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Against simplicity

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Abstract

Sometimes metaphysicians appeal to simplicity as a reason to prefer one metaphysical theory to another, especially when a philosophical dispute has otherwise reached a state of equilibrium. In this paper, I show that given a Quinean conception of metaphysics, several initially plausible justifications for simplicity as a metaphysical criterion do not succeed. If philosophers wish to preserve simplicity as a metaphysical criterion, therefore, they must radically reconceive the project of metaphysics.

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Notes

  1. For example, Hirsch argues that all metaphysical disputes are really verbal disputes (2009, 2005). Bennett argues that while metaphysical disputes are substantive, there are nevertheless some debates that have reached a point of equilibrium such that they cannot be resolved on metaphysical grounds; Willard argues that structural features of the practice of metaphysics make it reasonable to believe that all metaphysical disputes are not resolvable (Bennett 2009; Willard 2013).

  2. Thanks to L. A. Paul and Michaela McSweeney for conversations and questions that inspired this paper; Heather Demarest and Jonathan Schaffer for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper; and, Rachael Briggs, Jason Turner, Daniel Korman, Lina Jansson, Ishani Maitra and participants at the 2013 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference for a vigorous and fruitful discussion.

  3. Adapted from Schaffer (2009, 366).

  4. Thanks to Louis deRosset and Michaela McSweeney for pressure on this point.

  5. Huemer (2009, 223–224) discusses a similar (although not a priori) argument, according to which simpler models are more likely to be confirmed or disconfirmed. Suppose that the data to be explained is the wobble in the orbit of Uranus, and we consider the merits of postulating one planet, Neptune, as Leverrier did, over postulating eighty-three planets, which no one did. If we postulate one planet, we can explain the evidence by adjusting the mass and orbit of Neptune; if we postulate eighty-three, we can explain it by adjusting the mass and orbit of all of the postulated planetlets.

    The one-planet theory takes a risk, for it would be refuted by any observations that required more planets. The eighty-three planet theory plays it safe, spreading its possibility over a larger range of possible observations. This means, however, given the actual observations, that the simple theory is more probable.

  6. Though see Huemer (2009) for reasons to think that simplicity is not a driving consideration even in ordinary reasoning.

  7. Thanks to both Heather Demarest and Jonathan Schaffer for encouraging me to consider this possible response.

  8. Thanks to Heather Demarest and Jonathan Schaffer for encouraging me to clarify this point, and to Heather for the apt formulation of the problem with premise (17).

  9. See Della Rocca (2000) for some reasons to think that once one accepts explicability arguments with respect to existence, one must accept the full-blown principle of sufficient reason.

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  1. Weber State University, Ogden, UT, USA

    M. B. Willard

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  1. M. B. Willard
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Willard, M.B. Against simplicity. Philos Stud 167, 165–181 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0228-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0228-1

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