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Notes
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) is abridged as Calculus throughout.
Buchanan relates utility maximization to Arrow’s, Black’s, Downs’s and Schumpeter’s accounts of political choice, while he associates the idea of “politics as exchange” chiefly to Wicksell in Buchanan (1987).
Binmore (2009) discusses the small versus the large world problem very well.
Giving up the unanimity criterion for in-period decisions can itself be seen as a higher order Pareto-superior move.
It is unclear why the political economist at time t n should rely on some former preference profile (P 1(t 0),P 2(t 0),…,P k (t 0)), rather than on the profile P(t n ) at t n >t 0. Of course, to the extent that individuals have committed themselves to accept the outcomes of certain procedures at a former time, they may be treated as normatively bound. Yet the theorist must make a decision about which preferences he will apply.
“The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done but cannot do at all, or cannot do so well for themselves in their separate and individual capacities. In all that people can do individually as well for themselves, government ought not to interfere.” Abraham Lincoln in an 1854 speech.
It seems that the ratificatory role of the protective state is the best—perhaps the only—way to make good sense of Hayek’s distinction between the rule of law and legislation.
The sphere that is beyond substantive rather than merely ratificatory in-period “politics” may be defined politically when the constitution is set up.
Applied to the productive state the unanimity criterion of the Calculus is right on the mark. Having a veto presupposes that everything is forbidden unless accepted by everybody; see also Kliemt (1994).
As in Buchanan (1975), of course.
The Buchanan and Congleton (1998) way out via strengthening the generality criterion is inspiring yet leaves too many interpretative loopholes. Requiring more inclusive voting thresholds and extending compensation payments to those who end up in political minorities in the spirit of Wicksell seems more promising.
Preferring the Pareto criterion to any notion of a “maximum sum” of utility in evaluating policies, and favoring, other things being equal, “unanimity” to anything less than unanimity then seems natural.
References
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Buchanan, J. M. (1987). Justification of the compound republic. The calculus in retrospect. The Cato Journal, 7, 305–312.
Buchanan, J. M., & Congleton, R. (1998). Politics by principle, not interest: towards nondiscriminatory democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J. M., & Tullock, G. (1962). The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
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Kliemt, H. The consents of The Calculus . Public Choice 152, 439–443 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9996-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9996-y