Abstract
We use key events associated in the two decade-long U.S.–Canada softwood lumber trade dispute to present the dynamic relationship between U.S. Congress and the Administration in the formation of international trade policy. We find that the executive branch of the U.S. government responded quickly to several letters from a group of U.S. Senators demanding a solution to the “lumber problem.” A roll call analysis is used to identify factors influencing Senators’ willingness to sign these letters and pressure the President on behalf of the U.S. lumber industry. The results show that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a Senator’s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a Senator less likely to sign these letters.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Apsey, T. M., & Thomas, J. C. (1997). The lessons of the softwood lumber disputes: politics, protectionism, and the panel process. Council of Forest Industry, Vancouver, Canada.
Berg, S., & Tschirhart J. (1988). Natural monopoly regulation: principles and practices. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Becker, G. S. (1983). A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 371–400.
Bullock, D. S. (1992a). Redistributing income back to European community consumers and taxpayers through the common agricultural policy. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74, 59–69.
Bullock, D. S. (1992b). Objectives and constraints of government policy: the countercyclicity of transfers to agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74, 618–629.
Cashore, B. (1998). Flights of the Phoenix: Explaining the durability of the Canada–U.S. softwood lumber dispute. Canadian-American Public Policy, No. 32. The Canadian–American Center, University of Maine.
Crone, L. (1995). United States forestry policy: bureaucratic discretion or congressional dominance? Department of Economics, Weber State University. Ogden, Utah.
Finger, J. M., Hall, H. K., & Nelson D.R. (1982). The political economy of administered protection. American Economic Review 72(3), 452–66.
Fox, I. K. (1991). The politics of Canada–U.S. trade in forest products. In R. S. Uhler (Ed.), Canada–United States Trade in Forest Products. (pp. 15–56) Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press: Canada.
Gardner, B. L. (1983). Efficient redistribution through commodity markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65, 225–34.
Gardner, B. L. (1987). Causes of U.S. farm commodity programs. Journal of Political Economics 95, 290–310.
Gorte, R. W. (1996). softwood lumber imports: the 1996 U.S.–Canada agreement. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.
Joskow, P. (1972). Determination of the allowed rate of return in a formal regulatory proceeding. Bell Jorunal of Economics and Management Science 3(2), 632–44.
Kalt, J. (1988). The political economy of protectionism: tariffs and retaliation in the timber industry. P. 339–68 In R. E. Baldwin (Ed.), Trade policy issues and empirical analysis. University of Chicago Press.
Kalt, J., & Zupan M. (1984). Capture and ideology in the economic theory of politics. American Economic Review 74(3), 279–300.
Kernell, S., & Jacobson G. C. (2000). The Logic of American Politics. CQ Press, Washington, DC.
MacNair, D., Holmes T., Palmquist R., & J. Loomis (1995) A public choice model of forest service decision making. Paper presented at the 1995 American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting. Indianapolis, Indiana. August (6–9)
Marks, S. V., & J. McArthur. (1990). Empirical analyses of the determinants of protection: a survey and some new results. In J. S. Odell and T. D. Willett (Eds), International trade policy: Gains from exchange between economics and political science. University of Michigan Press. Arbor, Michigan.
Mehmood, S., & D. Zhang. (2001). A roll call analysis of endangered species Act Amendments. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 83(3), 501–12.
Nelson, R. A. (1982). An empirical test of the Ramsey theory and Stegler–Peltzman theory of public utility pricing. Economic Inquiry 20, 227–90.
Noll, R. (1989). Economic perspectives on the politics off regulation. In R. Schmalensee and R. Willig (Eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol II. New York: North-Holland.
O’Toole, R. (1988). Reforming the Forest Service. Island Press. Washington, DC.
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a more general theory of regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19(2), 211–40.
Peltzman, S. (1984). Constituent interest and congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 27(1), 181–210.
Powell, D. S., Faulkner, J. L., Darr, D. R., Zhu, Z., & MacCleery, D. W. (1994). Forest Resources of the United States, 1992, General Technical Report RM-234. USDA Forest Service Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, Fort Collins, CO.
Rausser, G. C. (1982). Political economics markets: PERTs and PESTs in food and agriculture. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 64, 641–52.
Rausser, G. C., & Foster W. E. (1990). Political preference functions and public policy reform. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 72, 290–310.
Ritchie, G. (1997). Wrestling with the elephant: The inside story of the Canada–U.S. trade wars. Macfarlane Water & Ross. Toronto, Canada.
Smith, W. B., Vissage, J. S., Darr, D. R., & Sheffield, R. M. (2001). Forest Resoures of the United States, 1997, General Technical Report NC-219. St. Paul, MN, U.S. Forest Service North Central Research Station.
Spelter, H., & T. McKeever. (2001). Profile 2001: Softwood sawmills in the United States and Canada. Research Paper FPL-RP-594. Madison, Wisconsin: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Forest Products Laboratory. 73p.
Stigler, G. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1), 3–21.
Teske, P., S. Best & M. Minstrom. (1994). The economic theory of regulation and trucking deregulation: Shifting to the state level. Public Choice 79(2), 247–56.
U.S. Bureau of Census. (1992). Lumber production and mill stocks: 1991. MA24T(91)-1. Industry Division, Washington, D.C. 20233.
U.S. Bureau of Census. (2002). Lumber production and mill stocks: 2001. MA24T(2001)-1. Industry Division, Washington, D.C. 20233.
U.S. International Trade Administration. (1983). Final negative countervailing duty determination: certain softwood lumber products from Canada. Federal Register 48(105), 24159–24183. May 31.
U.S. International Trade Administration. (1986). Preliminary countervailing duty determination: certain softwood lumber products from Canada. Federal Register 51(204), 37453–37469. (October 22)
Wear, D. N., & K. J. Lee. (1993). U.S. policy and Canadian lumber: Effects of the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding. Forest Science 39(4), 799–815.
Zusman, P. (1976). The incorporation and measurement of social power in economic models. International Economic Review 17, 447–62.
Zhang, D. (1997). The Political Economy of U.S.–Canada Trade in Softwood Lumber and Newsprint. Working Paper, School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences, Auburn University, Alabama.
Zhang, D. (2001). Welfare impacts of the 1996 U.S.–Canada Softwood Lumber (trade) Agreement. Canadian Journal of Forest Research 31 (November):1958–67.
Zhang, D. (2004). The Softwood Lumber War between U.S. and Canada. Working Paper, School of Forestry and Wildlife Sciences, Auburn University, Alabama.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zhang, D., Laband, D. From Senators to the President: Solve the lumber problem or else. Public Choice 123, 393–410 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7168-z
Accepted:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7168-z