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On Ensuring that Physicalism is Not a Dual Attribute Theory In Sheep’s Clothing

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Abstract

Physicalists are committed to the determination without remainder of the psychological by the physical, but are they committed to this determination being a priori? This paper distinguishes this question understood de dicto from this question understood de re, argues that understood de re the answer is yes in a way that leaves open the answer to the question understood de dicto.

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  1. The Australian National University, H C Coombs Building 009, ACT 0200, Canberra, Australia

    Frank Jackson

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  1. Frank Jackson
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Correspondence to Frank Jackson.

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Jackson, F. On Ensuring that Physicalism is Not a Dual Attribute Theory In Sheep’s Clothing. Philos Stud 131, 227–249 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-5989-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-5989-3

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