Abstract
Many philosophers have attempted to provide a solution to the paradox of fiction, a triad of sentences that lead to the conclusion that genuine emotional responses to fiction are irrational. We suggest that disagreement over the best response to this paradox stems directly from the formulation of the paradox itself. Our main goal is to show that there is an ambiguity regarding the word ‘exist’ throughout the premises of the paradox. To reveal this ambiguity, we display the diverse existential commitments of several leading theories of emotion, and argue that none of the theories we consider are committed to notions of ‘exist’ employed by the paradox. We conclude that it is unclear whether or not there remains a paradox of fiction to be solved—rather than to be argued for—once this ambiguity is addressed.
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Notes
For more on motivation and the role of behavioral circumscription in theories of belief see Rose et al. (under review) as well as Tullmann (in prep), Buckwalter et al. (2013) and Buckwalter and Turri (under review).
Throughout the remainder of the paper we use ‘non-cognitivism’ to label those theories that reject cognitive content strictly as a necessary condition of emotion. We note however that Prinz and Robinson do allow for emotions that are evaluative and intentional—and are sometimes thought of as ‘cognitive’ on this basis.
For instance many allege that thought-based theories are overly cognitive theories of emotion, while others argue that neo-Jamesian accounts are not cognitive enough (see Turvey 1997).
To be clear, we remain theory-neutral on the “reality” of fictional entities and reference to them, except insofar as they relate to objects of emotions.
Interestingly, it is this kind of theory that the paradox of fiction was traditionally construed to address—emotions are caused or constituted by beliefs. See also footnote 2.
This terminology is based on Prinz’s characterizations of theories of emotions in Gut Reactions (2004a).
Many non-cognitivist theorists maintain that the associated bodily changes need not be conscious. See Prinz 2004a.
Of course, the question of perceiving fictions becomes a bit more difficult when talking about multiple genres, and for instance, if experiencing literature counts as direct perception (Goldie 100). We think that a case can be made that imagining an emotion-proper property of an object in such cases is reasonable, though will postpone this argument for another occasion.
Note that neither Walton nor Nussbaum discuss the possibility of unconscious emotions. Perhaps we can have an unconscious belief about a fictional character that triggers an emotion. This, however, seems to go against the spirit of the pure-cognitive project.
On this view one might also wonder about the status of abstract systems, mathematical and logical entities that sometimes evoke emotional responses—we find them beautiful.
We also retain the option of simply denying that belief theorists must be committed to Walton’s notion of motivation.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this point.
For helpful feedback and discussion we thank Berit Brogaard, Noël Carroll, Jesse Prinz, Andy Specht and John Turri.
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Tullmann, K., Buckwalter, W. Does the Paradox of Fiction Exist?. Erkenn 79, 779–796 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9563-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9563-z