Abstract
This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either (‘3NT’). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them. Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity—a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ and ‘equally good as’. It follows, she argues, that many choice situations in which rationally justified choice seems precluded are in fact situations within the reach of practical reason. This article has three aims: (1) it challenges Chang’s argument for the possibility of parity; (2) it demonstrates that, even if parity would exist, its problematic implications for practical reason would not differ from those of Raz’s incomparability; (3) it discusses the underlying cause of hard cases of comparison: the fact that none of the three standard value relations applies (‘3NT’). It will be shown that the problematic implications for the rational justification of the choice are due to 3NT itself, irrespective of whether 3NT is explained as incomparability or parity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The Small Improvement Argument is based on the small improvement phenomenon: Although A is neither worse nor better than B, a small improvement of A does not make A better than B. This means that A is not equally good as B, because, if this were the case, a small improvement of A would make it better than B. In combination with the fact that A is also neither worse nor better than B, this means that none of the three standard value relations applies. See also Chang (2002, pp. 667–673). Raz (1986, p. 325) calls the small improvement phenomenon the ‘failure of transitivity’.
Chang argues that this is not always the case, because, ‘To paraphrase Aristotle, you can have too much of a good thing.’ See Chang (2001, p. 132).
Chang: ‘To paraphrase Hegel, with enough of a change of one kind, a change of another kind kicks in.’ See Chang (2001, p. 132). In response to a ‘penetrating comment of an anonymous referee’, Chang adds later on (2002) a third condition. See the next section.
‘Uni-directionality’ means that one option is better or worse than the other option in all aspects; so it has the same meaning as ‘Pareto-superior’ respectively Pareto-inferior’. ‘Bi-directionality’ means that one option is better with respect to one aspect while the other option is better with respect to another aspect.
The reason why I maintain the objection mentioned in this section while Chang has adapted her conditions, is that she does not take into account this objection in her book (2001) and that the Mozart/Michelangelo example which Chang adduces to show the possibility of parity (see below) seems vulnerable to the objection of Pareto-inferiority of Talentlessi, a key figure in the supposed demonstration of the comparability of Mozart and Michelangelo with respect to creativity. See the next section and footnote 11.
Probably Chang will not give this but another reply which I shall discuss in the next section. Below it will become clear why it is still relevant to discuss the present reply.
In my dissertation (2007) I show that both ‘incomparabilists’ and ‘comparabilists’ perpetrate this fallacy.
Cf. Williams (1981, p. 77). Williams regards options representing significant differences in amounts of incommensurable values as incomparable, but regards them as comparable if the amount of one value in one option only trivially differs from the amount of the same value in the other option.
Chang, ‘Introduction’ in Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, pp. 14–16.
Chang may reply that ‘very poor’ need not be ‘insignificant’. This reply will be discussed in the next section.
To avoid misunderstandings I want to emphasize that my aim is to challenge Chang’s argument for comparability rather than to defend the incomparability of Mozart and Michelangelo. I think it is perfectly possible to compare Mozart and Michelangelo with respect to their creative talent if there is no significant bi-directionality of relevant contributory values of creativity between the two artists. This is the case if both artists are (roughly) equally good with respect to all contributory values of creativity; or if one of the artists is better with respect to all these contributory values. Genres (painting or composing) need not be different contributory values with respect to creativity. They may be different forms in which the same contributory values are expressed. We do not want to compare Mozart and Michelangelo with respect to their skill in composing or painting but with respect to their creativity. This makes it less relevant that Mozart is a composer (and is better in composing) and Michelangelo a painter (and is better in painting). The Mozart/Michelangelo example would be more relevant for the issue under consideration (comparability of heterogeneous alternatives) if Mozart and Michelangelo (instead of merely differing in genres of creativity) would ‘bi-directionally’ differ in distinct and important contributory values of creativity, for instance originality and technical skill: e.g. if Mozart would have a greater originality and less technical skill than Michelangelo. If there is no bi-directionality there is no need of showing comparability because, in that case, comparability is evident. The absence of explicit bi-directionality between Mozart and Michelangelo makes Chang’s example less adequate than the career example in which the bi-directionality of the contributory values is explicitly shown. Besides, the absence of unambiguous bi-directionality between Mozart and Talentlessi (Talentlessi seems Pareto-inferior to Mozart), makes the relevant nominal-notable test vulnerable to the objection described in Sect. 2.1.
Several theorists regard two not-equally-good options as ‘comparable’ if we can rationally choose only one of them, and as ‘incomparable’ if we can rationally choose either. Cf. Raz (1986, Chap. 13), Parfit (unpublished manuscript, Chap. 2, Sect. 6, ‘Sidgwick’s Dualism’), and Sinnott-Armstrong (1985, pp. 321–329).
See the previous footnote.
To be sure, Chang could say something similar about those who take the position she denies. My aim is not to take sides with the latter thinkers (although I think they are right) or to argue that the onus of proof falls on Chang (although I think that this is the case, because her ambition is to replace a traditional and widely accepted view [the trichotomy-thesis] by a new, controversial and counter-intuitive one [the existence of a distinct fourth positive value relation ‘parity’]). As said in the introduction, the aim of the present article is to challenge Chang’s argument for the possibility of parity, rather than to demonstrate incomparability.
Still another objection against the Difference Principle can be raised, which is analogous to the ‘significance’ objection discussed in the previous section. Notable B may be regarded as better than nominal C, not so much on the basis of a trade-off between the contributory values as on the basis of a highly significant difference between the amounts of one contributory value (pleasant working environment) and a much less significant difference between the amounts of the other contributory value (salary). The latter difference (albeit not insignificant in an absolute sense) may ‘pale into insignificance’ relative to the highly significant former one. The comparison of notable A and notable B, by contrast, cannot be based on such differences in significance. In this case the comparison has to be based on a trade-off between the different amounts of the contributory values, the possibility of which is denied by incomparabilists and has to be demonstrated. Indeed, incomparabilists may recognize the comparability of notable B and nominal C, and simultaneously deny the comparability of notable B and notable A, although only small uni-dimensional differences connect nominal C with notable A. Cf. Joseph Raz’s similar argument that “more of one thing may be better than a certain amount of another, even if less of the first is incommensurate [incomparable] with that amount of the other” (1989, p. 1221, note 145). Donald Regan gives the following example as explanation of this sentence: “… a highly successful life of one kind may be more valuable than a modestly successful life of another kind, even though modestly successful lives of the two kinds might be incommensurable [incomparable]” (1997). Although Raz’s statement differs from the one to which this footnote refers, the point it shows is similar, namely that ‘asymmetry of significances’ (that is, the significance of one difference is dominated by the significance of the other) may imply comparability, while this does not mean that ‘symmetry of significances’ implies comparability, although both situations are connected by a chain of small uni-dimensional differences. Cf. Schaber’s (2004) distinction between asymmetrical and symmetrical reasons.
Commenting on an earlier draft Joshua Gert argues that it may be odd to assert that in cases of equal goodness ‘it does not matter which option is chosen’, because it suggests that ‘mattering is (merely) a matter of difference in (total amount of) value’. But, Gert continues, ‘it could matter a great deal which of two equally valuable things one chooses: not because one would get more value from one than from the other, but simply because of the important differences (in kind) between the items.’ I agree. However, I follow Chang’s definition of ‘equal goodness’, namely ‘the state of being identical with respect to what is relevant to the choice’. In that case we can be indifferent between the options. Chang: ‘If alternatives are equally good, practical reason tells us that it does not matter which alternative is chosen, for the alternatives are, with respect to whatever matters to the choice, exactly the same’ (2001, p. 171). Cf. Broome (1995, p. 7): ‘If [the alternatives] were equally good, you would be indifferent about which was chosen.’ And Raz (1986, pp. 333–334): ‘[Incomparability] is unlike the situation where one course of action is as good as the other. It is indifferent which action we take. They are equally good and equally bad.’ So ‘equal goodness’ is an ambiguous phrase. Option A and B may be ‘equally good’ in the following two senses: (1) A and B are identical with respect to what is relevant to the choice’; (2) A is not better and not worse than B, while A and B are not identical with respect to what is relevant to the choice. (1) and (2) are different phenomena. In order to avoid confusions we shall reserve the term ‘equal goodness’ to (1). Interestingly, a (neutral) name for the value relation mentioned under (2) does not exist. For reasons discussed in Part 3 I call this value relation ‘3NT’. This is the value relation that Chang explains as ‘parity’, but it can be explained in many other ways (see Part 3). Whatever be the right explanation, ‘equal goodness’ in the sense of ‘equal (amount of) value’ seems not to be the correct one, if (as many theorists think) the so-called ‘small improvement phenomenon’ applies (see footnote 1).
Rational irresolvability in the defined sense is similar to Raz’s ‘under-determination of the choice by reason’ (1986, Chap. 13).
In Amartya Sen’s explanation of Buridan’s ass, the donkey died of hunger due to his own irrationality. He was confronted with two roughly equal haystacks and, having no reason to choose one rather than the other, he could not make a choice. But his indecisiveness was ungrounded because he could have rationally chosen either. After all, if options are roughly equally good, it does not matter much which one is chosen. See Sen (2003, pp. 67–68).
Chang: ‘There are three different cases in which choice between either alternative is rationally permissible: when the alternatives are (1) equally good, (2) incomparable, or (3) on a par’ (2005, p. 345). However, two pages later (p. 347) she argues that in the case of incomparability reason (‘rational choice function’) ‘fails to give an answer as to… whether it is rationally permissible to choose either.’ This turn is not entirely transparent and contradicts the above quotation. ‘Rationally permissible’ means ‘permissible from the view point of reason’. It is not easy to understand how something can be ‘permissible from the view point of reason’ and at the same time beyond the reach of reason. If neither option is worse than the other (which is the case if the options are incomparable), either choice is permissible from the view point of reason, as Chang recognizes in the above quotation. In any case, the distinction between two kinds of rational permissibility seems irrelevant with respect to the implications for practical reason. Not only in the case of parity but also in the case of overall incomparability the agent is capable of concluding that (i) option A is better with respect to ‘value V1’ and option B is better with respect to ‘value V2’ (indeed, overall incomparability does not exclude, and usually maintains, comparability with respect to the separate contributory values), and that (ii) neither option is overall worse than the other. Suppose that, after careful considerations, the agent decides to choose A. Because (ii) prevents a rationally impermissible choice in both cases, it is unclear why the considered choice would be ‘not rationally permissible’ if A and B are ‘overall incomparable’ (but still comparable with respect to the separate contributory values), while the same choice, based on the same considerations, would be ‘rationally permissible’ if the options are ‘on a par’.
Joshua Gert argues in a comment on an earlier version of this paper that the phrase ‘rational irresolvability’ may lead to ‘begging the question’. Indeed, Chang will give a different explanation of rational resolvability: for instance ‘the possibility of a rational choice in the presence of a reason RA to choose A instead of B that is not defeated or rendered ineligible by a reason RB to choose B instead of A’. This is true, but this ‘rational resolvability’ is the same as what we mentioned above ‘rational permissibility’ or (in Raz’s terminology) ‘rational eligibility’ which merely requires that the chosen option is not worse than the non-chosen one. This is the case, not only if the options are on a par but also if they are incomparable.
The value-pump means that, in a series of choices, one ends up with less value than one started with. Suppose A is incomparable with B, B is incomparable with A+, and A+ is better than A. If one is faced with a choice between A+ and B, it is rationally permissible to choose either since they are incomparable. Suppose one chooses B. Now suppose that one is offered a choice between B and A. Since they are incomparable, again it is rationally permissible to choose either. Suppose one chooses A. But now one is left with A where before one might have had A+, which is better than A.
See footnote 20.
In a footnote Chang (2005, footnote 18, p. 346) admits this. “But”, she continues, “we can distinguish two sorts of value pump puzzles: those in which the value pump is created by choices delivered by a choice function, and those in which it is created by the failure of a choice function to deliver a correct choice. My focus here is on the puzzle arising when the choice function is not silent.” I wonder whether this distinction between the two sorts of value pump puzzles is correct and relevant. In both cases reason remains silent, under-determines the choice and does not show which option should be chosen. Besides, the theoretical distinction does not change the fact that in both cases either choice is rationally permissible and that in both cases the value-pump problem has to be avoided. So all implications of parity relevant to practical reason are identical to those of Raz’s incomparability.
Personal communication. In a forthcoming article (‘Voluntarist Reasons’) Chang argues as follows (summarized in her personal communication): “When items are on a par, there is a new kind of reason that comes into play—‘personal’ reasons—or ‘will-based reasons’—that have to do with one’s normative identity. When things are on a par, we have rational space to ‘create’ reasons for ourselves through an active attitude involving the will that constitute our normative identities.” Nothing in this formulation differs from what Raz says about the will with respect to a choice between incomparable but rationally eligible options.
Raz (1986, pp. 333–334): ‘Where the considerations for and against two alternatives are incommensurate, reason is indeterminate. It provides no better case for one alternative than for the other. Since it follows that there is no reason to shun one of the alternatives in favour of the other, we are in a sense free to choose which course to follow. That sense of freedom is special, and may be misleading. It is unlike the situation where one course of action is as good as the other. It is indifferent which action we take. They are equally good and equally bad. Incomparability does not ensure equality of merit and demerit. It does not mean indifference. It marks the inability of reason to guide our action, not the insignificance of our choice.’
Raz (1986, Chap. 13) and Morton (1991, Chap. 3) explain 3NT as ‘incomparability’; Parfit (1984, p. 431) explains 3NT as ‘imprecise equality’, Broome as ‘vagueness’ (1999, pp. 123–144), Seung and Bonevac as ‘indeterminacy’ (1992, pp. 799–813), Gert explains 3NT as ‘cases in which the justifying strength of the reasons favoring each option exceeds the requiring strength of the reasons favoring the other’ (2007, pp. 533–562); and I explain it as ‘incomplete comparability’ (2007).
In a similar context John Broome too speaks of a ‘red herring’ (1999, p. 154).
See footnote 27.
Compare Nagel (1979, p. 129): ‘… either choice will mean acting against some reasons without being able to claim that they are outweighed’ (emphasis original).
See also Kornhauser and Sager (2004).
See also D’Agostino (2003, pp. 6–17).
Intransitive orderings may only occur (and even then not necessarily) if more than two alternatives have to be ranked.
References
Boot, M. (2007). Incommensurability, incomplete comparability and the scales of justice. DPhil dissertation, University of Oxford.
Broome, J. (1995). Weighing goods: equality, uncertainty and time. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Broome, J. (1999). Ethics out of economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Broome, J. (2004). Weighing lives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chang, R. (1997). Introduction. In Incommensurability, incomparability and practical reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Chang, R. (2001). Making comparisons count. New York: Routledge.
Chang, R. (2002). The possibility of parity. Ethics, 112, 659–688. doi:10.1086/339673.
Chang, R. (2005). Parity, interval value, and choice. Ethics, 115, 331–350. doi:10.1086/426307.
Chang, R. (forthcoming). Voluntarist reasons. In D. Sobel & S. Wall (Eds.), Practical reason and action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
D’Agostino, F. (2003). Incommensurability and commensuration. The common denominator. Burlington, USA: Ashgate.
Gert, J. (2007). Normative strength and the balance of reasons. The Philosophical Review, 116(4), 533–562. doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-013.
Kornhauser, L. A. (1998). No best answer? University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 146, 1599–1637. doi:10.2307/3312815.
Kornhauser, L. A., & Sager, L. G. (2004). The many as one: Integrity and group choice in paradoxical cases. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32, 249–276.
Morton, A. (1991). Disasters and dilemmas: Strategies for real-life decision making. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Raz, J. (1986). The morality of freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (1989). Facing up: A reply. Southern California Law Review, 62, 1221, n. 145.
Regan, D. (1997). Value, comparability, and choice. In Ruth. Chang (Ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability and practical reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Schaber, P. (2004). Are there insolvable moral conflicts? In P. Baumann & M. Betzler (Eds.), Practical conflicts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sen, A. (2003). On ethics and economics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1985). Moral dilemmas and incomparability. American Philosophical Quarterly, 22, 321–329.
Seung, T. K., & Bonevac, D. (1992). Plural values and indeterminate rankings. Ethics, 102, 799–813. doi:10.1086/293449.
Williams, B. (1981). Moral luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Acknowledgements
The research on which this article is based has been made possible by an award of The Arts and Humanities Research Council. I am grateful to Ruth Chang, G. A. Cohen, Joshua Gert, Martha Nussbaum, Wlodek Rabinowicz and an anonymous reviewer for valuable and detailed comments. During a presentation of an earlier version of this paper at the Choice Group of the London School of Economics I got constructive comments which are incorporated in the definitive version.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Boot, M. Parity, incomparability and rationally justified choice. Philos Stud 146, 75–92 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9245-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9245-x