Notes
This distinction between using someone merely as a means versus harming someone as a means is critically discussed in Parfit [6], chapter 9.
I am thankful to Patrik Baard and Oscar Barrestål for their comments on an earlier draft of this text.
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Bülow, W. Why (at least some) moral vegans may have children: a response to Räsänen. Theor Med Bioeth 44, 411–414 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-023-09632-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-023-09632-4