Abstract
This essay offers a constructive criticism of Part I of Davis’ Meaning, Expression and Thought. After a brief exposition, in Sect. 2, of the main points of the theory that will concern us, I raise a challenge in Sect. 3 for the characterization of expression that is so central to his program. I argue first of all that a sincere expression of a thought, feeling, or mood shows it. Yet attention to this fact reveals that it does not go without saying how it is possible to show such things as thoughts, feelings or moods; we need an account of how this is possible, and I offer a partial such account in Sect. 4. Second, much of the attraction of Davis’ program depends on its ability to explain how linguistic meaning can be arrived at without covertly presupposing linguistic conventions. This in turn depends, in Davis’ hands, upon the claim that it is possible to express any of a wide range of ideas in the absence of conventions. I argue in Sect. 5 that the account of showing at which we will by then have arrived makes clear that Davis needs, and lacks, an explanation of how it is possible to do this.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This reasoning respects Davis’s observation that expressing belief does not require manifesting it. I can only manifest a belief that I have, whereas for Davis I can express, when insincere, beliefs that I lack (45). ‘Show’ is a success verb in just the way that ‘manifest’ is, yet a behavior can be designed to show something without being invariably paired with what it is designed to show. Further, I do not require that all expression involves showing what’s within. Rather I require that the expressive act be of a kind that reliably indicates what’s within. Given that most of us cannot produce tears at will, tears show grief when caused in the right way by grief; however, even when not caused, or not caused in the right way, by grief, they are still the kind of thing that reliably indicates what’s within. (This would not be so in a community of thespians who can produce tears at will.)
I elaborate on this notion of showing-how in Green forthcoming b.
Hawthorne (1990), p. 53.
These themes are pursued at greater length in Green forthcoming a and forthcoming b.
References
Bar-On, D. (2004). Speaking my mind. Oxford.
Davis, W. (1992a). Speaker meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy, 15, 223–253.
Davis, W. (1992b). Cogitative and cognitive speaker meaning. Philosophical Studies, 67, 71–88.
Davis, W. (1998). Implicature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davis, W. (2003). Meaning, expression and thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davis, W. (2004). Nondescriptive meaning and reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Green, M. (2002). Review of W. Davis, Implicature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 241–244.
Green, M. forthcoming a: Self-expression. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Green, M. forthcoming b: ‘Empathy, expression and what artworks have to teach,’ to appear. In G. Hagberg (Ed.), Art and ethical inquiry. Blackwell: Blackwell Publishing.
Griffiths, P. (1997). What emotions really are. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hawthorne, N. (1990). The scarlet letter. In B. Harding (Ed.). Oxford University Press, p. 53.
Saul, J. (2001). Review of implicature: Intention, convention, and principle in the failure of gricean theory by Wayne Davis. Noûs, 35, 630–641.
Sellars, W. (1969). Language as thought and communication. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 29, 506–527.
Wright, C. (1998). Self-knowledge: The Wittgensteinian legacy. In C. MacDonald, B. Smith, & C. Wright (Eds.), Knowing our own minds (pp 13–46). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Green, M.S. Expression, indication and showing what’s within. Philos Stud 137, 389–398 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9127-7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9127-7