. My special thanks to Shlomo Mizrahi who encouraged me to theorize the subject. I am especially indebted to Charles Tilly for his enduring support and guidance.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Policy and Administration, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, PO B. 653, Beer-Sheva, 84105, Israel

    Yagil Levy

Authors
  1. Yagil Levy
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Yagil Levy.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Levy, Y. Soldiers as laborers: A theoretical model. Theor Soc 36, 187–208 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-007-9028-y

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-007-9028-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation