Abstract
Many philosophers think there is a luck problem confronting libertarian models of free will. If free actions are undetermined, then it seems to be a matter of chance or luck that they occur—so the objection goes. Agent-causal libertarians have responded to this objection by asserting that free actions, in their essence, involve a direct causal relation between agents and the events they cause. So, free actions are not lucky after all. Not everyone, however, is convinced by this response. Al Mele and Peter van Inwagen, for instance, argue that luckiness remains even if agent-causation exists. One way to answer their arguments, I suggest, is by appealing to considerations in metaphysical grounding and the associated idea of explanatory priority. Mele’s argument loses force if facts about which possible world is actual are partly grounded in facts about free choices themselves. And van Inwagen’s challenge can be met if facts about free actions are explanatorily prior to any objective probabilities associated with those actions.
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Notes
For present purposes, I will assume a standard view of events according to which events are instantiations of properties at times. See Kim (1976).
I set aside the large debate about whether alternative possibilities are necessary conditions on all free actions. Instead, I accept a weaker thesis, namely, that at least some (but not necessarily all) of an ultimately responsible agent’s free actions have alternative possibilities. On this topic, see Stump (1999) and Kane (1996, pp. 44–59).
Later on, I will raise the question of whether grounding considerations can dissolve luck objections to event-causal libertarian models.
It is important to note that Mele maintains that the type of cross-world luck (which I develop in the next section) intrinsic to agent-causation (and event-causation) is not freedom-undermining. That is to say: he does not frame it as an argument against libertarianism in general (2006, pp. 105–136; 2017, p. 136). I am inclined to think (though not entirely convinced) that the cross-world argument, properly formulated, would in fact undermine freedom. But I set that point aside since my argument is that the cross-world argument fails to demonstrate the presence of luck in the first place.
Mele’s example is adapted from one used by O’Connor (2000, p. 74).
Agent-causal libertarians differ on terminology here: some use “decisions” to refer to the events which agents directly cause; others think of the event, S’s causing E, as the decision itself. For this paper, I adopt the former, but nothing in the argument hinges on this. What is important is that agents directly cause events within the worlds.
Based on Mele’s comments on this topic at a recent conference, I gather my interpretation is closer to what he has in mind.
One might object that Tim does in fact agent-cause the event w1’s being actual or w2’s being actual. This is incorrect, however, except in loose way of speaking. Tim’s agential power consists in being able to bring about events such as his raising his hand, his deciding to get married, and his swinging a bat. These events, in turn, cause other events: e.g. his swinging a bat causes the bat’s hitting the ball which causes the ball’s breaking the window, and so on. Notice, however: nowhere in this causal chain of events does Tim directly or indirectly cause w1’s being actual. The more accurate description is this: the fact that w1 is actual is due to the fact that Tim causes d1 (at t1). I suggest in the following section that the locution, “is due to”, captures an implicit grounding relation. And I argue that casting the argument in terms of grounding relations will allow us to answer Mele’s argument.
Some have employed elements of grounding/explanatory priority in different contexts of the free will debate. See, for example, Beebee and Mele (2002) and Law and Tognazzini (2019) In particular, Tognazzini (2015) has argued persuasively that certain luck problems in the free will literature may profitably be framed in terms of grounding relations.
See Schaffer (2009, p. 375). There is some debate about the relata of the grounding relation. Some think that it holds between facts (Rosen, 2010). Others (e.g. Kim, 1994) argue that it spans various ontological categories For the sake of the essay, I take no hard position on this debate, but I will generally refer to the grounding relation as holding between facts.
In what follows, I remain neutral regarding “unionism”—the view that grounding just is metaphysical explanation. In any case, the arguments will go through even if explanatory relations are merely reliable guides to grounding relations. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
As in Lewis (1986).
The present strategy, as far as I can tell, could also be deployed in favor of event-causal libertarianism. For example, one could propose the following: w1’s being actual depends on Tim’s making decision d1 where “making a decision” is spelled out in the typical event-causal terms. The strategy, however, will not save (nor is it designed to save) the event-causalist from the disappearing agent objection (see footnote 4) whose success I have simply assumed. The disappearing agent objection is a separate, independent argument that relies on different premises and intuitions. For now, therefore, it is entirely consistent for the agent-causalist to maintain (i) that the grounding strategy applies to both agent/event causal models, and (ii) that event-causal libertarianism succumbs to the disappearing agent objection. At best, the present strategy supplies event-causalists with a response (free of charge) to an objection which has not been lodged against them. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for insights here.
So, grounding/ontological dependence helps explain why the modal argument is unsound. From (1).
□ (w1 is actual → Tim will cause d1) and (2) w1 is actual, it does not follow that (3) □ (Tim will cause d1). The conclusion would follow only given □ (w1 is actual). Yet, if w1’s being actual is partly grounded in Tim’s causing d1, then we have reason to think □ (w1 is actual) is false. Mutatis mutandis with respect to the argument against divine foreknowledge below.
For a defense along these lines, see Freddoso (2004, pp. 68–75).
There are other responses to van Inwagen’s argument in the literature. Buchak suggests that (P1) stands in need of additional support because it might be the case that if the universe were rolled back numerous times, the ratio of lies to truth might form a non-convergent series (2013, p. 24). As such, it would be false that the ratio would converge on some value. Additionally, one might dispute (P3) by appealing to the existence of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Counterfactuals of freedom are propositions about what free agents would do if they were placed in a maximally specified circumstance. If there are such counterfactuals, then the following counterfactual might be true: If Alice were in C*, then she would freely decide to tell the truth. If that is true, then no matter how many times God rolls back time to t1 (in which Alice is in C*), Alice will always decide to tell the truth, and she will always do so freely. For a formulation (and rejection) of this solution, see Hartman (2017a). These responses, in my opinion, have some merit but are also vulnerable to important objections.
Van Inwagen (2014) does not himself think that grounding/dependence relations hold between different ontological levels. And I imagine he would object to my procedure of citing instances of grounding relations as a starting point for the discussion. It should be clear, however, that I am not attempting to provide a full defense or exposition of grounding relations. The sorts of examples I cite (e.g. that mental properties are grounded in physical properties) are simply ones often discussed. The reader might take my thesis conditionally: if there are grounding relations between objects/facts, then one can formulate a coherent answer to van Inwagen’s rollback argument.
On the other hand, see O’Connor (2000, pp. 74–76) for a response.
According to John Bishop (1990) “Naturalism does not essentially employ the concept of a causal relation whose first member is in the category of person or agent (or even, for that matter, in the broader category of ‘continuant’ or ‘substance.’) All natural causal relations have first members in the category of events or state of affairs” (p. 40). For a more moderate position while still emphasizing the need of events for naturalistic purposes, see Clarke (2010).
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Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2016 Illinois Philosophical Association and the 2019 American Philosophical Association Eastern Division. I am grateful to the audiences for their helpful comments. In addition, a special thanks goes to Vince Archer, Robert J. Hartman, Daniel Muñoz, and two anonymous reviewers for their excellent feedback and suggestions.
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Archer, J. Grounding and the luck objection to agent-causal libertarianism. Philos Stud 179, 1763–1775 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01728-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01728-8