Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Between market forces and knowledge based motives: the governance of defence innovation in the UK

  • Published:
The Journal of Technology Transfer Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The purpose of this contribution is to examine the evolutionary transformations that have characterised the UK defence innovation system since the mid 1980s. It focuses on the central and challenging issue faced by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in implementing effective governance mechanisms emerging from the continuous trade-off between short-term market driven measures motivated by efficiency arguments, and more long term and relational considerations in terms of knowledge economics. Furthermore, in terms of technology transfer, this evolution has been accompanied by a gradual shift from an initial logic of spin-off to society expected from government driven military projects, to a logic of spin-in where the main concern of the military sector is to broaden its industrial and R&D base.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The National Audit Office is a Government independent institution whose role is to audit the financial statements of all government departments and agencies. Its aim is to promote the proper conduct of public business and beneficial change in the provision of public services.

  2. Military off the shelf (MOTS) refers to products and services already developed by a commercial entity for use in military equipment. The motivation for using MOTS components is that they reduce overall development time and costs because the components can be purchased from external sources instead of being developed from scratch. A MOTS strategy can however have an ambivalent impact: overall cost and development time can definitely be reduced, but often at the cost of an increase in component integration work and a dependancy on external suppliers.

  3. Through Life Management, a cornerstone of the Smart Procurement Process refers to the integrated management of the life-cycle of military capability or equipment, from identification of the need to its disposal.

  4. Incremental Acquisition is defined as a procurement strategy which aims to adopt a progressive building up of a required capability or equipment, thereby reducing the risk inherent in introducing large one step improvements and allowing systems to incorporate evolving technology as it becomes available.

  5. As underlined by the NAO (2001) “This principle states that the basis of non-competitive pricing should be one of Equality of Information between contractors up to the time of price fixing. The phrase Equality of Information has no precise definition. It is presumed that each party divulges information that is relevant to the agreement of a fair and reasonable price so that, when final judgment on pricing takes place, both parties are in the same position as each other”.

  6. Towers of Excellence are key partnering projects for directing resources into priority areas of technology research identified by the Ministry of Defence and UK defence industry. The ToE model aims to develop world class defence technology capabilities in selected areas through co-operation between organisations and facilitate technology transfer between MOD’s research programme and industry.

References

  • Adler, P. S. (2001). Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge economy and the future of capitalism. Organization Science, 12(2), 215–234. doi:10.1287/orsc.12.2.215.10117.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amesse, F., & Cohendet, P. (2001). Technology transfer revisited from the perspective of the knowledge-based economy. Research Policy, 30(9), 1459–1478. doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(01)00162-7.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amin, A., & Cohendet, P. (Eds.). (2004). Architectures of knowledge: Firms, capabilities and knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Conner, K. R., & Prahalad, C. K. (1996). A resource-based theory of the firm: Knowledge versus opportunism. Organization Science, 7(5), 477–501. doi:10.1287/orsc.7.5.477.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Fraja, G., & Hartley, K. (1996). Defence procurement: Theory and UK policy. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 12(4), 70–88. doi:10.1093/oxrep/12.4.70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660–679. doi:10.2307/259056.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • House of Commons. (1999). Defence research. Ninth report of the select committee on defence, session 1998–1999: 10 NovHC616. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • House of Commons. (2000). The future of DERA. Ninth report of the select committee on defence, session 1999–2000: 20 Jun HC462. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • House of Commons. (2003a). Defence procurement. Eighth report of the select committee on defence, session 2002–2003: 23 July HC694. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • House of Commons. (2003b). Developments with QinetiQ minutes of evidence, Tuesday 21 January 2003. Session 2002–2003: 9 April 2003, HC322-i. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kogut, B. (2000). The network as knowledge: Generative rules and the emergence of structure. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 405–425. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(200003)21:3<405::AID-SMJ103>3.0.CO;2-5.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of technology. Organization Science, 3(3), 383–397. doi:10.1287/orsc.3.3.383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Langlois, R. N., & Foss, N. J. (1999). Capabilities and governance: The rebirth of production in the theory of economic organization. Kyklos, 59(2), 201–218. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1999.tb01442.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leonard-Barton, D. (1995). Wellsprings of knowledge. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Defence. (1998a). Strategic defence review. White paper: 8 July 1998. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Defence. (1998b). Partnering arrangements between the MOD and its suppliers. Ministry of Defence/Confederation of British Industry London. Retrieved July 31, 2006, from http://www.ams.mod.uk/ams/content/docs/toolkit/gateway/guidance/linkdocs/partner/section1.htm#1.

  • Ministry of Defence. (1998c). Defence diversification: Getting the most out of defence technology. Proposals for a defence diversification agency. Green paper: 5 March 1998. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Defence. (2001a). Policy paper no. 4: Defence acquisition: December 2001. London: Ministry of Defence.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Defence. (2001b). Defence science and innovation strategy. Retrieved July 31, 2006, from http://192.5.30.131/issues/science_innovation/index.htm.

  • Ministry of Defence. (2001c). The future of the defence diversification agency: A consultative document: Feb 2001. London: Ministry of Defence.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Defence. (2002a). Policy paper no. 5: Defence industrial strategy: October 2002. London: Ministry of Defence.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Defence. (2002b). Smarter partnering: Additional practical guidance about partnering arrangements between MoD and its suppliers, a document produced by MoD and industry. London: Ministry of Defence.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ministry of Defence. (2005). Defence industrial strategy: Defence white paper: 15 Dec 2005. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mollas-Gallart, J., & Sinclair, T. (1999). From technology generation to technology transfer: The concept and reality of the dual-use technology centres. Technovation, 19(11), 661–671. doi:10.1016/S0166-4972(99)00063-2.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mollas-Gallart, J., James, A., & Rigby, J. (2000). National case study of civil-military interface: The UK’s defence evaluation and research agency––in search of a successful model of technology transfer. Report to the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences.

  • National Audit Office. (1997). The defence evaluation and research agency: Review of performance, HC 411, session 1997–1998. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • National Audit Office. (2001). Non-competitive procurement in the ministry of defence, HC 290, session 2001–2002. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • National Audit Office. (2002). Implementation of integrated project teams, HC 671, session 2001–2002. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • National Audit Office. (2003). Through life management, report by the comptroller and auditor general, HC 698, session 2002–2003). London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • National Audit Office. (2004). The management of defence research and technology. Report by the comptroller and auditor general, HC 630, session 2003–2004. London: The Stationery Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nooteboom, B. (1999). Innovation and inter-firm linkages: New implications for policy. Research Policy, 28(8), 793–805. doi:10.1016/S0048-7333(99)00022-0.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nooteboom, B. (2000). Learning by interaction: Absorptive capacity, cognitive distance and governance. Journal of Management and Governance, 4, 69–92. doi:10.1023/A:1009941416749.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the corporation. Harvard Business Review, 68, 81–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Spinardi, G. (1992). Defence technology enterprises. Science & Public Policy, 19(4), 198–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

This contribution is based on a study carried out by the BETA (Bureau d’Économie Théorique et Appliquée), a research laboratory of the University Louis Pasteur of Strasbourg, for the Observatoire Economique de la Défense (OED). The authors thank Dr Lucy Stojak for her help in polishing the text.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Bureau d’Économie Théorique et Appliquée, Université Louis Pasteur, 61 avenue de la Forêt Noire, 67000, Strasbourg, France

    Arman Avadikyan & Patrick Cohendet

  2. École des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC), 3000 chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montreal, QC, H3T 2A7, Canada

    Patrick Cohendet

Authors
  1. Arman Avadikyan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Patrick Cohendet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Arman Avadikyan.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Avadikyan, A., Cohendet, P. Between market forces and knowledge based motives: the governance of defence innovation in the UK. J Technol Transf 34, 490–504 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-008-9102-2

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-008-9102-2

Keywords

JEL Classification

Search

Navigation