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A Defense Of A Unificationist Theory Of Explanation

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Abstract

This paper defends a unificationist theory of explanation. I first explore the notion of understanding entrenched by the unificationist. Then I present an overview of various kinds of causal statements and explanations. It is claimed that only genuine causal law statements have explanatory power. Finally, I attempt to fit causal explanations into the unificationist theory of explanation. In this way, I try to provide an account of how causal explanations provide understanding of the phenomena that they explain.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Lund University Kungshuset, Lundagård, SE-222 22, Lund, Sweden

    Rebecca Schweder

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  1. Rebecca Schweder
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Correspondence to Rebecca Schweder.

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Schweder, R. A Defense Of A Unificationist Theory Of Explanation. Found Sci 10, 421–435 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-004-5250-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-004-5250-5

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