Skip to main content
Log in

Experiments on strategic choices and markets

  • Published:
Marketing Letters Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Much of experimental research in marketing has focused on individual choices. Yet in many contexts, the outcomes of one’s choices depend on the choices of others. Furthermore, the results obtained in individual decision making context may not be applicable to these strategic choices. In this paper, we discuss three avenues for further advancing our understanding of strategic choices. First, there is a need to develop theories about how people learn to play strategic games. Second, there is an opportunity to enrich standard economic models of strategic behavior by allowing for different types of bounded rationality and by relaxing assumptions about utility formulation. These new models can help us to more accurately predict strategic choices. Finally, future research can improve marketing practice by designing better mechanisms and validating them using experiments.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Abdulkadiroglu, A., & Sonmez, T. (1999). House Allocation with Existing Tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 233–260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amaldoss, W., & Jain, S. (2002). David versus Goliath: An analysis of asymmetric mixed strategy games and experimental evidence. Management Science, 48(8), 972–991.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amaldoss, W., & Jain, S. (2005a). Conspicuous consumption and sophisticated thinking. Management Science, 51(10), 1449–1466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amaldoss, W., & Jain, S. (2005b). Pricing of conspicuous goods: A competitive analysis of social effects. Journal of Marketing Research, 42, 30–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amaldoss, W., & Jain, S. (2007). An analysis of limited edition products. Working Paper. Marketing Department, Duke University.

  • Amaldoss, W., & Jain, S. (2008). Trading up: A strategic analysis of reference group effects. Marketing Science (in press).

  • Anderson, S., Goeree, J., & Holt, C. (2004). Noisy directional learning and the logit equilibrium. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(3), 581–602.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M., & Morgan, J. (2004). Price dispersion in the lab and on the internet: Theory and evidence. RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3), 449–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, G. (1991). A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Price. Journal of Political Economy, 99(5), 1109–1116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Belk, R. (1988). Possessions and the Extended Self. Journal of Consumer Research, 15(2), 139–168.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bolton, G., & Katok, E. (2006). Learning-by-doing in the newsvendor problem: A laboratory investigation of the role of experience and feedback. Working Paper, Penn State University, University Park, PA.

  • Braess, D. (1968). Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung. Unternehmensforschung, 12, 285–268.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bruce, N., Desai, P., & Staelin, R. (2005). Trade promotions of consumer durables. Journal of Marketing Research, 42(1), 54–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cachon, G. P., & Camerer, C. (1996). The sunk cost fallacy, forward induction and behavior in coordination games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, 165–194.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, NJ, USA.

  • Camerer, C., & Ho, T.-H. (1999). Experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games. Econometrica, 67, 837–874.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K. (2002). Sophisticated learning and strategic teaching. Journal of Economic Theory, 104, 137–188.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C. F., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K. (2004). A cognitive hierarchy model of games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 861–898.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cason, T., & Friedman, D. (1997). Price Formation in Single Call Markets Econometrica, 65(2):311-345, March 1997.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charness, G., & Chen, K.-Y. (2002). Minimum advertised price policy rules and retailer behavior: An experiment. Interfaces, 32, 62–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chao, A., & Schor, J. (1998). Empirical Tests of Status Consumption: Evidence from Women’s Cosmetics. Journal of Economic Psychology, 19, 107–131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chen, Y., Iyer, G., & Pazgal, A. (2007). Limited memory and market competition. Working paper, University of California, Berkeley.

  • Chen, K.-Y., Kaya, M., & Ozer, O. (2008). Dual sales channel management with service competition. Manufacturing and Service Operation Management (Special Issue on behavior research) (in press).

  • Chen, Y., & Sonmez, T. (2002). Improving efficiency of on-campus housing: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1669–1689.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cripps, J. D., & Meyer, R. J. (1994). Heuristics and Biases in Timing the Replacement of Durable Products. Journal of Consumer Research, 21(2), 304–318.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Croson, R., & Donohue, K. (2002). Experimental economics and supply chain management. Interfaces, 32, 74–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Desai, P., Koenigsberg, O., & Purohit, D. (2004). Strategic decentralization and channel coordination. Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2(1), 5–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, D. (1991). Evolutionary games in economics. Econometrica, 59(3), 637–666.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gale, D., & Shapley, L. (1962). College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. American Mathematics Monthy, 69, 9–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grosskopf, B. (2003). Reinforcement and directional learning in the ultimatum game with responder competition. Experimental Economics, 6, 141–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ho, T.-H., Camerer, C., & Chong, J.-K. (2007). Self-tuning experience-weighted attraction learning in games. Journal of Economic Theory, 133(1), 177–198.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ho, T.-H., Lim, N., & Camerer C. F. (2006). Modeling the Psychology of Consumer and Firm Behavior with Behavioral Economics. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(3), 307–331.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ho, T.-H., & Zhang, J.-J. (2008). Designing price contracts for boundedly rational customers: Does the framing of the fixed fee matter? Management Science (in press).

  • Huck, S., Normann, H.-T., & Oechssler, J. (1999). Learning in cournot-oligopoly—An experiment. Economic Journal, 109(454), C80–C95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Iyer, G., & Kuksov, D. (2007). Consumer feelings and equilibrium product quality. Working paper, University of California, Berkeley.

  • Jones, S. (1984). Economics of Conformism. Oxford: Blackwell.

  • Kagel, J., & Levin, D. (1999). Common value auctions with insider information. Econometrica, 67(5), 1219–1238.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kalra, A., & Shi, M. (2001). Designing optimal sales contests: A theoretical perspective. Marketing Science, 20(2), 170–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Katok, E., & Wu, D. (2006). Contracting in supply chains: A laboratory investigation. Working Paper, Penn State University, University Park, PA.

  • Krishna, A., & Wang, Y. (2007). The relationship between top trading cycle and top trading cycle and chains mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 132(1), 539–547.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krishna, A., & Unver, U. (2008). Efficiency enhanced course bidding: Evidence from a field experiment at the University of Michigan Business School. Marketing Science (in press).

  • Krishnamurthy, S., Bottom, W., & Rao, A. (2003). Adaptive Aspirations and Contributions to a Public Good: Generic Advertising as a Response to Decline. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 92, 22–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841–864.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lim, N., Ahearne, M. J., & Ham, S. H. (2007). Designing sales contests: Does the prize structure matter? Working paper, Department of Marketing, University of Houston.

  • Mitzkewitz, M., & Nagel, R. (1993). Experimental results on ultimatum games with incomplete information. International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171–198.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, J., Orzen, H., & Sefton, M. (2007). Network architecture and traffic flows. Working Paper, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.

  • McKelvey, R., & Palfrey, T. (1995). Quantal response equilibrium for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 6–38.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study. American Economic Review, 85, 1313–1326.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, R., & Tang, F. F. (1998). Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: An investigation on learning. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 356–384.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, R., & Vriend, N. (1999). An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 9, 27–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neugebauer, T., & Selten, R. (2006). Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets. Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 183–204.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Oprea, R., Friedman, D., & Anderson, S. (2007). Learning to wait: A laboratory investigation. mimeo.

  • Oza, S., & Srivastava, J. (2007). Generic advertising campaigns: Effect of market trends and solicitation appeals on voluntary contributions. Working Paper, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, MD.

  • Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, L., Bierbrauer, G., & Hoffman, S. (1975). The Role of Attribution Processes in Conformity and Dissent: Revisiting the Asch Situation. American Psychologist, 31, 148–157.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A., & Erev, I. (1995). Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and Economic Behavior, 8, 164–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. E., & Peranson, E. (1997). The effects of change in the NRMP matching algorithm. Journal of the American Medical Association, 278, 729–732.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., & Utku Unver, M. (2004). Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 457–488.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schweitzer, M. E., & Cachon, G. (2000). Decision bias in the newsvendor problem with a known demand distribution: Experimental evidence. Management Science, 46, 404–442.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R., Abbink, K., & Cox, R. (2005). Learning direction theory and the winner’s curse. Experimental Economics, 8(1), 5–20.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R., & Buchta, J. (1998). Experimental sealed bid first price auction with directly observed bid functions. In D. Budescu, I. Erev, & R. Zwick (Eds.), Games and human behavior, essays in honor of Amnon Rapoport. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

    Google Scholar 

  • Selten, R., & Stoecker, R. (1986). End behavior in sequences of finite prisoner’s dilemma supergames: A learning theory approach. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7(1), 47–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1992). Choice in context: Tradeoff contrast and extremeness aversion. Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 281–295.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sönmez, T., & Utku Ünver, M. (2005). Course bidding at business schools. Boston College Working Papers in Economics, no 618.

  • Sterman, J. (1989). Modeling managerial behavior: Misperceptions of feedback in a dynamic decision making experiment. Management Science, 35, 321–339.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wang, Y., & Krishna, A. (2006). Time-share allocations: Theory and experiment. Management Science, 52(8), 1223–1238.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weibull, J. (1995). Evolutionary game theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Wilfred Amaldoss.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Amaldoss, W., Ho, TH., Krishna, A. et al. Experiments on strategic choices and markets. Mark Lett 19, 417–429 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-008-9040-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-008-9040-7

Keywords

Navigation