Abstract
According to the standard opinions in the literature, blocking the unacceptable consequences of the notorious slingshot argument requires imposing constraints on the metaphysics of facts or on theories of definite descriptions (or class abstracts). This paper argues that both of these well-known strategies to rebut the slingshot overshoot the mark. The slingshot, first and foremost, raises the question as to the adequate logical formalization of statements about facts, i.e. of factual contexts. It will be shown that a rigorous application of Quine’s maxim of shallow analysis to formalizations of factual contexts paves the way for an account of formalizing such contexts which blocks the slingshot without ramifications for theories of facts or definite descriptions.
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Baumgartner, M. Shallow Analysis and the Slingshot Argument. J Philos Logic 39, 531–556 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9131-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-010-9131-9